

STAT

Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010006-8

Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010006-8



FOREIGN PRESS DIGEST

Translations From "Voyennaya Mysl"

NUMBER 10 - OCTOBER 1971

STAT

RECEIVED
FBI
AGENCY FILE #
30378-3120

11 February 1974
FPD 0008/74

224998/1

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOREIGN PRESS DIGEST NO. 0008 -- 11 February 1974

TRANSLATIONS FROM "VOYENNAYA MYSL'," NO. 10, OCTOBER 1971

Issue No. 10, October 1971 was signed to press on 21 September 1971.

CONTENTS

The Ideological Training of Officers -- to the Level of Requirements of the 24th CPS Congress (3-11)	1
Military Questions in the History of the CPSU (12-22) Maj Gen V. Matsulenکو	13
Strictest Observance of Socialist Law -- a Major Condition for the Further Strengthening of One-Man Command and Enhancing Military Discipline (23-31) Lt Gen of Justice A. Polev	25
Correlation of Forces and Rate of Advance (32-39) Col A. Gaponov	37
Sea and Ocean Communications and Warfare on Them (40-48) Capt 1st Rank B. Balev	47
Employment of Helicopters in the Combat Operations of Ground Forces (49-58) Col I. Andrukhov	58
Questions on the Methods of Organizing Combat Operations (59-64) Col A. Serov, Col Ye. Sokolov, Col B. Trusevich and Col N. Kil'yachenkov	70
The Development of Military-Economic Science (65-70) Col M. Gladkov	78
The Distortion by Maoists of Leninist Ideas of the Defense of Socialism (71-83) Col V. Zubarev	87
America Under Arms (Book Review) (84-92)	104
Meeting with Readers and Authors (93-96)	116

THE IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING OF OFFICERS --
TO THE LEVEL OF REQUIREMENTS OF THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS

It was noted at the 24th CPSU Congress that the central task of ideological work by party organizations consists in forming a Marxist-Leninist world outlook and a high level of ideological and political qualities and norms of communist morality among the workers. Its most important aspect is that of nurturing a communist attitude toward labor and public property, the development of creative activity on the part of the workers, and a strengthening of discipline and organization based on awareness. The congress pointed out the necessity of continuing to nurture among the Soviet people a feeling of pride for their motherland, for their people, and for their country's great accomplishments, and a feeling of respect for the worthy pages of their nation's past. It was emphasized that the development of Soviet patriotism is inseparably connected with the development of socialist internationalism and a readiness to defend the achievements of socialism on the part of the Soviet people.

The new image of Soviet man and his communist morality and world outlook are being confirmed in the constant and uncompromising struggle with relics of the past and with the harmful influence of bourgeois ideology. The Resolution of the 24th Congress on the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee states: "the main aspect of ideological work by the party consists in spreading the concept of Marxism-Leninism and in an uncompromising, aggressive struggle against bourgeois and revisionist ideology."

In defining the main directions and concrete tasks of ideological work, the supreme forum of the CPSU resolved first of all to "direct increased attention toward the Marxist-Leninist molding of communists and the education of cadres on the basis of a profound mastery of Marxism-Leninism and attitudes toward basic contemporary problems, as worked out by the party." In developing Leninist principles of selecting, distributing, and educating cadres, the congress emphasizes that the CPSU considers it to be of primary importance that all sections of party, government, administrative, cultural-ideological and social work be headed by politically mature and capable organizers who have a good knowledge of their work.

It goes without saying that this applies wholly and completely to personnel of the armed forces. Military affairs are developing rapidly under modern conditions. To a certain degree one finds focused in military matters the achievements of the most advanced scientific and technical thought and of the natural and social sciences. The new problems involved in the administration, training, and indoctrination of personnel are being solved, ensuring the necessary combat readiness of the troops. The officer corps has undergone qualitative changes and the demands on its moral-political and combat qualities have increased.

In connection with this the matter of further improving the political maturity, ideological strength and Marxist-Leninist training of army and naval officers is becoming more important. Without a profound knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and decisions of the CPSU an officer, or any military leader, no matter what position he occupies, inevitably loses the qualities of a bearer of communist ideals and an educator of the military masses. He is turned into a mere administrator or a simple technical worker, which is a contradiction to the fundamental principles of Soviet military organizational development. The Marxist-Leninist theory arms military personnel with a knowledge of the objective laws of the development of nature and society, the building of communism and its armed defense. It makes it possible for our officers to solve problems on a scientific basis, to foresee events, and to operate from a long-range position.

Improving the System of Marxist-Leninist Training

The ideological tempering of officers is a multifaceted process. Its greatest significance lies in the system of Marxist-Leninist training which has developed in the armed forces. Its basis consists of firmly defined training plans, programs and aids and the necessary academic base; tried and tested principles of the organization of groups and the designation of their leaders, and of the forms and methods of conducting classes; constant and effective leadership, supervision of and assistance to the officers in improving their Marxist-Leninist education.

In preparing for the hundredth anniversary of the birth of V. I. Lenin and for the 24th CPSU Congress military councils and directorates of armed forces branches, districts, fleets and groups of forces, and commanders, political organs and party organizations considerably intensified their work in the area of the ideological tempering of officer personnel. In the Central Asian Military District, for example, during the period prior to the congress the military council specially discussed the matter of measures for further improvement of the ideological and theoretical indoctrination of leading personnel and the entire officer corps. This matter was also introduced at a meeting of party activists. It was discussed in party activists of combined units and in many staff party organizations, as well as at assemblies conducted by the political directorate for secretaries of unit party committees, secretaries of party commissions, party organizational workers of political organs, secretaries of staff party organizations, as well as for propagandists of units and combined units.

It is characteristic that the level of ideological and theoretical training primarily of leading personnel has improved in the army and navy. Instructive in this regard is the example of the political directorate and the political section of the Main Staff of the Navy, which conducted a theoretical conference on the subject, "The Guiding Role of the CPSU in

the Development of Communism and in Strengthening the Country's Defensive Capabilities." A report was delivered by Admiral V. M. Grishanov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Navy. Other speakers at the conference were Admiral G. M. Yegorov, deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy, Engineer-Admiral P. G. Kotov, Engineer-Vice-Admiral V. G. Novikov, Vice-Admiral S. I. Averchuk, chief of the political section of the Main Staff of the Navy, and others. Following the conference its participants conducted theoretical seminars and talks on the same theme with officers in the directorates and sections.

Reports and papers are prepared by officers and generals within the system of Marxist-Leninist training among the missile forces as well as among all the other branches of armed forces. Supervisory personnel discussed such urgent problems as: "V. I. Lenin on the Defense of the Socialist Homeland and the Principles of Military Organizational Development," "V. I. Lenin on Communist Indoctrination of the Soviet People and Servicemen in the Army and Navy," "V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the New Type of Military Personnel."

Marxist-Leninist training of other categories of officers is also being improved. This has been facilitated to a great degree by the singling out of groups of young officers which has occurred in recent years and the organization of a system for training political workers. Mandatory checks on groups for the Marxist-Leninist training of officers during troop inspections are very important. As a result of these and other measures the responsibility of officer personnel for their Marxist-Leninist education has increased.

The very content of Marxist-Leninist training of all categories of officers has improved. At the present time study plans and the long-range planning of ideological and theoretical training of officers initiated in the military service are making it possible for officers to study more systematically all of the integral parts of revolutionary theory, including its military aspects, the party activities directed toward the armed defense of the socialist homeland, and the fundamental issues of CPSU theory and policy under modern conditions.

The most important thing which has been achieved in the content of ideological and political training of officers is their extensive familiarization with the Leninist theoretical heritage, including the military heritage. During the 1969-1971 period almost all of the officers, generals and admirals enrolled in the system of Marxist-Leninist training studied the fundamental works of V. I. Lenin -- Chto Delat'? (What Is to Be Done?), Materializm i Empiriokrititsizm (Materialism and Empirio-criticism), Imperializm, Kak Vysshaya Stadiya Kapitalizma (Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism), Gosudarstvo i Revolyutsiya (The State

and Revolution), Detskaya Bolezn' 'Levizny' v Kommunizme (Left-Wing Communism, An Infantile Disease), and others.

Independent studies by military personnel of the classical works of Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of the CPSU have noticeably improved. There are now many combined units among the forces in which every third or even every second officer has the complete or three-volume collection of works by V. I. Lenin in his personal library.

The evening universities of Marxism-Leninism are playing an ever greater role in the ideological and theoretical training of officers. These make it possible to fulfill one's service duties and at the same time obtain a higher political education within the system of party studies. The number of students at the evening universities increased by 50 percent between the 23d and 24th party congresses. There was a 150 percent increase in the general departments and a 200 percent increase in the departments of party-political work.

At the present time the system of Marxist-Leninist training is being more actively supplemented by other forms of ideological tempering of officer personnel. Leninist readings have become a practice in many districts. Lectures by officers, including lectures on military pedagogics and psychology, are popular. Extensive use is also made of political information for officer personnel. The network of non-organic offices for the political self-education of officers has been expanded. All of this is having a positive effect on the ideological growth of military personnel and on increasing their political maturity and personal responsibility for their assigned work.

It can be seen, however, that certain aspects of the organization of ideological and theoretical training of officer personnel require closer attention on the part of commanders, political organs, and party organizations. First of all, it is important to thoroughly overcome such shortcomings as elements of formalism and an indifferent attitude on the part of certain officers toward the improvement of their ideological level. In some cases they violate the principle of systematic study by officers of the integral parts of revolutionary theory, they strive for quantity to the detriment of quality in their undertakings, and tolerate a pedantic, dogmatic method whereby the stress is placed not so much on mastery of the methodology of Leninism as on the simple memorization of a certain number of facts and theoretical theses. In a number of cases the necessary supervision over the officers' studies is lacking and inadequate assistance is available to them for their mastery of Marxism-Leninism. One still encounters individual officers who are showing unsatisfactory improvement in the ideological respect and who are not able to apply the knowledge which they have obtained in their own practical work. Party organizations

are not always demanding enough of the communists with respect to performance of their primary service duty.

The decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress emphasized the fact that it is essential to further improve the political training of personnel and the system of party education and to decisively overcome all elements of formalism in this work. "In order to keep up with the pace of life," it is stated in the Resolution of the 24th Party Congress on the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee, "all of our personnel must constantly study, improve their ideological and theoretical level, and master the achievements of science and advanced practice."

Fulfillment of these requirements is obligatory for all commanders, political organs and party organizations of the army and navy.

In organizing this work it is important to consider more thoroughly the modern advances in military affairs, service experience, the level of theoretical training of officer personnel, their qualitative changes and the tasks which they are carrying out. As the minister of defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, pointed out in his speech at the 24th CPSU Congress, more than 45 percent of the officers' positions in the army and navy are currently occupied by engineers and technicians and more than 65 percent of the officers on the regimental level are less than 30 years old. All of this requires a differentiated approach to the solution of problems connected with further improvement of the ideological tempering of officer personnel.

The urgent necessity to further improve Marxist-Leninist training, primarily of the supervisory military personnel, is dictated by life itself. It would be expedient to consolidate and disseminate throughout all districts, groups of forces and fleets the proven practice of creating in the appropriate political organs special groups for the Marxist-Leninist training of all echelons of supervisory personnel, from top to bottom, with consideration given to the organization of commander's training for them. The practice of organizing theoretical seminars within the system of Marxist-Leninist training, the sessions of which are conducted on the basis of an established curriculum with consideration given to the sphere of work of the officers, generals and admirals, deserves to be expanded within the central directorates, scientific research establishments and military training institutions.

The political training of young officers requires a great deal of attention in the units, on the ships, and in the combined units. It must completely facilitate their fastest possible development and the formation in them of the necessary command, moral-political and combat qualities. The necessity is also arising for separating political workers on the company level into individual groups for Marxist-Leninist training and for conducting classes

for them according to a special study plan, ensuring the maximum degree of their ideological growth.

Improvement of the system of Marxist-Leninist training of officers presupposes more precise planning and the establishment, where possible, of permanent days and hours for the classes in order that the officer personnel know about them in advance. It is also required that greater concern be demonstrated for the creation of classrooms sufficiently equipped with visual aids. It is important to raise the level of organization of lectures and seminars and to improve control over attendance. It is necessary to increase the responsibility of commanders, political organs, and the entire staff of officers in carrying out these and other tasks.

The Most Important Thing Is to Thoroughly Study Leninism and the Documents of the 24th CPSU Congress

A mastery of Leninism and a good understanding of the decisions of the CPSU and its policy with respect to all aspects of the development of a new society and the armed defense of the achievements of socialism represent the core of a Marxist-Leninist education of military personnel. "Leninism, an eternally vital and developing doctrine, has been, is, and will continue to be at the center of the ideological life of the party and the basis of its entire revolutionary-transformational work. Turning to the ideological legacy of V. I. Lenin, the party regards its most important task to be that of finding a solution to the urgent problems of communist construction on the basis of Leninist thought and Leninist methodology."¹

It follows from the decisions of the 24th Congress that officer personnel are obligated to master Leninism as a method for analyzing the reality of life, to study according to Lenin, to evaluate current events from class and party positions, and to conduct a decisive battle against bourgeois and revisionist ideology. The primary task of officer personnel consists in their finding in Leninist methodology the key to correct understanding of current qualitative changes in military affairs themselves. Only on this basis is it possible to clarify the essence of modern military theory and practice, to see the outlook for their further development, and to creatively resolve concrete matters involved in the training and educating of the troops, which is especially important under conditions of the military-technical revolution.

The fulfillment of this task presupposes a profound understanding of the essence of Leninist ideas by each officer. We must everywhere ensure that officers study Leninism as a single system of scientific knowledge, theory and practice in the struggle for communism; we must help them to master scientific methods of analyzing social phenomena and develop in them the

ability to creatively apply theory for purposes of solving contemporary problems connected with Soviet military organizational development and those involved in increasing the combat readiness of the forces.

The ideas of V. I. Lenin have been developed in documents of the CPSU. The historical decisions of the 24th Congress represent the living embodiment of Leninism. The Accountability Report of the Party Central Committee, the Resolution, the Directives on the Five-Year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the USSR for the 1971-1975 Period, and other materials of the congress provide profound theoretical deductions concerning contemporary problems of communist construction, the foreign policy activities of the party, the armed defense of the achievements of socialism, and the communist education of the Soviet people and servicemen of the army and navy. That is why a thorough study of the documents of the 24th Party Congress occupies a central position in the system of Marxist-Leninist education of party and administrative, as well as military, personnel. It is for this very purpose that the special study plan "Urgent Problems of Marxist-Leninist Theory and the Policy of the CPSU in Light of Decisions of the 24th Party Congress" is being introduced. This plan is recommended for study primarily by supervisory officer personnel, political workers on the regimental level, and officers of political organs. In accordance with the decisions of the 24th Congress other study plans for Marxist-Leninist training of officer personnel have also been refined.

In the process of studying the materials of the congress it is important first of all to reveal more clearly the growing role of the party in communist construction and in strengthening the military might of the Soviet nation, the laws governing its development, and the increased influence of the CPSU as the leading revolutionary force of modern times. For this purpose it is useful to utilize all of the rich materials of the 24th Congress, including speeches by representatives of the fraternal communist, workers', and leftist socialist parties, who emphasized the fact that they view the CPSU as the vanguard in the struggle for socialism, that one's attitude toward the CPSU is the criterion for loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism, and that anti-Sovietism is a crime against the workers of all nations.

The process of Marxist-Leninist training of officers requires a more thorough demonstration of the essence of the economic policy of the party as worked out by the congress and its concern for Soviet man and for improving his standard of living and cultural level. It requires a more substantial explanation of the fact that successful fulfillment of the new five-year plan is helping to strengthen the defensive might of our motherland, and requires that the magnitude of the advances made by the Soviet people in the building of communism be revealed.

The congress worked out a clear-cut program of social action for the CPSU. The social policy of the party is directed toward strengthening the moral and political unity of the Soviet people; toward bringing together all classes and social groups of the city and village, those engaged in both mental and physical labor. It is directed toward the development of nations, national relations, and socialist democracy, toward strengthening the Soviet state and law and order, and toward increasing the role of public organizations and all Soviet citizens in fulfilling tasks involved in the building of communism. All of these processes have a direct effect on the organizational development of the Soviet Army and Navy and the mechanism of this influence must be clear to each officer who is expected to develop a high level of moral-political and combat qualities among the personnel.

The building of communism in our nation is being effected in a complex international situation. The congress outlined a scientifically substantiated foreign policy line meeting the vital interests of all of the world's progressive forces. Considering the aggressive aspirations of the imperialists, primarily of the United States and its accomplices, the CPSU considers it essential to continue strengthening the defensive might of our Soviet country and its valiant armed forces. Everything which has been created by the people must be reliably defended. This requirement by the congress is the basis for all of the activities of officers of the army and navy.

As borne out by the facts officer personnel as a whole are studying the documents of the congress with great application in the districts and the fleets. The officers are actively discussing the questions posed and are deriving practical deductions for their own work. During the course of a check in the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet and the Baltic Military District, as well as in a number of other places, it was apparent that not all of the students demonstrate a profound knowledge of the decisions of the congress. It does happen that certain officers, concentrating their attention on the numerical indicators of further development of the national economy, do not penetrate properly into the essence of the economic and social policy of the party under modern conditions. The training classes sometimes poorly expose the concepts and propagandistic methods of bourgeois ideologists, as well as those of right-wing and "left-wing" opportunists. It is not always emphasized that success in fulfilling tasks of the new five-year plan depends on each Soviet individual and on servicemen of the army and navy.

Individual young officers do not have a sufficiently complete concept of the special importance of instructions of the congress to the effect that "increasing the defensive might of our motherland in every way possible and educating the Soviet people in the spirit of a high level of vigilance and constant readiness to defend the great achievements of socialist must continue to be one of the most important tasks of the party and people."

The elimination of these shortcomings is connected with a further improvement in the ideological level of the courses conducted, with providing high quality training of propagandists, and with involving the best qualified supervisory personnel in the matter of explaining the decisions of the congress. Improvement of independent work by the officers on the classical works of Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress is of primary importance. Let us recall Lenin's instruction that: without a certain amount of independent work the truth of a single serious issue cannot be found, and whoever is afraid of work deprives himself of the possibility of finding the truth. (Complete Collected Works, vol. 23, p 68)

The independent work requires a system, consistency, and purposefulness. The service of officers is exceptionally intensive. The wave of daily activities, combat training and working with the personnel frequently "overwhelms" some of them. Naturally, a great deal of persistence and the ability to correctly utilize his service and personal time are required of each officer.

S. M. Kirov said: "When we touch upon matters of self-education, we most frequently have a single argument -- we have no time, we are on the run the whole day long, our tongues hanging out the entire day. But I advise you to try putting the tongue back in your mouth even for an hour and you will see that nothing terrible will come of it. Things will be better." Life itself convinces one that this advice is also completely applicable for officer personnel. Senior commanders and political workers are obligated to help the young officers organize their independent work aimed at improving their political education.

A profound study of Leninism and the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress is also facilitated by such forms of ideological and theoretical training of officers as group and individual consultations, discussions and interviews, lectures, reports and theoretical conferences. Readings and lectures by officers on the materials of the 24th CPSU Congress are proving worthwhile. The guarantee of further improvement in the Marxist-Leninist education of military personnel lies in the creative and comprehensive application of above-mentioned forms.

Combining the School of Knowledge with the School of Life and Improving the Efficiency of Officer Training

The goal of Marxist-Leninist training is to provide officers with a body of knowledge in the area of revolutionary and military theory and the decisions of the CPSU. This body of knowledge is expected to develop a communist world outlook among military personnel, to instill a high level of moral-political and combat qualities in them, and to assist them in improving their military-pedagogical skills. The most important

qualitative distinction of Soviet officers, as officers of a new type, offsprings of the Great October, is defined by their ideological and theoretical training. There was good reason then for the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy" to emphasize the necessity of directing special attention toward improvement of the quality and effectiveness of the Marxist-Leninist training of officers.

The entire body of experience in Soviet military organizational development convinces one that the system of Marxist-Leninist training of officers which has been developed in the army and navy is achieving its goal. We must, however, continue to improve the effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist training of officer personnel. Fulfillment of this task depends first of all on the propagandists and their theoretical and methodological preparation and on further improvement in the work of selecting, training, and retraining of group leaders for Marxist-Leninist studies. Assemblies, seminars and instructional-methodological classes are conducted for this purpose.

In some places, unfortunately, all of this work is reduced to brief instructions and individual lectures. In addition, certain group leaders for the Marxist-Leninist training of officers are frequently absent from even these limited training-methodological undertakings. Supplementary work is not organized. As a result they attend the classes inadequately prepared or else they completely reassign the lectures and seminars to poorly-qualified individuals. Life itself requires that these and similar shortcomings be resolutely overcome and that the theoretical and methodological training of group leaders be persistently improved.

The system of Marxist-Leninist training of officers represents a great school of political skills. A bookish knowledge of Marxism, however, without being tied in with life, is abstract and ineffective. V. I. Lenin taught that we must replace the old bourgeois studies, cramming, and drilling with the ability to grasp the entire body of human knowledge in such a way that communism is not something which we have learned by rote, but rather something which we have thought through ourselves, representing the deductions which are inevitable from the point of view of modern education. V. I. Lenin considered that a serious ideological tempering of Soviet cadres required not a dogmatic rote learning of certain Marxist positions, but rather the development of sufficiently firm convictions and a constant readiness to successfully defend them against anyone at any time.

This is only possible on the basis of theoretical training combined with the practical struggle for the building of the communist society. That is why it is necessary to constantly strive for a more profound organic link between the school of knowledge and the school of life in order to improve

the effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist officer training. The link between the theoretical matters studied and the practical struggle of the party and the entire Soviet people for the development of communism is of primary importance. We mean by this that the ideas of the 24th CPSU Congress and the policy worked out by the party should become, to the fullest degree, the personal convictions of each officer and the motivation behind his daily activities and that all officers should live by the decisions of the congress and actively struggle for their implementation.

An important aspect of combining the school of knowledge with the school of life for officer personnel is the further intensification of the link between Marxist-Leninist training and military practice, the tasks of the armed forces, and the concrete problems involved in increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of the forces. A thorough analysis of the problems connected with the improvement of combat equipment and arms, the administrative system, and the training and indoctrination of personnel during classes in the process of theoretical officer training greatly helps attain more successful accomplishment of the practical tasks facing the units and ships.

Improved effectiveness of ideological and theoretical officer training presupposes a highly purposeful level for each class directed toward the fulfillment of educational tasks. Documents of the 24th CPSU Congress further developed Lenin's requirements for Soviet cadres, with direct application to officer personnel as well. In light of the decisions of the congress it is of primary importance to develop ideological conviction on the part of the officers during the process of Marxist-Leninist training. This is facilitated to the greatest degree by the development of an awareness of party principles and a class approach to the evaluation of events and phenomena. On the strength of this the most pressing current problems of life's reality cannot be skirted in the training classes. A creative discussion of these problems is the route toward recognition of the truth and toward the development among officers of correct views on events, phenomena, and personal behavior and actions.

Among the important qualities essential to Soviet, including military, personnel, the 24th CPSU Congress mentioned knowledge of one's work, good organizational capabilities, and the ability to find the most rational solutions to problems. In the armed forces such qualities are mainly developed during the process of combat training and during the entire course of an officer's service. Their theoretical and scientific foundations, however, are laid during the process of Marxist-Leninist training. In this plan officers must master the substance of Leninist principles on the main link and must skillfully apply those principles in their practical work of training and indoctrinating personnel.

The process of political training contains great possibilities for developing among officers a feeling for the new and the ability to foresee, and for improving administrative methods. Those group leaders are doing the right thing who, during lectures and seminars, skillfully pose questions of scientific administration, discuss methods of scientific search, summarize the advanced experience in this field, and make it known to all unit or combined-unit officers.

An officer is an educator of the personnel. As a one-man commander he cannot resolve matters just on the strength of an order. He is obligated to reinforce his orders by personal example and by organizational and educational work with the personnel. He needs a profound knowledge of party-political work and the fundamentals of military pedagogics and psychology. And Marxist-Leninist training is expected to assist officers in acquiring these skills. For this purpose the study plans provide for special subjects. At the same time it is necessary to direct the entire learning process more toward the development in officers of the qualities of an educator.

The current more active involvement of officers in social work is acquiring special importance. This sort of experience has been accumulated in the districts and the fleets. Commanders, political organs, and party organizations are expected to strive to see that this experience is disseminated to all of the units, ships, staffs and directorates. Its introduction is an absolute condition for the further improvement of the effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist training of army and naval officers.

* * *

According to the teachings of the party, everything connected with matters of political education and the ideological tempering of personnel should be under the direct supervision of the party organizations. The propagandists require special attention. With the new academic year approaching we should consolidate and develop the level which we have achieved and eliminate shortcomings in the organization of Marxist-Leninist education of the officers. Improvement in its quality and effectiveness should be subordinated to the main purpose, that of ensuring a high level of combat readiness on the part of units, ships, and combined-units.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev: Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Politizdat, 1971, p 125.
2. S. M. Kirov: Selected Articles and Speeches. 1912-1934, Gospolitizdat, 1939, pp 692-693.

MILITARY QUESTIONS IN THE HISTORY OF THE CPSU

(In Connection with Publication of Book 1, Volume V of History of the CPSU)

Maj Gen V. Matsulenko, Professor, Doctor of Historical Science

Book 1, Volume 5 of History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, has been published by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee CPSU.* This volume relates how the Soviet people, under the guidance of the Communist Party, entered a new stage in the development of the socialist society, how it emerged victorious in a bitter conflict with the attack forces of imperialism, how it defended the socialist homeland and, crushing the enemy, extended a fraternal hand of assistance to the peoples of Europe and Asia, opening up for them the road to freedom and independence.

This volume contains a great many new documents and materials, such as more than 130 resolutions and decrees of the Party Central Committee and its agencies: the Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat, as well as the State Defense Committee. A great many new archival documents were used in preparing this volume, documents which reveal the activities of local party organizations.

This has enabled the authors, in contrast to previously-published works dealing with party activities in the prewar and war years, to show more fully and comprehensively the titanic job done by the Communist Party, its central and local entities and party organizations during that period.

The book is in two parts: the first is entitled "New Stage in the Life of the Party and Nation" and covers the period 1938-June 1941; the second part -- "The Party -- Organizer and Inspirer of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War" -- covers the period June 1941-September 1945.

* Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Volume V: The Communist Party on the Eve of and During the Great Patriotic War, During the Period of Consolidation and Development of the Socialist Society, 1938-1958. Book 1 (1938-1945), Politizdat, 1970. Project Chief Editor P. N. Pospelov. Editors for Volume V: Yu. P. Petrov, V. S. Zaytsev.

This volume contains a thorough study of the diversified activities of the CPSU in all areas of life in this country during this period. In this article we shall discuss primarily matters pertaining to CPSU military policy and its leadership role in organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces and organization of the defeat of the Nazi German invaders.

* * *

Having proceeded on a course toward completion of the building of socialism and guided by Lenin's statement that "the most important, root interest of the proletariat after it has taken over political power is an increase in output of goods and in the enormous dimensions of the productive resources of society" (Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 44, page 345), the Communist Party focused its efforts on expanding and perfecting the material and technological base of socialism. An enormous role in solving this problem was played by the 18th CPSU Congress, which was held in March 1939.

This volume contains a detailed examination of the materials of that congress. A central place in the proceedings of the congress was occupied by adoption of the Third Five-Year Plan. This plan consistently followed the party line calling for a new upsurge in the nation's productive resources. Special attention in the prewar five-year plan was focused on establishment of a powerful industrial base in the East, which was of great importance for strengthening the defense capability of the USSR. "The consolidation of socialism, its economic and political foundations comprise the content of the new phase in the history of Soviet society, which was defined by the congress as the period of completion of the building of socialism and the gradual transition to communism" (page 6).

The congress advanced the creation of large state reserves and mobilization stockpiles as an important task of the forthcoming five-year plan. The importance of this task was dictated both by the targeted immense economic growth and by the looming threat of war. In addition, the increasing threat of war demanded increased budget appropriations for defense. In 1940 they totaled 56.9 billion rubles, as compared with 17.5 billion rubles in 1937.

The work done by the party to prepare the country for defense against the aggressive encroachments of imperialism is discussed on the basis of extensive material published in this book for the first time. In the period 1939-1941 the Central Committee Politburo passed the following resolutions: "On Renovation of Existing and Construction of New Airframe Plants" (September 1939); "On the Work of the People's Commissariat of the Aircraft Industry" (January 1940); "On Production of T-34 Tanks in 1940" (June 1940); "On the 1940 Plan for Accumulation of State Reserves and Mobilization Stockpiles" (August 1940). and others.

As a result of efforts by the party, by the summer of 1941 production capability of the Soviet aircraft and tank industry was almost 50 percent greater than that of Nazi Germany. Defense industry gross output volume growth was taking place considerably more rapidly than in industry as a whole. In 1938, with an overall industrial output growth of 11.8 percent, war industry growth was 36.4 percent. In 1939 industrial output rose 16 percent, while output at defense industry enterprises was up 46.5 percent. In 1940 war industry output rose by more than one third (pp 119-120). Mobilization stockpiles and state reserves grew substantially during these years. During the 18 months preceding the outbreak of hostilities the total value of state material reserves almost doubled, totaling 7.6 billion rubles (page 121).

The Communist Party devoted considerable attention to Soviet Armed Forces organizational development. An important stage in their consolidation was the 1939 Law on Universal Military Obligation and the shift to a cadre system of troop build-up.

In the fall of 1939 began the deployment of all services and arms, with an improvement in their structure. Dozens of new ground forces and aviation divisions, artillery and engineer units were formed. The number of rifle divisions alone more than doubled by 1941. [pages 14-15 missing]

* * *

Within the span of several months 1.5 million railroad cars carrying equipment, raw materials and fuel were transferred eastward, and more than 10 million people were evacuated. During the first 6 months of the war a total of 1523 industrial enterprises were evacuated to the east, including 1360 large enterprises. The Volga, Urals, and Siberia became the principal war industry base. Thanks to measures taken by the party, by the middle of 1942 the front was receiving considerably more war materiel than in 1941. In spite of all difficulties, the kolkhoz peasantry was supplying the front with provisions and industry with raw materials.

The success of this gigantic effort of rebasing industry demonstrated to the entire world the enormous organizing force of the Communist Party, the self-sacrifice and labor heroism of the Soviet people.

The initial period of the war, as is correctly noted in the book, demonstrated that the German military adventure was doomed to failure. Blinded by their hatred of communism, the Nazi rulers showed a total incomprehension of the essence and character of the Soviet political system and its great potential. They underestimated the strength of the Soviet economy, which was based on the most advanced socialist mode of production,

the strength of moral-political unity of Soviet society, the indestructible friendship of the peoples of the USSR, our nation's military organization and its Armed Forces (page 154).

Decisive events in the summer-fall campaign of 1941 took place on the central, Moscow axis. In the latter half of July the magnificent Battle of Smolensk began, during the course of which the Soviet guard was born -- the cream of the army, the pride of our people. As a result of this battle our troops frustrated Hitler's plan to advance to Moscow without a halt, thus dealing a serious blow to Hitler's doctrine of "blitzkrieg" war.

The Soviet Supreme Command had gained the time needed to establish and move to the front strategic reserves, which played an important role in the Battle of Moscow.

Having exhausted the German hordes in the defensive Battle of Moscow, on 5-6 December Soviet troops shifted to a decisive counteroffensive and crushed a large enemy force -- Army Group Center. This event was an important turning point in the war. The adventuristic plan of "blitzkrieg" had suffered a total failure. The myth of the "invincibility" of the German Army had been exposed to the world. The Germans suffered their first defeat in World War II. The strategic initiative had passed into the hands of the Soviet Supreme Command.

The Soviet victory at Moscow was perceived throughout the world as a general victory of progressive forces over fascism. It raised the morale of peace-loving peoples, strengthened the resistance movement in the fascist-occupied countries and played a substantial role in strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition.

The threat of Japanese entry into the war against the USSR was simultaneously greatly reduced by this victory. The events at Moscow also had a sobering effect on aggressive elements in Turkey (page 244).

For the peoples of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces the defeat of the Nazi German forces at Moscow signified the dawn of a future victory.

In the battles in the fields of Moskovskaya Oblast the Soviet Army gained valuable experience in the conduct of large-scale offensive operations, gained maturity and toughness. Soviet fighting men demonstrated mass heroism and excellent morale. Forty-six units and large units, including the 18th People's Militia Division of Moscow's Leningradskiy Rayon, were given the guards appellation for outstanding success in combat at Moscow. The lofty title Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 110 soldiers and partisans (page 244).

This volume devotes considerable attention to such great landmarks on the road to Soviet victory over the enemy as the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk. "The turning point finally came in the battle which took place between the Volga and Don rivers, a component part of which was the Battle of Stalingrad," the book states. "With their stubborn defense and powerful counterthrusts the Soviet troops frustrated the enemy advance and solidly pinned down in the Stalingrad area more than 50 of the enemy's finest divisions" (page 338).

The heroic defense of Stalingrad created conditions for shifting to a counteroffensive, which resulted in the encirclement of 22 German divisions, containing 330,000 men and large quantities of equipment. The Battle of Stalingrad exceeded all the battles of history in scope and significance. Savage fighting was waged for a period of 6 and a half months over a vast territory, involving the simultaneous participation of more than 2 million men. The enemy lost approximately 1.5 million officers and men, more than one fourth of his troops on the Eastern Front. Five of the enemy's armies were crushed: two German, two Romanian, and one Italian (page 343).

The victory at Stalingrad ended once and for all plans for Japan to attack the Soviet Union in the east and Turkey in the south, compelling them to maintain their "neutrality" toward the USSR. It led to a new and powerful upsurge in the popular liberation struggle against fascism.

With the victory at Stalingrad the strategic initiative shifted once and for all into the hands of the Soviet Supreme Command. Soviet troops shifted to a general offensive, which signaled the beginning of the mass expulsion of the Nazi German invaders from Soviet territory.

In discussing the Battle of Kursk the authors correctly note that the Soviet military leaders accurately guessed the enemy's intentions and, proceeding on the basis of the current situation, drafted the most expedient plan of action for the summer of 1943. The Soviet Supreme Command decided to establish a stubborn defense on the Kursk salient in order to halt the advance of large enemy forces, to weaken his assault forces and to create conditions for crushing them with a subsequent counteroffensive. In contrast to the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, the shift to defense at Kursk was not a forced decision but was of a deliberate nature and did not signify that the Soviet Army was losing the initiative it had seized during the winter campaign. The subsequent course of events confirmed the correctness of this decision (page 350).

The German army suffered a major defeat in the Battle of Kursk. More than 70 enemy divisions took part in the battle, or approximately one third of all enemy divisions operating on the Eastern Front; 30 of these divisions were destroyed. In 50 days of fighting the Germans lost more than half a million men. The Germans were unable to replenish these immense losses; Germany was at the brink of catastrophe.

A direct consequence of the defeat of the Germans at Kursk was further development of the crisis within the fascist bloc and the beginning of its disintegration, which was expressed in the collapse of the fascist regime in Italy.

Following the Battle of Kursk the Soviet Army conducted a number of brilliant operations in the summer-fall campaign of 1943 and in the campaigns of 1944, which led to the final liberation of Soviet territory.

The Great Patriotic War was of a popular character. A vivid manifestation of this was the partisan movement, which was extensively organized on the party's initiative. Approximately 6200 partisan detachments and groups (1,300,000 patriots) and 735 underground party entities were operating on enemy-occupied territory. "No political party in history has managed such a mass movement behind enemy lines. The Communist Party successfully coped with this task" (page 508). The partisan movement was an important strategic fact in the war. The authors demonstrate on the basis of extensive documentary materials how the party exercised direction of the popular struggle behind enemy lines. This book contains the first published systematized index of underground party entities. The struggle behind enemy lines was truly popular, encompassing all forms of popular resistance: combat operations by partisan units, activities of underground organizations in cities and towns, and mass sabotage against the enemy.

This book devotes considerable attention to the liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces. This mission was initiated in the spring of 1944, when our troops, pursuing the enemy with the aim of annihilating him, crossed the Soviet border into Romania. Entry by the Soviet Army into a new phase of the war -- the phase of liberation of the peoples of Europe -- increased demands on all party political effort. Bearing this fact in mind, the Central Committee Politburo held a conference of members of front military councils (May 1944), at which the tasks of military political officers in the new phase of the war were defined (pp 588-589). The Soviet Army received strict orders from the State Defense Committee (dated 10 April and 27 October 1944) not to interfere in the internal affairs of the liberated nations and to give their peoples the right to decide their own destiny. These orders proceeded from the program for lending assistance to the fascist-enslaved peoples of Europe in their just struggle for independence and freedom. Implementing this program, the Communist Party acted in full conformity with the ideals of proletarian internationalism, to which it was always faithful.

The Soviet Army sacredly observed the principles of the Leninist foreign policy of the USSR, bringing liberation to the peoples of Central and Southeastern Europe.

The authors discuss in detail the comprehensive assistance by the Soviet Union to the peoples of other nations struggling against fascism, in the establishment of national military units and the arming of these units with the requisite weapons and combat equipment. The following were established on Soviet territory: the Czechoslovak Corps (16,000 men), the First Polish Army (78,000 men), two Romanian divisions, a Yugoslav infantry battalion, tank brigade and two air regiments, and the French Normandy-Neman Fighter Regiment. Foreign units established with the assistance of the USSR totaled more than 550,000 men (page 573).

The foreign large units established on Soviet territory fought bravely side by side with the Soviet Army against the common foe and subsequently played an important role in the establishment and development of national armed forces in the liberated nations.

Liberation of the peoples of Europe demanded of the Soviet Armed Forces enormous efforts and a high cost in human lives. A total of 69,000 Soviet fighting men were killed in Romania, 600,000 in Poland, more than 140,000 in Czechoslovakia, more than 140,000 in Hungary, 26,000 in Austria, 8000 in Yugoslavia, and more than 102,000 in Germany (pp 592-600). More than 1 million Soviet officers and men gave their lives in the European nations liberated by the Soviet Army.

The Soviet Army also carried out its international duty in respect to the Asian peoples enslaved by militarist Japan. The decisive defeat which Soviet troops handed Japan's elite ground forces -- its million-man Kwangtung Army -- constituted the most important factor in the liberation of many Asian peoples from the yoke of the foreign invaders, particularly the people of China, Korea, and Vietnam, as well as bringing a victorious end to the war in the Far East (page 654).

The Soviet Union achieved equally important results in foreign policy. The authors state that through its foreign policy the party assisted the peoples of Europe and Asia liberated by the Red Army in reestablishing their national statehood and sovereignty (page 656).

Soviet diplomacy rendered useless the schemes and intrigues of the imperialist nations, which were attempting to isolate the Soviet Union in the international arena. Creation of the anti-Hitler coalition and its consolidation during the course of the war confirmed the correctness of the Leninist course of Soviet foreign policy.

The book emphasizes that the Soviet victory over fascism constitutes a victory of the Soviet societal and governmental system, a victory of the military organization of the Soviet state and socialist ideology. "The

party was able fully to utilize the advantages of the socialist economic system... With a smaller industrial capacity and shrunken strategic raw materials base the Soviet Union produced more military equipment than did Nazi Germany. Soviet industry produced during the war 137,000 airplanes, 104,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 488,000 artillery pieces" (page 644).

The Communist Party did enormous ideological work during the war years. This effort was aimed at indoctrinating the armed defenders of the homeland and all toilers, developing them into fearless, courageous, steadfast fighters who were solidly convinced of the righteousness of their cause and making every effort to achieve victory (page 651).

The Communist Party was the leader of the struggle of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces, the inspirer and organizer of our victory in the Great Patriotic War. All fundamental questions pertaining to running the country and conduct of the war were settled by the Party Central Committee -- the Politburo, Orgburo and Secretariat. More than 200 meetings of these executive party bodies were held during the war years. Decisions hammered out by the party Central Committee were later implemented by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, Sovnarkom, as well as the State Defense Committee and the Supreme Command (page 642). A precise system of party leadership of the armed forces took shape during the war. Strategic plans were as a rule examined jointly by members of the Party Central Committee Politburo and the Supreme Command. Members and candidate members of the Central Committee Politburo, sitting on the front military councils or regularly touring the critical areas of the front, with their experience and authority assisted in quickly and correctly settling on the spot complex problems of warfare (page 650).

The role and influence of the military councils, which contained many Central Committee members and candidate members, and top officials of republic, kray and oblast party organizations, in the army and navy became stronger. Acting on behalf of the party and government, the military councils were supported by commanders and political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations. Political workers, who included many Communists with considerable experience in party political work, engaged in extensive organizing and ideological activity (page 650). The party steadily grew in numbers and strength during the war years. Between 1 July 1941 and 1 July 1945 3,788,000 fighting men became probationary members and 2,376,000 received full party membership. By the spring of 1945 one out of every four Soviet fighting men was a party member.

Communists were always at the forefront. They led the others into combat through personal example and inspiring words. Almost three fourths of all Heroes of the Soviet Union are Communists. Approximately 2 million Communists were killed in action in the name of victory; this represents more than one half of the party membership as of the summer of 1941.

The victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany and militarist Japan created favorable conditions for the development and successful consummation of socialist revolutions in the nations of Europe and Asia and the establishment of a world socialist system. This victory had a profound influence on the struggle of peoples for peace, democracy and socialism, on development of the international communist and labor movement, and the national liberation movement in colonial and dependent countries.

The authors offer a worthy response to the bourgeois falsifiers of the history of World War II, who are endeavoring today, contrary to all truth, through various fabrications, omissions and slander, to minimize the world historic significance of the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II and its decisive contribution to the collapse of fascism. Their vain attempts boil down to portraying the defeat of Nazi Germany as a random event, a consequence of Hitler's mistakes, the Russian winter, the primitive Soviet road system, etc. They attempt to prove that the source of heroism displayed by Soviet citizens during the war was not socialist patriotism but rather "the spirit of holy Russia," that they did not fight for the socialist homeland but rather "for mother Russia."

These are brazen lies. The victory of the Soviet people and its army over fascism was most logical and expected. Its sources were the socialist economic system, the sociopolitical and ideological unity of society, Soviet patriotism and friendship of the peoples of the USSR, the rallying of the people around the Communist Party, and the unprecedented heroism and bravery of Soviet fighting men. It was a victory of the socialist ideology over the misanthropic ideology of imperialism and fascism.

References by the falsifiers to the cold, mud, and slush, which allegedly had a negative influence on the combat operations of the Nazi German troops, are groundless. Warfare is a bilateral process. He who is better trained, more skilled in combat, stronger in spirit, braver and more courageous was able to stand the cold and overcome the mud. It was primarily Soviet fighting men who possessed these qualities. They smashed the Germans with equal success in blizzard and downpour, winter and summer, day and night.

Attempts by bourgeois ideologues to belittle the role of our homeland in the defeat of fascism do not stand up to criticism.

The Soviet people played the decisive role in defeating Nazi Germany. Throughout the entire war 60 to 80 percent of all manpower and equipment at the disposal of the German Army was on the Eastern Front. It was here that the main forces of Germany and its satellites were destroyed -- 607 divisions. The Allies on the other hand destroyed and captured 176 divisions in North Africa and Western Europe. The Germans lost in battle against the

Soviet troops the bulk of their artillery and tanks, three fourths of their aircraft, while casualties comprised 10 million out of 13,600,000 total casualties sustained by the Germans in World War II (pp 568-569).

The bourgeois falsifiers of history are doing everything they can to distort prewar Soviet foreign policy as well. The aim of their falsification is to remove from the Western powers responsibility for urging Nazi Germany into war and to make it look as if the Soviet-German nonaggression treaty was the cause of World War II.

With the lying claim of a "Soviet threat" to other nations in 1939-1941 they want to camouflage and justify imperialist aggression in Indochina and the Near East and U.S. attempts to preserve its domination in NATO and other aggressive blocs. But no matter how hard the apologists of the bourgeoisie try, their attempts are in vain. The facts of history are against them. The Soviet-German nonaggression pact signed on 23 August 1939, the authors state, frustrated the plans of the imperialists and allowed the Soviet Union time to strengthen its defenses. This treaty also struck a blow at the aggressive plans of imperialist Japan, which was counting on a German attack on the USSR presenting the opportunity to undertake major offensive operations against the Mongolian People's Republic and the Soviet Far East (page 73).

The Communist Party and Soviet government did everything possible to prevent World War II. But under those conditions this was impossible: resolution of this problem depended not on the USSR alone. War broke out, but not as the Western imperialists had planned it. Instead of a united campaign by the imperialist nations against the Soviet Union, hostilities began among the imperialist predators. The Germans directed their efforts primarily against the Anglo-French-American bloc.

The authors convincingly demonstrate that entry by the USSR into the war, provoked by the attack by Nazi Germany, became the decisive factor in the transition of World War II from an unjust imperialist war to an antifascist war of liberation, that is, it ultimately altered its political character (pp 73-77).

From the very first days of the war the Soviet Union became the center of peace-loving forces, around which all peoples oppressed by fascism united. Subsequently this led to the creation of an antifascist coalition, which was an alliance not only of states but of peoples as well.

The bourgeois falsifiers claim that the Soviet troops won victories due to a 10 to 20-fold superiority in manpower and weapons over the Nazi German troops. This volume contains convincing facts refuting this fabrication. For example, in the counteroffensive at Moscow the enemy enjoyed a

superiority in numbers and equipment. As of 5 December 1941 our forces included: 718,800 men, 5900 guns and mortars, 667 tanks, and 762 aircraft. The Germans had 801,000 men, 10,400 guns and mortars, 1000 tanks, and 615 aircraft (page 240).

The rout of the Nazi German forces at Stalingrad took place with a slight numerical advantage on the side of the Soviets. The Soviet forces included 1,000,500 men, 13,541 guns and mortars, 894 tanks, and 1414 aircraft, while the enemy totaled 1,011,500 men, 10,290 guns and mortars, 675 tanks, and 1216 aircraft (page 342).

The authors emphasize that reactionary military historians minimize the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad and exaggerate the influence of combat operations fought by British and American troops in North Africa on the course of World War II, forgetting that the enemy had 50 divisions at Stalingrad and 12 in North Africa. The Nazi German Army suffered 20 times the losses in killed and captured in the Battle of Stalingrad as in Africa (page 344).

In the Kursk counteroffensive and in subsequent operations in 1944-1945, Soviet troops enjoyed a slight numerical advantage over the Germans: 50 to 100 percent in men, 3 to 4-fold in artillery and tanks, and 2 to 3-fold in aircraft. On main axes of advance the Soviet forces greatly outnumbered the enemy in men and equipment, particularly in the operations of the final phase of the war. But this superiority was achieved due to massing of forces in areas of penetration, at the expense of weakening secondary axes.

The outcome of the Great Patriotic War, as is correctly noted in this book, fully demonstrated the indestructible might of socialism, the omnipotent force of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and the Soviet people's total dedication to the Leninist party. These results serve as a stern warning to the imperialist aggressors, a severe and unforgettable lesson of history.

Ignoring the lessons of the last war, present-day imperialism, headed by the United States, has stepped up its aggressive strategy, the cutting edge of which is pointed at the socialist nations, and against the Soviet Union in particular.

The 24th CPSU Congress stressed the necessity of keeping a vigilant eye on the intrigues of the imperialist nations and constantly maintaining at the center of attention matters pertaining to military organizational development and strengthening the might and combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces. "Everything that has been created by the people," stated L. I. Brezhnev in the Central Committee Report to the 24th CPSU Congress, "must be reliably defended. To strengthen

the Soviet state means to strengthen its Armed Forces as well, comprehensively to increase the defense capability of our homeland. As long as we live in a troubled world, this remains one of our primary tasks... Carrying out the will of the people, the Communist Party tirelessly works to strengthen the nation's defenses... Soviet citizens can be confident that our glorious Armed Forces are prepared at all times, day and night, to repel an enemy attack, from whatever quarter it might come."

Book 1, Volume V of History of the CPSU is a work of major significance. It will play an important role in indoctrinating Soviet citizens in the glorious, heroic tradition of the Leninist party, in a spirit of dedication to the homeland and constant readiness to defend the conquests of the Great October Revolution.

STRICTEST OBSERVANCE OF SOCIALIST LAW --
A MAJOR CONDITION FOR THE FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF ONE-MAN
COMMAND AND ENHANCING MILITARY DISCIPLINE

Lt Gen of Justice A. Polev

In executing control over all of the aspects of the life and the work of the Soviet Army and Navy, the Communist Party directs a great deal of attention to the strictest observance of socialist legality as the most important condition for further strengthening of one-man command and discipline.

"Respect for the law," as pointed out in the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party, "must become the personal conviction of each individual. This especially applies to the activities of officials. Any attempt to deviate from the law or to circumvent it, no matter what the motivation, cannot be tolerated."

One-Man Command -- The Basic Form of Control Over the Life and Activities of the Troops

The founders of scientific communism, Marx, Engels, and Lenin, convincingly proved that the significance of precisely functioning production, military, and any other activity of the people continues to increase according to the measure of development of social production, science and technology and the equipping of the armed forces with the latest combat weapons. In industry, in transportation, in agriculture, in the Army or the Navy, and throughout all of public life normal activities by the people become impossible without subordination to a certain order and clear rules and standards of conduct as established by appropriate laws, decrees, regulations, and instructions. This is precisely why the role of control of the Army and Navy is constantly growing and why the demands placed on performance and military discipline are increasing.

The founder of our party and state, V. I. Lenin, taught that "neither the railroads, nor the transportation system, nor the large machines and enterprises in general can function correctly if there is not a unity of will, joining the entire body of available workers into a single economic organization functioning with clockwork accuracy." (Complete Collected Works, vol. 36, p 157) This especially applies to the armed forces: the extensive introduction of the latest arms, various radioelectronic equipment, complex combat vehicles, aircraft, and ships requires the perfectly functioning, precisely organized activities of each soldier and entire collectives, and an exceptional level of discipline and irreproachable performance. The slightest laxity or self-willed action by individual officials, a deviation from the established order, or an attempt at

insubordination can cause tremendous damage to the armed forces and Soviet society as a whole.

The Communist Party has recognized one-man command at all stages in the organizational development of the Soviet Army and Navy as the most effective form of leadership of the personnel, providing a constantly high level of combat and mobilizational readiness on the part of the subunits, units, and ships.

The essence of one-man command under modern conditions consists in concentrating in the hands of a commander or chief all of the command, political, technical, administrative, and logistical functions of management and control over all of the aspects of life and activities of the subunits, units, ships and combined units entrusted to him. This means that the one-man commander or chief is completely responsible to the people, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government for combat and political training, for troop discipline, for personal, logistical and medical support of the troops, and for the condition of the arms and combat equipment. Together with the party organization he actively indoctrinates the personnel, instills communist attitudes in servicemen, and persistently develops communist relations among them.

All of the actions of any commander or chief are executed within the limits of the power given him by the law. This in no way indicates any sort of limitation of the service rights and personal responsibility of the commander's subordinates for their assigned work, but makes it possible to define the sphere of their obligations and rights, within the boundaries of which they function independently. Along with the one-man commander or chief, responsibility for the conditions of some specific sector of military activities is also borne by the corresponding officials: chiefs of staffs, services, and so forth.

Regulating the actions of commanders and chiefs within the framework of the authority assigned to them also ensures strict observance of legality in the interrelations of all military personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces without exception, as well as protection of the rights and interests of the citizens in military service.

Further comprehensive strengthening of one-man command and military discipline and improvement of the political and military education of personnel in the spirit of communist ideals is unthinkable without the most extensive application of legal standards and the laws of the Soviet state. It is here that the will of the people and the basic directions of party policy on matters of strengthening the defensive capabilities and security of our nation are reflected in concentrated form.

The Legal Bases of One-Man Command and Military Discipline

The leadership of the Communist Party in accordance with unified Soviet legislation is the very basis for the development of our state as a whole and military organizational development in particular. Unified legislation does not exclude the specific features of legal regulation of military organizational development, as necessitated by the organizational specifics and the special procedures applicable to military service. In connection with this legislation is enacted which represents the legal basis for the operations of the military apparatus and all service personnel and for regulating the life and activities of the USSR Armed Forces.

The concept of Soviet military legislation encompasses the laws of the USSR, ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, decrees of the USSR Council of Ministers, and military regulations, which contain legal standards, reflect the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government on matters of military organizational development and the political and military education of personnel, and in which the rights, obligations, mutual relations and responsibilities of servicemen are defined.

The basic law of the land, the Constitution of the USSR, defines the sphere of authority of higher agencies of state power and state control in the area of organization of the defense of our motherland, the construction of the armed forces, and their leadership. In order to have the laws correctly reflect the processes occurring in society and current requirements, keep pace with the times, and facilitate the development of that which is new and progressive, the USSR Supreme Soviet constantly works toward improving Soviet, including military, legislation.¹ This is one of the methods of state guidance of society and of communist development.

The "Law on Universal Military Duty" passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 12 October 1967 on the basis of the Constitution established the system for the organization and manning of the Soviet Armed Forces, the procedure for induction into military service, the basic principles of completing active military service and reserve service, the system of registering for the draft, and other regulations.

Ukases have been issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, ratifying²: Internal Service Regulations (23 August 1960), the Garrison and Guard Service Regulations (22 August 1963), and the Armed Forces Disciplinary Regulations (23 August 1960). Thus, departmental acts (as the regulations were considered prior to confirmation by ukases of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet) acquired the force of state laws. Ukases have also been issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratifying the Regulation on Material Responsibility of Servicemen for Loss Caused to the State (23 May 1966), the Regulation on Officers' Comrade Courts of Honor in the Armed Forces of the USSR, and others.

Relations arising during the process of the performance of military service are also defined to a great degree by orders of the Ministry of Defense. Thus, citizens are drafted into the active military service, rules of accounting for property are established, and appropriate regulations are put into effect on the basis of decrees of the Government of the USSR. Orders by the USSR Minister of Defense, issued on the basis of and supplementary to Soviet laws, represent general standards which are binding on all service personnel.

In this manner relations developing during the process of military service in the Soviet Army and Navy are regulated by legal standards.

The system and order of military relations, regulated by legal standards and consolidated in laws, make up the concept of military legal order. Consequently, the entire procedure of military relations between servicemen of units, subunits and military installations, regulated by military regulations, orders of the USSR Minister of Defense, and other legal standards, constitute the military legal order.

Personal responsibility for the strengthening of the military legal order in the unit and subunit and on the ship is assigned to the commander. The regulation specifies that subordinates be required to comply with military regulations, service duties, and orders, precisely and in good time, that they immediately eliminate any violations of service procedures detected, strive to strengthen military discipline, prevent offenses by subordinates, and expose and eliminate the grounds giving rise to them in good time. The law thereby requires of the commander actions and decisions directed toward all-round strengthening of the military legal order, discipline and organization.

We know that in order to confirm the military legal order it is not enough just to regulate legislation, rescind laws which have lost their force, and develop and issue laws. A good law can be passed, but if it is not observed by all servicemen and officials without exception, then such a law will be ineffective. The vitality of a law is manifested in its effect and execution. Undeviating and precise observance and execution of Soviet laws and other legal acts based on them by all state organs, public organizations, officials and citizens constitutes socialist legality.

Legality (zakonnost') and the legal order (pravoporyadok) are interrelated, but they are not one and the same. Legality presumes the requirement of everyone to strictly and unfailingly observe the laws of the Soviet state. As a result of the realization of this requirement, an order and a system of relations develops which is generally referred to as the legal order [or: law and order].

"Socialist legality and the legal order are the basis for the normal life of society and its citizens," the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his speech at the meeting of electors on 12 June 1970. Socialist legality is closely connected with socialist democracy: democracy gives rise to and strengthens legality, and legality, in turn, consolidates democracy.

Proceeding from the fact that "law is a political measure and a policy," (Complete Collected Works, vol. 30, p 99), V. I. Lenin attached exceptional importance to revolutionary legality in the development of the new social structure. From the very first days of the proclamation of Soviet power he unceasingly called upon the workers, and all of the toilers, to strengthen the revolutionary order and revolutionary legality. At the initiative of V. I. Lenin, the Sixth All-Russian Extraordinary Congress of Soviets approved a decree "On Precise Observance of the Laws," which in essence meant that the declaration of legality was one of the basic principles of Soviet power.

V. I. Lenin was resolutely opposed to contrasting legality and expediency. What is legal is expedient, it exists within the framework of the law and does not deviate from it. Soviet laws and military regulations indicate the most expedient routes and means for achieving set goals and tasks.

Constantly pointing out the necessity for strengthening legality in the Army, V. I. Lenin appealed to the men to "carry out the laws of the Red Army and all orders, and to maintain discipline in it in every way possible, not out of fear, but as a matter of conscience..." (Complete Collected Works, vol. 39, p 152) He spoke out resolutely against manifestations of a lack of discipline: "One should avoid like fire unsystematic work, willfulness on the part of individual detachments, and disobedience to the central authority because it leads to ruin..." (Ibid)

Lenin's ideas on the importance of socialist legality have been developed and strengthened in subsequent decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government.

In a decree of 19 January 1955, the CPSU Central Committee worked out measures to further strengthen socialist legality and intensify the procurator's supervision in the nation. In a decree of July 1966, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers required that all party, soviet, and administrative organs conduct work on a broad front and with public support directed toward the prevention of violations of the law and toward intensification of the struggle against crime.

Everything necessary exists in the Armed Forces of the USSR for the successful execution of tasks of the party program -- to ensure strict observance of socialist legality and the elimination of all violations of

the legal order, crime, and its causes. Commanders, political organs, staffs and party organizations have an extremely important role in fulfilling this task.

By orders and directives the USSR Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy have demanded undeviating observance of Soviet laws in the issuance of orders and other legal acts by organs of the military directorate and, in reviewing letters and complaints, absolute observance of regulation interrelations between service personnel. Military councils of districts, fleets and groups of forces direct constant attention to these matters.

It would be difficult to imagine one-man command which is not based on a knowledge of and force of law.

Soviet law facilitates the strengthening of one-man command in every way and the authority of the commander by supporting his orders and the established order of subordination. The law on military offenses provides for strict punishment for failure to obey the commander, for refusing to carry out his orders, for resistance to him in fulfilling the obligations of military service or using coercion to violate them, or for any attempt to defame the character of the commander or threaten his health or life. The one-man commander is invested with a great deal of power, expressed in the rights and obligations assigned to him. He has the right and is obligated to strive firmly and unswervingly for observance of order and discipline on the part of his subordinates and for their undeviating observance of requirements of the laws and regulations, to prevent laxity and lack of discipline, and to exact punishment for violations of discipline. However, an understanding of the role of the one-man commander just from the point of view of his right to require observance of the laws from others is not free of one-sidedness and could lead to errors.

In the Soviet state the safeguarding of socialist legality in all administrative agencies of the government is assigned to their leaders. In the Army and the Navy, where the role of the one-man commander is more significant as a consequence of the specifics of the military organization, the one-man commander is the organizing force behind the realization of socialist legality.

Military regulations make it the duty of the commanders to strictly observe the laws, thereby setting an example for their subordinates, and to manifest concern for them and strictly observe the laws and the privileges of military personnel and members of their families. All the activities of a commander must be based on absolute observance of Soviet laws, military regulations, statutes, manuals, and orders of superior

commanders. The commander educates his subordinates in the same spirit by the legality of his actions.

Today a commander cannot command without a detailed knowledge of the fundamentals of modern law. In issuing an order which infringes upon one right or another of a subordinate, a commander cannot claim ignorance of the law. Ignorance of the law and violation of it or an attempt to circumvent the law indicate that a commander is deficient in legal knowledge. "One cannot circumvent decrees: one can be taken to court just for proposing such a thing," V. I. Lenin wrote on the occasion of hearing such a proposal. (Complete Collected Works, vol. 50, p 266)

A commander's exercise of his rights as an investigative agent represents an important means for strengthening legality and military discipline. The one-man commander in the Soviet Armed Forces is assigned one of the responsible and specific state legal functions, that of conducting, within his authority, investigations of violations of the law committed by his subordinates. In accordance with the law a commander is obligated to initiate criminal proceedings whenever a crime is detected, to take measures directed toward establishing the elements of the crime and the individuals guilty of its commission, and toward punishment of those individuals. Failure to react to violations of the law, laxity, and failure to punish represent gross violations of socialist legality, which damage the military legal order and education of servicemen.

Unit staffs and services have a great role in matters connected with the all-round strengthening of legality. Many violations of discipline are the direct result of the condition of troop duty, the way in which subunit headquarters and commanders organize guard duty and internal service, control over their performance, and elimination of conditions giving rise to violations.

It is most important that the matter be organized in such a way that all officials of organs of the military directorate know the principles of legislation within the limits of their authority, not just knowing their rights, but also their obligations, and strictly fulfilling them in their work without regard for position or rank.

The Soviet officer personifies qualities of ideological conviction, devotion, bravery, a high cultural level, competence and industry. His actions and decisions must stand out for their great demandingness of himself and his subordinates and they must be reasonable and just.

The commander directs his subordinates, issuing orders and instructions. His order carries authority and it is absolutely intolerable to debate it, no matter for what reasons. It is to be carried out absolutely and voluntarily, but in case of unwillingness to carry it out, compulsion will

be used. Orders and instructions of the commander must always correspond to the requirements of regulations and laws, and be based on them.

That commander is not correct who considers it possible to hush up violations of the law, not react to such violations in accordance with the law, or who makes a decision which exceeds his legal authority. And in combat, which places a special moral and psychological demand on an individual and requires intensive efforts of him, the commander functions on the basis of the authority and power vested in him by the law, and subordinates the will and actions of his subordinates to his will for purposes of achieving victory over the enemy in the interests of defending the motherland.

A commander who exceeds the power vested in him or abuses it cannot expect his actions to be understood by his subordinates. Wilfulness or arbitrariness, no matter what the motivation, are always unlawful and amoral. They are not fit servants of the military order. In the final analysis such actions are detrimental, including to the prestige of one-man command, which is executed on a party basis and on the firm foundation of legality.

Ways to Further Strengthen One-Man Command and Improve Military Discipline

In the socialist society and its armed forces the main method of influence is that of persuasion, while compulsion is retained as a specific, but essential, method of action. "We must first of all persuade," V. I. Lenin taught, "and then compel. We must first do everything possible to persuade, and later compel." (Complete Collected Works, vol. 43, p 54)

Persuasion is the aggregate of organizational, educational, incentive, and other measures. It is manifested in various forms: talks with personnel (including individuals) on legal subjects, individual talks with violators of discipline, discussions of offenses at meetings, criticism of shortcomings, encouragement of outstanding personnel, and so forth. The Program of the CPSU, however, states that so long as there are manifestations of criminality, it is essential that strict measures be taken to punish those individuals committing crimes which are dangerous to society, those who violate the rules of the socialist community, and those who do not desire to join in the life of honorable labor.

The disciplinary code, which represents the legal foundation for the disciplinary authority of a commander, contains a statute which says that one of the methods for achieving firm military discipline is the skillful combination and correct application of measures of persuasion and compulsion. Methods of persuasion and compulsion in the actions of a commander are expressed in his disciplinary rights, as applied with respect to his subordinates, in the right to reward and punish.

Punishment is an expression of compulsion. And although the sphere of its application in the Soviet Armed Forces is limited, since compulsion is used in the case of an insignificant number of military personnel, it is still not possible to dispense with it. The well-known Soviet teacher A. S. Makarenko said that "an intelligent system of punishment is not only legal, but also essential. It helps to develop strong character in the individual, nurtures a feeling of responsibility, trains the will and promotes an appreciation for human dignity and the ability to resist and overcome temptations."³

The USSR Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy require that a great deal of concern be given to equipping the officers, especially young officers, with the knowledge of the fundamentals of military psychology and pedagogics and methods of working with people, and that they be taught to skillfully apply measures of persuasion and compulsion in educating their subordinates as well as the correct application of disciplinary measures.

In our pedagogical and practical educational work we have developed standards of mutual relations between people which have become the rules for a socialist community.

In rewarding and punishing his subordinates, a commander must be convinced of the justness and legality of his decision, and must see to it that each disciplinary measure is applied with a feeling of responsibility and that it produces beneficial moral results.

It must not be considered correct when individual officers show a preference for compulsion and set out on a course of distortion of disciplinary practice, exceeding their authority and applying methods of influence in which they demonstrate their power over their subordinates in unauthorized forms. The execution of orders strictly on the basis of compulsion, and the observance of service regulations out of fear of punishment cannot be an ethical matter, one which is profoundly felt and voluntarily accepted. Life itself teaches that only the soldier with a profound political awareness can be regarded as genuinely disciplined.

Military agencies authorized by the state to use compulsion in the Soviet Armed Forces are the military tribunals which are called upon to combat infringements of the security of the USSR, the combat capability of the Army and Navy, and of military discipline and the established order of performance of military service.

Great educational and preventive influence on the consciousness of military personnel is rendered by conducting military tribunal cases in the units in the presence of unit personnel. It is important that commanders, political workers and staffs together with workers of the military

tribunals and military prosecutors' offices approach the matter of improving their organizational-political and educational levels in a thoughtful manner.

A large role in the matter of safeguarding socialist legality belongs to the Soviet procurator's office, to which the Constitution of the USSR and the Statute on Supervision by the Procurator's Office in the USSR assigned the highest responsibility for control over the precise fulfillment of the laws by all ministries and their subordinate establishments as well as by individual officials and citizens.

The Statute on the Military Prosecutor's Office was ratified by a law passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 19 December 1966. It executes its functions in the Armed Forces of the USSR in close interaction with the military command, political organs, and the army and naval communities, and is expected throughout its work to promote the strengthening of socialist legality and the nurturing in military personnel of a spirit of precise and undeviating compliance with Soviet laws, the military oath, military regulations, and the orders of commanders and chiefs.

Military prosecutors carry out their functions independent of any local or military organs and subordinate only to the General Procurator of the USSR. Within the limits of their authority, they see to it that orders and other legal acts by organs of the military directorate correspond to the laws. They see to the compliance with laws in the work of investigative agencies, the observance of legality in the detention of arrested personnel in guardhouses, the execution of laws on procedures for reviewing and resolving complaints and requests, and the observance of labor legislation with respect to workers and employees of enterprises, organizations and establishments of the USSR Ministry of Defense, and others.

The decree on measures to improve the work of agencies of the courts and procurators' offices, approved in 1970 by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, is new proof of the concern of the party and government for strengthening of the legal order and legality in the nation. Agencies of the courts and the procurators' offices have been assigned the task of increasing the protection of socialist property and of ensuring strict punishment of malicious thieves, in accordance with the law. Agencies of the procurators' offices are required to prove the effectiveness of their supervision over the precise and strict observance of the laws by all state, administrative and public organizations, and to more actively expose and eliminate cases of mismanagement, wastefulness, and violations of state discipline.

V. I. Lenin linked legality with the cultural level. He pointed out that without legality "there is no point in even talking about the creation of

a culture." (Complete Collected Works, vol. 45, p 199) These ideas were expressed well by M. I. Kalinin who wrote that the introduction and consolidation of legality means an improvement in the cultural level of the masses and improves the culture of the population and its legal awareness.⁴

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government are systematically implementing a course directed toward ensuring precision and smoothness of the operations of all the links of the state and administrative apparatus, toward the strict observance of the laws and standards of the socialist community, and toward eliminating violations of the law and other antisocial phenomena. Discipline and organization on the part of all of society's members assumes primary importance under these conditions. Achievement of these goals is facilitated by improvement of the legal standards of the population by means of strengthening the legal education of the workers and increasing the legal awareness of citizens on this basis.

The political education of military personnel is inseparable from their legal education. It must be regarded as an important component part of ideological work in the army and navy. The main point in the legal education of soldiers is that of instilling in them a respect for the laws of the Soviet state and to ensure that each serviceman has a profound understanding of the fact that strict observance of the laws, their implementation, and the strengthening of legal order and discipline are necessary conditions for the successful fulfillment of the tasks facing the armed forces.

Legal education, which includes clarification of the profound sense of such requirements of the military oath and regulations as the necessity to be steadfast in bearing the rigors and deprivations of military service, to be ready to sacrifice one's life in fulfillment of military duty, and to consciously and strictly obey commanders, should promote the improvement of the moral and psychological training of servicemen.

A great deal of experience has been acquired in the forces with respect to propagandizing Soviet laws. This work represents an integral part of legal education. Forms of legal propaganda have been developed such as lectures, reports, discussions, including with individuals, filmed lectures, and thematic evenings. Legal lectures and schools of legal knowledge have been organized for various categories of military personnel. Commanders and chiefs study the fundamentals of law at meetings and seminars. Printed visual aids are issued on legal matters.

However, the legal education of servicemen has not been set up properly everywhere. In certain places it is conducted without a definite system, without consideration for the specific features of the service, and out of

touch with the actual state of legality. There is a lack of differentiated approach to various categories of soldiers.

For purposes of improving the legal education of servicemen on 17 November 1970 the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy ratified a plan of measures directed toward improving this work.

It is proposed that commanders and political organs systematically discuss the state of legal education in the political directorates, in the political organs, at conferences of commanders and political workers, and in party and Komsomol organizations. It is important that this work be set up on an organized basis and that specific responsibility for it be achieved.

Extensive legal education of all categories of military personnel is one of the most effective means for eliminating violations of the law. It helps to increase the personal responsibility of each serviceman for performing military duty and the work assigned to him, accomplishing tasks connected with combat and political training, strengthening military discipline and legality, and increasing the combat readiness of the forces.

FOOTNOTES

1. In recent years the Supreme Soviet has passed a number of laws regulating important aspects of social relations and, in particular, principles of legislation of the USSR and Union republics on public health, labor, marriage and the family, and so forth.
2. The day, month and year of ratification of ukases by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet are indicated in parentheses.
3. A. S. Makarenko, Works, Volume 5, published by the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, 1951, p 379.
4. M. I. Kalinin, Selected Works, Volume 1, State Political Publishing House, 1960, p 670.

CORRELATION OF FORCES AND RATE OF ADVANCE

Col A. Gaponov

In practical combat and operational training frequently only average day's standard load on personnel and average rate of subunit movement on the battlefield are considered in computing rate of advance. We feel that this method should be improved, with the aim of determining ways to achieve comprehensive consideration of quantitative and qualitative indices of friendly and hostile troops.

In this article we shall endeavor to demonstrate in general form a simplified quantitative relationship between rate of advance and correlation of forces and troop battlefield mobility, and to present a formula for computing rate of advance which is convenient for staff personnel. This article is of a tentative nature and lays no claim to an exhaustive analysis and full solution to this problem. In elucidating the objective relations which determine rate of advance we shall assume that both belligerents operate intelligently in combat and employ optimal means of achieving their objectives.

In the general case attacking troops accomplish the twofold mission of destroying the defending enemy and capturing specified ground. If one arbitrarily excludes hostile resistance, then the attacking force, proceeding in combat formations, would capture hostile territory at an average rate of V_m km per day, the maximum allowable on the basis of the nature of the terrain and technical capabilities of tanks and infantry. In this case, if depth of the combat mission comprises L km, the time of mission accomplishment in days can be conditionally presented in the form of the following relation:

$$t_y = \frac{L}{V_m}.$$

Taking into account opposition by the defending force, the actual time required to accomplish the combat mission in attack will be

$$t_d = t_y + t_{td},$$

where t_{td} -- time required to achieve total destruction of the enemy.

Designating the average rate of troop advance during the conduct of combat operations, that is the rate of advance (km per day) with V_a , we obtain the relation

$$\frac{V_a}{V_m} = \frac{t_y}{t_y + t_{td}}. \quad (1)$$

The time required to achieve total destruction of the enemy (t_{td}) is obtained by solving simplified equations of combat dynamics for the quadratic law (model A)¹ and can be expressed in the form

$$t_{td} = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{n_1 n_2}} \ln \frac{\frac{N_1}{N_2} \sqrt{\frac{n_1}{n_2}} + 1}{\frac{N_1}{N_2} \sqrt{\frac{n_1}{n_2}} - 1} \quad (2)$$

where N_1 -- number of combat units of the attacking side at the beginning of combat operations; N_2 -- number of combat units of the defending side at the beginning of combat operations; n_1 and n_2 -- effective rate of fire of the combat units of the attacking and defending sides respectively, which are equal to the product of the average rate of fire and probability of hitting the target with one round fired. Formula (2) is meaningful when

$$\frac{N_1}{N_2} \sqrt{\frac{n_1}{n_2}} > 1.$$

The correlation of forces of the belligerents, taking into consideration their quantitative

by quantity $\left(\frac{N_1}{N_2}\right)$ and qualitative $\left(\sqrt{\frac{n_1}{n_2}}\right)$ indices is expressed

$$f = \frac{N_1}{N_2} \sqrt{\frac{n_1}{n_2}}.$$

Improvement of all qualitative indices (weapons and equipment, personnel combat and morale-psychological training, control systems and supply, etc), regardless of whether or not we are able to express them with a number, has a single end objective -- achievement of superiority over the enemy in rate of inflicting losses with a numerical equality in forces. This objective can be achieved only under the condition that

$$\sqrt{\frac{n_1}{n_2}} > 1.$$

Now, after determining the value of t_{td} and substituting it in formula (1), we find the analytical relationship between rate of advance and the basic characteristics of the combat capabilities of the two sides:

$$\frac{V_a}{V_m} = \frac{t_y}{t_y + \frac{1}{2\sqrt{n_1 n_2}} \ln \frac{f+1}{f-1}} \quad (3)$$

Formula (3) is meaningful if $f > 1$. It follows from an analysis of this formula that rate of advance is determined by the following parameters: correlation of forces, taking into account their quantitative and qualitative indices

$$\left(f = \frac{N_1}{N_2} \sqrt{\frac{n_1}{n_2}} \right);$$

an essential condition for success thereby is superiority in forces over the adversary ($f > 1$); combat effectiveness of the weapons of both sides ($\sqrt{n_1 n_2}$); depth of echelonment of troops and weapons of the defending adversary (L); battlefield mobility of attacking troops (V_m).

The rate of advance correspondingly increases or diminishes with an increase or reduction in any of these parameters. The strongest influence on the end result (V_a) is exerted by the correlation of forces (f) and battlefield troop mobility (V_m). It is evident from the formula that if $f \rightarrow \infty$, then


$$\frac{V_a}{V_m} \rightarrow 1, \text{ that is value } V_a \text{ approaches value } V_m.$$

Thus the conclusions obtained from an analysis of formula (3) are in conformity with conclusions drawn from the theory and practice of combat operations.

At this point, however, it is appropriate to note that the simplified combat dynamics equation, the solution of which obtains formula (2), can be applied with certain restrictions to more or less uniform engagements and battles. These restrictions are caused by the fact that in practice combat operations contain the element of chance, the existence of which makes it impossible precisely to predict the outcome of an engagement or battle.²

Therefore the question arises of how applicable formula (3) is for analysis of combat operations of the last war and to what degree one can derive practical benefit from this.

We shall simplify formula (3) as applied to existing data on Soviet combat operations, first expressing the formula graphically as a function of a single variable f .



Graph of relationship between quantity $\frac{V_a}{V_m}$ and correlation of forces (f).

It is evident from an analysis of the curve in this diagram that in general one can replace formula (3) within a certain range, with an approximation which is allowable for practical purposes, with the linear equation portrayed in the diagram with a dashed line.

Making this substitution, we shall have

$$\frac{V_a}{V_m} = k(f-1), \quad (4)$$

$$\text{whence } V_a = k(f-1)V_m, \quad (5)$$

where k -- proportionality factor.

If $n_1 = n_2$, then

$$V_a = k\left(\frac{N_1}{N_2} - 1\right)V_m. \quad (6)$$

Formula (5) applies when $f > 1$, and formula (6) -- when $\frac{N_1}{N_2} > 1$.

Assuming $n_1 = n_2$ when attacking a defending force (this equality closely approaches the conditions of a meeting engagement), we commit a certain error.³ But this error is of a systematic nature and therefore will be considered in computing quantities $\sqrt{n_1 n_2}$ and k with formulas (2), (3) and (6), employing data on wartime offensive operations. If the ratio of qualitative indices of the two sides is known

$\left(\sqrt{\frac{n_1}{n_2}}\right)$, then formula (5) is employed in computations in place of formula (6).

We shall further note that in calculations one can estimate the correlation of forces separately for each arm, without reducing their combat capabilities to a single equivalent force of one or the other side.

Lacking a better method of determining correlation of forces, we shall assume that with massive employment of combat units of various conventional weapons arms, the ratio of the resultant forces of the belligerents will be close to the mean arithmetic value of the ratios for these arms.

Taking this comment into account and employing formulas (2), (3) and (6), we have elaborated several indices of Soviet combat experience during the Great Patriotic War.⁴ The results of this elaboration are summarized in tables 1 and 2. The calculations made it possible to determine:

numerical value of the index of average daily combat effectiveness of weapons employed by the two sides -- $\beta = \sqrt{n_1 n_2}$ (on the basis of formulas (2) and (3));

proportionality factor -- k (according to formula (6)).

1 Кампании	Начальное превосходство в силах на участках прорыва (N_1/N_2) 5				Глубина обороны в км (L) 10	11 Продолжи- тельность прорыва обороны в сут- ках (t_d) 12	Сред- няя темп- на- ступле- ния (км в сутки) (V_a) 12	Рассчитанные величины 13	
	по об- разам (сб. об.) 6	по тан- кам и САУ 7	по ар- тилле- рии 8	сред- нее 9				сред- нее точ- ное значе- ние 14	k
Зимняя 1942/43 года 2	2-3	2-3	3-4	2.8	4.5	1.25	3.6	0.34	0.07
Летне-осенняя 1943 года 3	3-4	3-4	5-7	4.3	13.0	1.25	10.4	0.28	0.10
Кампании 1944/45 года 4	5-7	3-5	7-9	6.0	14.0	1.20	11.7	0.24	0.08

Table 1. Offensive engagement indices for rifle divisions in penetrating a tactical defense zone during the Great Patriotic War

Key to table: 1 -- campaign; 2 -- 1942-43 winter; 3 -- 1943 summer-fall; 4 -- 1944-45 campaigns; 5 -- initial superiority in forces in penetration areas (N_1/N_2); 6 -- in battalions (rifle battalions, infantry battalions); 7 -- in tanks and self-propelled guns; 8 -- in artillery; 9 -- average; 10 -- defense depth in km (L); 11 -- duration of defense penetration in days (t_d); 12 -- average rate of advance (km per day) (V_a); 13 -- computed quantities; 14 -- average daily value β

Note: $V_m=30$ km per day was employed in computing quantity k

Analysis of the obtained results confirms the possibility of extending the relations proceeding from formulas (2-6) to combined-arms combat.

This conclusion is substantiated in the first place by the fact that the numerical values of the index of average daily combat effectiveness of the weapons of both sides, β , computed with formulas (2) and (3), are in satisfactory agreement with the actual average daily ammunition consumption by Soviet troops in these operations: a greater or lesser value β corresponds to greater or lesser average daily ammunition consumption in the operations. This is easily demonstrated by comparing in Table 2 the duration of each of three operations and their corresponding quantities β (assuming identical ammunition consumption per weapon unit for all operations).

In addition, index β in its numerical value generally correctly reflects the actual expenditure of ammunition by combat operation stages. It is apparent from tables 1 and 2 that penetration of the operational defense zone requires a greater daily expenditure of ammunition than for the entire operation as a whole (first 4-6 days of the Vistula-Oder Operation), while the greatest expenditure occurs on the first day of the operation, that is during penetration of the tactical defense zone. Obviously the adversary had analogous ammunition consumption dynamics during the course of combat operations, as is attested by the figures on distribution of average daily casualties for the same operation stages.

Table 2. Values β and k Computed on the Basis of the Indices of Several Soviet Army Offensive Operations

Name of Operation	Duration of Combat Operations, days (t_D)	Computed Quantities	
		Average Daily Value	k
Belorussian (23 June-29 August 1944)	68	0.006	0.08
Lvov-Sandomierz (13 July-29 August 1944)	48	0.009	0.08
Vistula-Oder (12 January-7 February 1945)			
for the entire operation as a whole .	27	0.011	0.09
on main attack axes of the front:			
First Belorussian Front	4	0.09	0.08
First Ukrainian Front	6	0.038	0.06

Note: a) in computing quantity k we assumed that throughout the depth of the entire operation $V_m=50$ km per day, and on the main axes of advance of the fronts, during penetration of operational defense, $V_m=40$ km per day; b) quantities β and k were computed with the same method as in Table 1, while the overall correlation of forces was figured on the basis of men, tanks, artillery, and aircraft.

In the second place, insignificant deviations of particular values of the proportionality factor computed in tables 1 and 2 on the basis of formula (6) from average $k=0.08$ indicate the acceptability of formula (3) for analyzing combat operations of a combined-arms character and the practical validity of its replacement by linear equation (4).

Substituting in formula (6) average value $k=0.1$ (rounding off to the nearest tenth), we are able to compute approximately the average anticipated rate of advance under conditions of employment of conventional weapons:

$$V_a = 0.1 \left(\frac{N_1}{N_c} - 1 \right) V_m. \quad (7)$$

Formula (7) applies when $1 < \frac{N_1}{N_c} < 10$ and can be correct only on the average, that is it is used to determine the most expected result.

One cannot help but note that the average obtained value of factor k was practically identical for the engagement and operation, in spite of their great differences in scale and number of troops involved. This "versatility" of quantity k is due primarily to formula (3). In the former case (Table 1) there is a shallow depth of combat operations and high average daily ammunition consumption, which directly affects quantity β . In the second case (Table 2), it is the contrary: a comparatively great depth of combat operations and relatively smaller average daily ammunition consumption.

The difference in number of troops involved in the engagement and operation does not affect the rate of advance, since formula (3) considers only the ratio of forces and not their absolute values. Values k may differ somewhat in magnitude if one employs for the calculations in tables 1 and 2 one and the same quantity V_m . But there is no basis for such a selection of V_m , since in the last war troop mobility in the tactical zone was determined primarily by rate of infantry advance in combat formations, and by rate of advance of tank and mechanized large units during exploitation of success. In addition, at operational depth, in contrast to the tactical zone, pursuit occupied a prominent position in the operations of attacking troops.

In elaboration of the data in tables 1 and 2, values V_m for the engagement and operation (30 and 50 km per day) were taken on the basis of experience in analyzing numerical data for the Vistula-Oder Operation.⁵

The increased combat effectiveness of modern nonnuclear weapons and an increase in defense depth under the influence of new types of weapons will somewhat raise (according to formula (3)) the rate of advance in comparison with the last war. Lacking numerical data for taking into consideration anticipated increase in rate of advance, we shall limit ourselves to that increase in quantity k which is obtained in formula (7) by rounding off proportionality factor k upward (by 20-25 percent).

The increase in troop mobility which has occurred since the war is taken into account in formula (7) in practical computations of an average value of V_m under specific conditions of the stated combat mission.

Formulas (2-7) employ the correlation of forces at the beginning of combat operations

$(f, \frac{N_1}{N_2})$ and that result of combat (t_{td}, V_a) which is achieved in the engagement of these forces alone. Therefore the correlation of forces is considered general if the rate of advance is determined for the entire depth of the combat mission, or only in the area of penetration if rate of advance during penetration is computed. The correlation of forces of the two sides is obtained with the same method as was employed in elaborating the combat experience data in tables 1 and 2, bearing in mind that the ratio of resultant forces was figured as the mean arithmetic value of ratios in infantry, tanks and artillery -- for combat by combined-arms large units, and for men, tanks, artillery, and aircraft for battle by operational forces.

Mean value V_m is computed for the same depth of enemy defense as the correlation of forces, and it is determined on the basis of an estimate of the defending force (distribution of men and weapons in depth and, in dependence on this, where and to what degree it is possible to penetrate enemy-occupied territory in combat and approach march formations or at en-route speeds), as well as on the basis of assessment of terrain conditions, nature of man-made obstacles, performance capabilities of tanks and infantry, combined-arms units and large units as a whole, and capabilities of control and supply systems. Value V_m , in contrast to V_a , can be determined on the basis of the experience of exercises and maneuvers.

Practical employment of formula (7) will present no difficulties to staffs. As an example let us assume that the following overall superiority in forces has been established with the objective of crushing a defending hostile force and seizing a specified area by attack, employing nonnuclear weapons: 2.8:1 in men; 3.7:1 in tanks; 3.5:1 in artillery; 4.0:1 in aircraft. The combat qualities of the two sides are equal. We shall assume $V_m=100$ km per day. We must approximately calculate the average anticipated rate of advance.

Solution. First we shall reduce the correlation of forces in men and types of weapon to a mean arithmetic value:

$$\frac{N_1}{N_2} = \frac{2.8+3.7+3.5+4.0}{4} = 3.5.$$

Then, substituting formula (7), we obtain:

$$V_a = 0.1(3.5-1) \cdot 100 = 23 \text{ km per day.}$$

Regardless of the power of the weapons employed, the correlation of forces constitutes an objective basis for gaining success in combat. If in the organization and conduct of combat operations, however, commanders relied

solely on the objective potential of the initial correlation of forces, the art of warfare would perhaps not exist. In organizing and conducting combat operations each side endeavors to obtain a favorable change in the correlation of forces by obtaining advantage in method of combat operation.

The profound significance of Suvorov's rule "fight with skill, not numbers" contains the possibility of achieving an advantageous change in the correlation of forces in combat by achieving advantage in the quality of preparation and conduct of combat operations, that is due to the skill of the military commanders, the military skill and valor of the troops. We know, for example, that one important stage in combat operations is selection of place and time for committing to battle support echelons and reserves. Commitment of these troops at the decisive moment and the decisive point can determine the outcome of an engagement and battle.

The adversary, doing an optimal job at this stage of combat operations, will counter the attacking force at the requisite point with his own support echelons and reserves; under this condition the correlation of forces will not be qualitatively changed. If the adversary is slow in countering moves by the attacking force, the latter will be presented with favorable conditions for destroying the defending force piecemeal. In this instance the attacking force alters the correlation of forces to his advantage by improving the quality of conduct of combat operations and achieves a higher rate of advance than the anticipated average.

We shall employ a simple example to illustrate the significance of such a change in correlation of forces.

Let us assume that the initial correlation of forces of the opposing sides is $f \rightarrow 1$. If their methods of combat operations are equivalent, then according to formula (2) the engagement will be a long one ($t_{td} \rightarrow \infty$), and neither side will gain victory prior to onset of the "exhaustion" stage, when the element of chance begins to exert substantial influence on the outcome of combat, in connection with the small number of surviving combat units in both forces.

If one of the sides is forced or for other reasons chooses to commit its forces separately, such as in three equal parts, then the other side, mounting concentrated attacks on each one sequentially, will soon destroy the enemy, since it will possess at all three stages of combat operations an approximately two to threefold superiority in forces (taking its losses into account).

Consequently, in conformity with formulas (1) and (3), under the conditions of this example, for the first variant $V_a \rightarrow 0$ (no advance is expected), and for the second $V_a > 0$ (the rate of advance will have a positive value).

In the other case a change in the correlation of forces can be achieved by anticipating the enemy in deployment and attack, by feinting a concentration of forces in one area and mounting a sudden, decisive attack at another point, etc.

History teaches us that the greatest qualitative gain in correlation of forces is usually achieved by employing new, effective methods of combat operations which are unknown to the enemy. Thus an important role in achieving a high rate of advance is played by the subjective factor, the effect of which in the final analysis is manifested by change in the correlation of forces achieved by improving the quality of combat operations.

We do not consider the conclusions and results presented in this article as final. They without question require further verification and refinement on the basis of employment of more rigorous methods of mathematical analysis and utilization of fuller and more reliable statistical data on the offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War.

FOOTNOTES

1. I. Anureyev and A. Tatarchenko: Primeneniye matematicheskikh metodov v voyennom dele (Employment of Mathematical Methods in Military Affairs), Voenizdat, 1967, pp 215-218; Yu. V. Chuyev: Issledovaniye operatsiy v voyennom dele (Operations Research in Military Affairs), Voenizdat, 1970, pp 139-141.
2. F. Morz and D. Kimbell: Metody issledovaniya operatsiy (Methods of Operations Research), translated from English, A. F. Gorokhov, editor, Izd-vo Sovetskoye radio, 1956.
3. The adversary, in taking the defense, obtains advantages over the attacking force in vulnerability and conditions of fire. This results in inequality $n_1 < n_2$, which qualitatively alters the correlation of forces

$$(f = \frac{N_1}{N_2} \sqrt{\frac{n_1}{n_2}})$$

in favor of the defending force.

4. The figures were taken from the following sources: Table 1 -- from Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No 2, 1968, page 45; Table 2 -- from Operatsii Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 (Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945), Volume II, Voenizdat, 1968, pp 282, 363, 377, 383; Volume 4, Voenizdat, 1959, pp 96, 100, 126, 135, 143, 159.
5. Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No 1, 1965, page 77.

SEA AND OCEAN COMMUNICATIONS AND WARFARE ON THEM

Capt 1st Rank B. Balev, Candidate of Naval Science, Senior Scientist

During the last 60 years there has been a relative regularity of mass flow of goods along primary ocean lines of communication: in peacetime cargo vessels regularly follow more than 300 regular sea routes; grain is shipped on 70 of these, ore on 80, chemicals, fertilizers and coal on almost 50, and oil and petroleum products on more than 100. World maritime shipping volume is steadily increasing. In 1960 it totaled 1,100,000,000 tons, while the volume has presently reached (according to U.N. figures) approximately 2,400,000,000 tons and is continuing to climb.

Dominant in the overall world system of sea lines of communication are sea-lanes crossing the Atlantic, since the most highly-developed nations of Western Europe and North America, which account for the bulk of world maritime shipping, lie on the shores of the Atlantic. In addition, within the Atlantic basin are located major raw material sources for the capitalist world -- the countries of Africa and South America. Also of considerable importance is the fact that sea lines of communication along which short-supply raw materials are exported to Europe and to some extent to the United States from countries contiguous with the Indian and Pacific Ocean basins also pass through the Atlantic.

In addition to an overall increase in maritime shipping, one also observes a change in the nature of this shipping. In the past primarily grain and coal were shipped by sea and ocean, while in the last 10 years more than half of the total shipping volume involved the hauling of oil, since many capitalist countries meet their oil requirements almost entirely with imports.¹

There has also occurred a substantial increase in the volume of iron ore shipped by sea, due to increased steel consumption in the majority of capitalist countries engaged in the arms race and in the development of the arms industry and related branches, including shipbuilding.

The experience of the two world wars indicates that the intensity of maritime shipping increases in wartime. For example, according to figures in the foreign press, during World War I approximately 140,000 troops were transported from the United States to Europe. According to the same source, during World War II 4,300,000 men and approximately 2,700,000,000 tons of combat equipment and military supplies were transported by water from the United States to Europe. This required 2200 convoys, involving 75,000 cargo ships and transports averaging 10-12 thousand tons each. During World War II U.S. maritime shipping operations comprised more than 80 percent of all movement of men and supplies to Europe, which exceeded the figures for World War I 30-fold.

The intensity of maritime shipping is convincingly attested to by figures on cargo ships and troop transport losses and replacement of losses during these wars.²

World cargo ship tonnage steadily grew following the war: by 1955 it exceeded the 1939 level by 30 million register tons, while by 1957 it was 39.2 million register tons above the 1939 level. Total gross capacity of the world merchant fleet rose 17 percent from 1967 through 1969, totaling approximately 200 million register tons by the end of 1969, according to Lloyd's Register. World merchant tonnage rose by 17.5 million tons in 1968 alone (9.5 percent annual growth). We should note that tanker fleet growth is proceeding at an even more rapid pace: in one year alone (from 1 July 1967 to 1 July 1968) it rose by 10.6 percent. Tanker fleet growth has in recent years involved primarily the construction of large-capacity tankers (Japan alone in 1968 built 24 supertankers ranging from 173 to 312 thousand deadweight tons each).

In view of the experience of the two world wars, the postwar dry cargo and tanker fleet growth rate, the achieved level of shipbuilding, as well as the capabilities of all other modes of transport, the majority of foreign experts conclude that in modern wars the significance of sea and ocean lines of communication in many cases becomes even greater. This conclusion is confirmed to a certain degree by postwar events and conflicts. The United States, for example, escalating its aggression in Indochina, transports the bulk of military supplies and approximately 70 percent of troops by ship.

It is true that with development of nuclear missile weapons, which have abruptly changed general views on the conduct of warfare and which have influenced the subsequent development of the art of land and naval warfare, some foreign military experts claim that in a future war sea lines of communication will lose their past significance and, if they are not totally eliminated from plans for conduct of war, they will occupy an extremely modest position in such plans.³ They substantiate this view with the statement that allegedly a considerable portion of weapons and supplies stockpiled in the NATO nations is concentrated in advance in the continental theaters of war, since these stockpiles are essentially replenished on a systematic basis in peacetime. Consequently shipping volume will increase in peacetime and will abruptly decline with the outbreak of hostilities. The supporters of this view claim that missiles, delivered in place of attack aircraft to theaters of war during peacetime and deployed at launch sites together with the requisite equipment, will for all practical purposes need no subsequent follow-up supply by sea. The essential minimum of missile consumables would be transported overseas by air.

A similar solution is assumed for the problem of supplying ground troops overseas. It is envisaged that local sources will be tapped, with production organized locally for the requisite types of supplies, or with requisite stores of supplies stockpiled in advance. Replenishment of ground forces with fresh manpower during the initial, most intensive period of a war by sea is considered simply unrealistic.

Some foreign experts, examining the problem of sea communications as applied to support and supply of naval attack forces, state the assumption that the basing of naval attack forces will be organized on a regional basis in comprehensive combination with ground forces and air bases, supply dumps and supply facilities containing nuclear missile weapons and various types of supplies essential for protracted naval combat operations in these areas without overseas resupplying. This type of organization of basing and supply in their opinion will reduce the need for a steady flow of supplies from overseas. In addition, they claim that the necessity of naval attack force support at sea with supply and repair vessels and the requirements of suitable protection of these ships will substantially reduce navy capability to protect sea lines of communication.

Finally, some theorists present the argument, in order to bolster the view of reduced importance of maritime shipping in a future war, that following employment within a comparatively short period of time of a substantial portion of the world stockpile of nuclear weapons, not only large military forces but entire nations as well will disappear from the face of the earth, together with millions of consumers of all types of supplies, thousands of enterprises requiring raw materials, power, etc. Consequently it will not be necessary to ship peacetime volumes of foodstuffs, raw materials and finished product. And those countries which have not collapsed under nuclear attacks will scarcely be able to conduct regular maritime shipping operations on a substantial scale or to protect them and engage enemy shipping.

The authors of these and other such assumptions and predictions arrive at the opinion that under conditions of a world nuclear missile war sea communications will lose their past significance, and consequently naval combat operations by the belligerents involving the protection of friendly or destruction of hostile shipping will play only a subsidiary role in the system of other missions performed by naval forces.

All these assertions and predictions, judging from foreign publications, are based on the firm assumption that a world nuclear war, if such a war should be initiated, will run its course very rapidly, that is as soon as both sides deliver their first massive nuclear missile strikes.

Can we proceed from this assumption and draw similar conclusions on the role and significance of maritime shipping in a future war? The majority of military experts and foreign naval leaders are of the opinion that there is insufficient basis to do so.⁴

Vast quantities of nuclear warheads have been produced and stockpiled; armed forces have at their disposal powerful vehicles which boast of great speeds and range, designed to deliver these warheads. But in the first place military investigators believe that the opposing sides presently possess sufficient quantities of warheads and delivery vehicles, which can be employed at a moment's notice. In the second place, they believe that means and methods of active and passive defense against these weapons and delivery vehicles will continue to be improved and perfected in all countries possessing nuclear weapons.

Thus it is believed that the above arguments substantiating the lessened significance and role of maritime shipping in a future war can to some degree apply only to the first phase of a nuclear war. The nuclear war proper (judging from the foreign press)⁵ may last a considerable time. During the course of such a war it will be necessary (in addition to the normal system of raw material supply to industry and delivery of materiel and supplies to the combatant armies) to undertake large-scale rebuilding and restoration efforts on the territories of the belligerent nations. This in turn will allegedly generate not a reduction but rather a sharp increase in their requirements in raw materials and replacement equipment, as well as considerable manpower both for replenishing the armed forces, for manning industry and for other purposes.

Local sources of raw materials and stockpiles will either be destroyed or heavily damaged during the initial phase of the war, which will make it necessary to transport them from other, remote areas which have either not been subjected to attack or which have suffered less.

Thus in the opinion of a great many foreign military experts, during certain phases of a war maritime shipping, and consequently the importance of sea lines of communication, will not be reduced to zero.

In addition, one must be aware of the fact, as is asserted abroad, that under present-day conditions nuclear war is not inevitable, even if there occur military conflicts involving several nations possessing nuclear weapons. In World War II all belligerent nations possessed substantial quantities of chemical and even biological weapons. But in spite of the savage character of the war and the most resolute aims of the belligerents, these weapons were not employed on a mass scale.

It is therefore believed that the struggle on sea and ocean lines of communication will continue to be an important and very complex part of the overall military conflict, particularly if it develops into a long, drawn-out war, when sea-lanes will become for some countries essentially the sole arteries capable in some measure of supplying troops in a theater of war.

One can to some extent judge the nature of this struggle under present-day conditions on the basis of the experience of the last war. The savage struggle of the shipping lanes, which began at the very outbreak of the war between the main maritime belligerent nations of Europe -- Britain and Germany -- assumed a unique character: British efforts were aimed at protecting shipping lanes, while German efforts were aimed at disrupting shipping. This struggle for the Germans assumed the form of isolated actions by submarines against enemy cargo ships and transports, primarily in coastal areas and straits. This was due primarily to the fact that the number of German submarines,⁶ their speed submerged and surfaced, navigation equipment and target detection equipment did not permit them to operate effectively in the open ocean. Since Germany lacked naval aviation, it was impossible to conduct at sea the requisite reconnaissance effort to spot convoys and guide submarines to them.

As experience was gained in disrupting shipping, as well as in connection with partial implementation of the plan for intensive development of the submarine fleet,⁷ the Germans shifted from isolated actions to operation in small groups of two to three submarines, and subsequently to so-called "wolf-pack" tactics -- involving highly-maneuverable groups of 10-12 submarines, which later grew to 15-20, operating in coordination with reconnaissance aircraft. After an enemy convoy was spotted by a reconnaissance aircraft the "wolf pack" deployed along a broad front, would be informed by radio of its location, course and speed and would converge on the convoy. It would then proceed on intercept courses at full speed (substantially exceeding the speed of the cargo ships and troop transports) surfaced; closing on the convoy, the submarines would submerge and attack the target ships. If following the attack the situation permitted, the submarines would surface and, overtaking those ships which had survived, would attack them again. At first "wolf packs" were employed during the day, since there was no effective opposition on the part of convoy escort forces. But the submarines shifted to night operations as convoy ASW defense improved.

A strengthening of convoy ASW defense as well as practical ASW experience appreciably diminished the success of German efforts against shipping. But the German navy undertook practically no organizational measures to counter-act ASW forces and therefore lost the battle of the shipping lanes.

In addition to U-boats, which were the principal arm employed against enemy shipping, Germany utilized aircraft and surface units. In making their war preparations the Germans relegated to aviation a secondary role not only in the effort against enemy shipping but also in other operations in remote ocean regions. Lacking a specially-trained naval aviation, the Germans were compelled at the very beginning of the war to utilize their meager air force (which in addition was poorly prepared for action on sea lines of communication) to bomb and torpedo cargo ships, troop transports and warships in coastal areas and for laying mines. Aircraft were used somewhat more extensively for attacking port facilities, shipyards and ship repair facilities. But even these air activities came practically to a stop after 1941 due to the need for aircraft on the Eastern Front, which grew by leaps and bounds year after year.

Operations by German surface naval units (chiefly heavy and light cruisers) involved raiding activities in the Central and South Atlantic, and later in the Indian Ocean as well. At certain times these operations were fairly effective. For example, the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer sank more than 20 cargo ships representing a total tonnage of 140,000 gross register tons in 6 months (beginning in October 1940) of marauding in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean. This brought the British Admiralty to a state of panic and for some time succeeded in disorganizing and partially paralyzing all British shipping.

The German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which destroyed and captured 22 vessels representing a total tonnage of approximately 120,000 gross register tons in 3 months of action in the Atlantic in 1941, were comparatively successful.

As a consequence of a steady improvement in countermeasures, the effectiveness of employment of German surface units against shipping declined steadily. Taking the war as a whole, German surface units did not seriously influence (in comparison with U-boats) disruption of British shipping activities.

The major fighting in the Pacific was between the navies of the United States and Japan. The Americans employed against Japanese shipping chiefly submarines and shore-based aircraft, and later carrier forces as well. In spite of the great extent of Japanese shipping routes and a weak system to defend this shipping, due both to a lack of forces and lack of necessary experience in this area on the part of the Japanese, the Americans at first showed little activity and enjoyed extremely modest success. Only toward the end of the war did they step up their effort against Japanese shipping, with the result that the inflow of raw materials into Japan was reduced sixfold in comparison with the prewar level! But this had no substantial influence on the outcome of the war, since the fate of imperialist

Japan had been in fact predetermined by other factors, chiefly by the defeat of Nazi Germany and entry into the war in the Far East by the Soviet Union.

The battle against shipping during World War II has been thoroughly studied and analyzed by military experts, staffs and scientific research organizations in the majority of the nations of the world, and particularly in the United States and Britain, with the objective of utilizing this experience in a future war, preparations for which reactionary and military circles in these countries began almost immediately after the end of World War II.

Preparing for a new war, the imperialists divided up all land and sea territories controlled by NATO into two principal zones: the European (where according to their plans, major operations most probably would take place), and a sea or ocean zone (in which there would take place military shipping for the support of armed forces operations in the European theater). The so-called NATO Armed Forces Atlantic Command was established (history's first coalition naval command in peacetime), which is engaged in readying for war the entire North Atlantic -- from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer, and from North American coastal waters to the west coast of Europe and Africa (excluding the coastal waters of Great Britain and the English Channel).

Of course in a modern war the system of shipping routes will differ substantially from that of the last war. Judging from published data, a basic role in changing this system will be played by automated air cushion vessels. It is believed that in coming years these ships will have a displacement of 5000 tons and more and will travel at speeds of 80-100 knots, which will enable them to cross the Atlantic in 24 hours.⁸ There will also be a change in the role and missions of the navy in supporting shipping and in military activity along shipping lanes. The forces and means employed to perform these missions will be different, and the methods of their utilization will also change correspondingly.

Of interest are certain views of NATO military experts on organization of shipping in the future. In their opinion, merchant vessels will transition from the present status of general-cargo carriers to large-tonnage specialized, fast, maneuverable dry cargo, mixed cargo-passenger ships and tankers. Development in the area of dry cargo vessels will include large ships equipped to carry such bulk cargoes as ore, sulfur, coal, grain, etc. The total number of vessels of this type will substantially decline (in comparison with the last war), but the size of each ship will increase sharply.⁹ Apparently these ships will have their own self-contained, fairly effective means of ASW and AAW and will be able to be utilized both in single-ship runs and in convoy operations.

In order to reduce the probability of several ships being hit with a single nuclear warhead, convoys can move in dispersed formation and can cover a rather extensive area. Although there will be a smaller number of vessels in a convoy, the defense zone perimeter will maintain reasonable dimensions.

In addition, the fact of dispersed-formation convoys coupled with reduced probability of ships taking a hit will increase the degree of their collision safety when moving at high speeds (20 knots and more). It is believed that convoys will be given strong ship and air escort, including warships and special surface units, submarines, plus reconnaissance, ASW and fighter aircraft. The overall defensive capabilities of such convoys will undoubtedly prove to be rather impressive, and their average rate of movement will increase substantially.

It is assumed that, just as in the last war, submarines and aircraft will constitute the main force in action against enemy shipping, although surface units will also play a greater role. Judging from publications abroad, great hopes are being placed on the possibility of establishing special space stations (manned or unmanned) capable of monitoring shipping movements, maintaining weather observations and providing total information required for controlling forces involved in shipping-interdiction activities.

New high-speed nuclear-powered submarines with practically unlimited range and endurance will be able to attack enemy shipping effectively in all parts of the world ocean, employing missiles, torpedoes and sea mines. Torpedoes and tactical missiles (with or without nuclear warheads) will have a substantial range. This will enable submarines to attack convoys while beyond the range of attack by immediate convoy escort forces (according to present concepts and standards). These submarine capabilities will make it necessary substantially to extend the convoy defense zone, which will require extensive, highly-maneuverable and well-equipped ASW forces, whereby their operational and tactical employment will become considerably more complex.¹⁰

The high submerged speed of nuclear submarines (up to 25 knots) will also substantially increase their combat capabilities on shipping lanes, even against modern high-speed cargo vessels and their escort ships. In World War II a speed of 20 knots guaranteed cargo ships and troop transports against submarine attack,¹¹ while today this speed is inadequate.

Finally, if one considers the massive employment of nuclear submarines in a future war, the importance and at the same time the complexity of the problem of protecting shipping against undersea forces will become quite obvious.

Aviation will constitute a second important arm in warfare on shipping lanes. Aircraft have undergone substantial qualitative changes since World War II -- there has been an increase in speed, range and operating altitudes. Jet-propelled aircraft are armed with new means of detecting and destroying targets. Today aircraft missiles make it possible to attack convoys at sea as well as ports of embarkation and destination without entering the air defense zone.¹² In addition, one of the principal missions of aircraft in the effort against enemy shipping will be reconnaissance of shipping lanes, spotting of enemy convoys and guidance of friendly submarines to these targets.

Surface units will also be employed, but certainly not as extensively (particularly in the ocean) as submarines and aircraft.

Large guided missile and conventional artillery warships will take part in operations against enemy shipping, evidently in conjunction with other naval arms; their mission will be primarily the destruction of enemy convoys which have already been substantially weakened by submarines and air strikes.

Operations by naval forces to disrupt enemy shipping, as in past wars, may assume the most varied forms and scale. Everything will depend on the importance of shipping in a given area at specific times and on the influence of such shipping on the general course of the sea war, and in certain instances on the course and outcome of the conflict as a whole.

Such actions can be carried out both during the course of routine naval combat activity and in the course of sea operations. Operations aimed at disrupting enemy shipping will assume the form either of independent actions carried out by naval forces together with other services, or will constitute a component of large-scale operations in continental theaters.

Efforts against enemy shipping in the form of sea operations involve the participation of substantial naval combat forces, as well as support forces, and the necessity of their prior deployment; this will require a considerable effort on the part of all these forces and will involve an enormous expenditure of resources. In connection with this it is assumed that naval actions against enemy shipping will assume the form and scale of combat operations only in certain cases (for example, in protecting friendly transocean shipping lanes or in disrupting enemy shipping with a high intensity of movement of convoys carrying troops or important military supplies which are of strategic or operational significance in the given period of the war).

In most other cases naval efforts both on transocean and coastal shipping lanes (involving both friendly and enemy shipping) will be of the nature

of routine combat activities conducted on a continuous basis and with varying degree of intensity, depending on the availability of manpower and means as well as the specific situation in the theater or in certain parts of the theater.

The success of actions on shipping lanes depends to a large extent on the composition of naval forces, weapons and equipment, as well as the stability of the control system for these forces. An important role is also played by military-geographic factors (physical-geographic conditions, system of theater basing and equipping).

In conclusion we should emphasize once again that in the opinion of foreign specialists the problem of shipping is just as important today as in the past. Consequently related matters of employment of naval forces on shipping lanes are also of importance for the present and future. Military effort on shipping lanes should be viewed and handled taking into account those major changes which the navy has undergone in weapons and equipment, as well as the further development of the art of war and naval warfare.

FOOTNOTES

1. The United States possesses large oil reserves, but (under the pretext of rapid exhaustion) limits oil production and imports a substantial amount of crude oil from abroad.
2. During World War I, according to British and French figures, merchant vessels representing a total tonnage of approximately 13 million register tons were destroyed as a direct result of military operations; this comprised 27.8 percent of world merchant tonnage as of the end of 1913. In World War II losses in cargo ships and troop transports were even greater: they totaled 21.2 million register tons for the Allies plus neutral countries, and 15 million register tons for the Axis nations. Japanese losses alone (Japan added almost 4 million register tons through wartime ship construction, enlarging its fleet to 10 million register tons) totaled 8.8 million register tons. Total merchant and transport fleet losses sustained by all nations exceeded one half of total world tonnage at the outbreak of the war (1939).
3. A conclusion drawn by a U.S. government commission to review the Poseidon project stated that the former missions and role of navies are becoming obsolete to a certain degree; the mission of protecting shipping is yielding to the mission of employing naval power against land targets. The same commission stated that in a future war the oceans would be transformed from an arena of action against enemy shipping to vast launch site areas for vehicles carrying various missile weapons aimed

at important enemy strategic targets. It is also stated that the NATO command should take steps to reduce to a minimum overseas supply of its troops.

4. Such a viewpoint has been expressed, for example, by U.S. Navy Chief of Staff Zumwalt in an article on plans for revising the principal missions of the U.S. Navy (Armed Forces Journal, 7 December 1970).
5. Maxwell D. Taylor: The Uncertain Trumpet, New York, 1960; Q. E. Lowe: "The Case for the Oceanic Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1968.
6. Upon entering World War II Germany possessed 57 U-boats (22 ocean-going and 35 coastal-service U-boats); no more than 30 percent could be at sea simultaneously. Losses averaged two U-boats a month. By the beginning of 1941 only 21 U-boats were on the line (the fewest at any time of the war).
7. In conformity with this plan, by the end of 1942 Germany possessed 400 U-boats (by the end of 1943 it was planned to have a fleet of 1000 U-boats, which would supposedly guarantee a halt to British shipping. But this plan was not fated for realization: in connection with Soviet victories in the East, the U-boat construction program was sharply curtailed, since the efforts of all German industry were focused on supplying the ground forces, which had sustained immense losses on the Eastern Front).
8. Naval Engineer Journal, No 2, 1970, pp 13-15, 18-22; Navy Times, 29 July 1970.
9. One 300,000 ton supertanker which is presently under construction in Japan is the equivalent of an average-size convoy (containing 30-40 cargo ships) of World War II.
10. "The Next Battle of the Atlantic," Navy, No 2, 1964.
11. During World War II fast ocean liners (with speeds of 20 knots and more) transported large numbers of troops from the United States to Europe, without the loss of a single ship.
12. Ye. Mamayev: "Disruption of Maritime Shipping," Voyennaya Mysl', No 12, 1968.

EMPLOYMENT OF HELICOPTERS IN THE COMBAT OPERATIONS OF GROUND FORCES*

Col I. Andrukhov

Increased troop mobility is a current problem facing present-day armies. Foreign military experts view the extensive employment of helicopters in the Armed Forces as the major direction to take in solving this problem. This is confirmed by the experience of military operations in Indochina, Korea, Algeria, in the Near East and elsewhere.

Helicopters have undergone substantial development and have gone into widespread use in the last 15-20 years. They have assumed a particular importance in the U.S. Armed Forces. In the United States there are more than a dozen companies and divisions of aerospace monopolies specializing in the manufacture of military and nonmilitary helicopters. In 1968 one third of the aircraft in the American armed forces were helicopters (totaling more than 11,000).

Solution of a number of technical problems has promoted growth of the helicopter industry: development of a suitable lightweight powerplant, elimination of vibrations, improvement of autorotation performance in case of engine failure, and many others. In addition, technological advances and the utilization of modern materials have made it possible to design less complicated helicopters which possess an adequate service life and are easy to operate and maintain.

In addition to technical improvements in helicopter design, considerable attention has been devoted to helicopter armament. Helicopters now carry cannon, machineguns, guided missiles, rockets, and grenade launchers. Initially existing aircraft and other weapons were adapted for helicopter use. Since then special helicopter fire systems have been developed to a more substantial degree.

The Americans drew a conclusion from the experience of the war in Vietnam that it was necessary to elaborate a comprehensive weapons system based on the helicopter. The development program was designated AA FSS (Air Artillery Fire Support System). After several years of trial and experiment, the Americans developed the AH-56A Cheyenne helicopter.

Helicopters are equipped with various instruments and devices, depending on the nature of the mission to be performed. Rescue helicopters carry special receivers to pick up downed airmen, rescue beacon signals, ASW helicopters carry submarine search gear, transport helicopters carry loading gear, etc.

* From materials in the foreign press.

In order to increase helicopter survivability, cockpit, seats and other important structures are being given armor-plate protection to an increasing degree. Not only metal alloys but ceramics as well are used to fabricate elements resistant to small-arms fire; such materials are used to fabricate protective panels, seats and flak vests for light helicopter crews.

Helicopters are used most extensively in ground forces combat operations. In the United States, Great Britain and other NATO member nations, approximately 80 percent of all armed forces helicopters are used for this purpose. Helicopters became operational in the U.S. ground forces at the beginning of World War II. At that time a total of 400 helicopters were purchased. By 1964 the number had increased to 3800, and by the end of 1968 -- to about 8000; it was planned to increase the total number to 11,000 in 1970. There will be a further increase in the future. According to a statement by the commander of U.S. Army Aviation, by 1980 the U.S. Army will have a total of 18,000 helicopters.

Based on the experience of the war in Indochina, which the United States is waging with the extensive employment of helicopters, military leaders in the FRG, Great Britain and other countries have recently begun devoting greater attention to developing helicopters and making them operational. At the beginning of 1968 British ground forces had a total of approximately 340 helicopters. In the next 10 years it is planned to purchase an additional 850 helicopters of new design. By the beginning of 1968 the FRG ground forces had a total of approximately 500 helicopters; in 1967 manufacture of helicopters for the Bundeswehr began under American license, followed by the manufacture of helicopters of German design.

The use of helicopters for ground forces, as has been stated above, is presently the principal trend. This determines helicopter types, design and principal development trends.

In the ground forces the helicopter is used primarily as a *means of transport* on the battlefield, particularly in connection with development of the concept of ground forces "airmobility." Intensive work being conducted in the armies of the United States, FRG and other NATO nations in the area of increasing the mobility of ground troops by use of helicopters is in full conformity with those changes which have taken place in the views of these nations' military leaders pertaining to the role and significance of ground troops in war. Adoption of the strategy of "flexible response" resulted in intensified attention toward the development of ground troops weapons suitable for utilization not only in a general nuclear-missile war but also in so-called limited wars without nuclear weapons or with utilization of only tactical nuclear weapons. This attention has not abated since adoption of the doctrine of "realistic deterrence."

Former U.S. Defense Secretary McNamara stated in June 1965 that use of the helicopter to transport men and weapons to the battlefield will provide great freedom of troop movement and will make it possible to employ the element of surprise on an unprecedented scale. Many foreign military specialists are of the opinion that in connection with the increased mobility provided by helicopters it is hardly worthwhile to waste efforts on further development of APCs, trucks, prime movers and other vehicles which will be only somewhat superior to existing models.

U.S. Army leaders believe that an army which employs helicopters will be taking a decisive step in the direction of increasing tactical mobility, which constitutes an essential condition for achieving success in combat.

Simultaneously with adoption of helicopters by ground forces there occurred a determination of their tasks, elaboration of theoretical principles of utilization and the solving of various organizational problems. The helicopters which became operational were assigned to so-called army aviation, where they now occupy a dominant position. The quantitative ratio of army light aircraft to helicopters is now 1:7. The structure of helicopter subunits is continuously being improved, as helicopter development, methods of helicopter utilization and tactics advance.

In the U.S. ground forces there are helicopter subunits (platoon, company, battalion, group) in the T/O of the field army, army corps, infantry, armored, mechanized and airmobile divisions, separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments.

In April 1967 the Americans formed an army helicopter brigade in Vietnam, of helicopter units and subunits of army aviation GHQ reserve; this brigade constituted the highest operational large unit. It included several helicopter groups, including one maintenance and supply group. It totaled 900 helicopters and 14,000 men. This was the first large army aviation unit in the U.S. ground forces.

The composition of army aviation groups is determined by their purpose and missions. Normally they contain 3-4 battalions. These groups handle airmobile operations and tactical air support. In addition, in Vietnam several army aviation groups, separate battalions and companies were attached to field commands.

In addition to army aviation units and subunits in the GHQ army aviation reserve, field armies, corps, divisions, separate brigades and armored cavalry regiments, U.S. ground forces contain army aviation units and subunits organized into special units -- airmobile large units and units. The latter can conduct combat operations both independently and in coordination with other troops. Helicopters constitute their principal means of

maneuver. This is a totally new type of unit, formed in connection with resolving the problem of increasing troop tactical mobility.

The 1st Airmobile Division was formed in July 1965. All division weapons, combat equipment and transport vehicles are air-transportable. Use of helicopters as means of transport has made it possible to reduce the number of trucks in the division to 1600 (an infantry division contains more than 3500).

The advantage of such a division consists in the fact that it is capable not only of effecting maneuver of subunits on the battlefield with the aid of aircraft but also to offer fire support to combat subunits with air-displaced artillery, as well as with helicopter-mounted weapons.

In the opinion of U.S. military experts, the airmobile division differs substantially from infantry and airborne divisions not only by its tactical but also its strategic mobility. Its total weight is only one third of that of the infantry division. A strategic displacement requires approximately half to three fourths the total number of flights required by infantry or airborne divisions. In a strategic airlift a full-strength airmobile division (with weapons and combat vehicles) can be displaced by C-130 military transports twice as fast as an infantry division.

Airmobile units have the capability of flexible maneuver with their own resources, controlling large areas and conducting combat operations over substantial areas, regardless of natural or man-made obstacles. In the opinion of U.S. military leaders, an airmobile division can carry out all combat missions with equal (if not greater) success as other regular army divisions. Possibly the sole exception is its utilization in position defense, when specified terrain must be held for an extended time. Such a division can, however, handle this type of mission as well, with appropriate reinforcement with tanks and guns, and with appropriate support. It is capable of operating in an army corps covering zone up to 100 km wide, securing its flanks, conducting vigorous combat operations on individual axes, etc. Finally, the new division can perform the functions of an airmobile corps or army reserve, capable of rapid maneuver over substantial distances under conditions of roadless terrain, destruction, roadblocks or terrain radioactive contamination.

In addition to the above-mentioned 1st Airmobile Division, in mid-1968 the U.S. command also reorganized the 101st Airborne Division, which was stationed in Vietnam, into an airmobile division. It now has 450 helicopters in place of 100. Airmobile troops are beginning to be formed in the armed forces of other capitalist nations as well.

Thus helicopters are not only being assigned to large units and units but themselves can form the basis of combat units.

At the present time the United States, on the basis of experience in employing airmobile troops in Vietnam, is proceeding with the further improvement of their organizational structure and methods of employment under various conditions. Units are being formed which contain both helicopters and tanks. It is believed that these qualitatively new combat units can be successfully employed in all theaters and in any type of war.

The principal mission of the many missions performed by helicopters in ground forces is the delivery of *airmobile task forces*. The helicopter has become firmly entrenched as the principal means of delivering AMTFs behind enemy lines. It has also become an effective weapon capable of supporting disembarked troops.

Military leaders in the United States, the FRG and other NATO member nations believe that employment of mass destruction weapons, which dictates dispersal of troops along the front and in depth, abrupt and swift battlefield situation changes, create extensive possibilities for employment of AMTFs with various missions, particularly for the immediate exploitation of nuclear strike results. It is also believed that AMTFs will be extensively employed in operations involving solely conventional weapons. Numerous examples of their utilization in military operations in Vietnam serve to confirm this view.

In the view of military experts in the United States, the FRG and other NATO member nations, AMTFs will be assigned the missions of seizing tactically advantageous objectives (major bridges, river-crossing sites, defiles, road junctions), destroying offensive nuclear weapons, control centers, supply dumps, communications facilities and other important installations. AMTF operations can be ordered under the most varied conditions: in attack, in pursuit, in the meeting engagement, in withdrawal, in defense, etc. AMTF operations should be employed on a massive basis, swiftly and with the element of surprise. An AMTF can vary in size from a company to a regiment.

The depth of AMTF deployment, in the view of U.S. military leaders, should be determined by the range of ground forces weapons. These views are shared by other Western armies. For example, in the Bundeswehr it is believed that a battalion-size AMTF can be delivered to a depth of 30 km and more.

It is recommended that AMTFs be landed in relatively weakly-defended areas or following artillery preparation. Local air superiority must be gained in advance for a successful landing operation.

AMTFs can be landed during the day, at night and under reduced-visibility conditions. The decision to conduct a tactical airmobile operation is made at the division level or higher.

So-called *airmobile operations* have been employed on a large scale in the war in Vietnam. As specified in U.S. field manuals, they constitute a form of action in which ground forces subunits and units are transported by helicopters for the purpose of executing assigned missions. In addition, the combat operations of these subunits and units are supported on the battlefield by helicopter firepower. Characteristic of these operations is speed of displacement of troops by air within the area of operations, regardless of man-made and natural obstacles which present difficulties to ground movement.

Tactical airmobile groups of airmobile (infantry, airborne) subunits, artillery subunits, engineer troops (depending on their mobility and air-transportability) and army aviation are formed for the conduct of airmobile operations. The composition of these groups is determined primarily by the mission, hostile forces and nature of terrain in the pending area of operations. Groups may contain from several platoons to several battalions of ground troops and army aviation.

Airmobile operations are carefully planned and executed under unified direction. Basic problems of planning and execution are normally handled at the battalion level. Brigade and division commanders determine only the general plan of operations, assign missions, attach the requisite manpower and means to the battalions and secure coordination of fire support.

It is believed that success in any airmobile operation is achieved primarily by speed and surprise. An ideal situation is when the enemy is hit immediately after he is located. The role of reconnaissance of all types, particularly air reconnaissance, increases greatly in connection with this.

Foreign military experts believe that helicopters can be employed both in offensive operations and in *the defensive engagement for executing counterattacks*. Therefore when organizing defense one should place in reserve fire support and transport helicopter subunits.

In order to achieve the objective of a counterattack it is necessary swiftly to establish a superiority in manpower and firepower and to launch a surprise attack at an advantageous point and at the proper time. AMTF transport helicopters make it possible to execute these missions. By utilizing them the commander can transport his subunits across natural and man-made obstacles, over enemy troops into his rear, from which they can launch a coordinated attack together with frontally-advancing subunits into the penetrating hostile force. A high rate of movement and precision in

troop actions during the conduct of a counterattack with helicopters are achieved only when the counterattack has been correctly planned and the mission has been assigned to the troops in a prompt manner.

The helicopter possesses great potential for utilization *in the interests of artillery and missile troops*. With the aid of helicopters it is possible to select firing positions, to shift observation posts swiftly, to effect artillery regrouping, to adjust artillery fire, and to deliver missiles to launching sites together with crews, launchers and control gear.

During the hostilities in Vietnam the American command has mounted so-called "artillery raids" behind enemy lines. Four-gun batteries would be helicopter-transported to an area where guerrilla forces were believed to be concentrated. Following disembarkation and suitable preparation, the battery would fire 60 rounds from each piece and then withdraw from the area.

It is believed that it will be possible to employ the helicopter not only as a means of transporting artillery pieces but also as a flying gun platform; carrying a large number of guided missiles on board, it will deliver brief fire from a hovering or ground position, after which it will disappear as rapidly as it appeared.

Fire support helicopters are being employed more extensively. As is indicated by the experience of combat in Vietnam, ground subunits, skillfully employing the helicopter gunship, are able to maneuver their fire support means more broadly and in a more diversified manner. A helicopter carrying weapons is particularly valuable in that it can be called in at that critical moment when the subunit has reached the assault objective, when artillery and tactical aircraft are unable to provide fire support without risking hitting friendly troops.

The basis of success in employing fire support helicopters is closely coordinated interaction between the helicopters and ground troops. First of all it is essential thoroughly to coordinate methods of requesting helicopter fire and the procedure of guiding helicopters to the targets. Only if these requirements are met will helicopters be able to offer effective support to ground troops.

Fire support helicopters perform a great number of missions during the course of an airmobile operation. At all stages of the operation they support the AMTF from the air.

During pickup of troops and equipment these helicopters guard the troop pickup zone until the transport helicopters take off. They also conduct air reconnaissance of adjacent terrain.

After the transport helicopters take off, fire support helicopters provide en-route escort and security. Normally they proceed on the flanks of the formation, echeloned in altitude and along the front. The fire support helicopters reach the landing area several minutes prior to the transport helicopters in order to neutralize spotted targets or to deliver fires on areas containing possible targets.

When field artillery in conjunction with fire support helicopters is employed to support the landing operation, fire support helicopters move into the landing area immediately after cessation of artillery preparation, followed by the transport helicopters. During the landing operation the fire support helicopters deliver barrage fire above the landing area and area of combat operations, delivering fires on targets both designated from the ground and spotted from the air. After the troops have disembarked, the fire support helicopters give direct aerial support to the ground subunits, neutralizing and destroying hostile personnel and weapons.

Considerable importance is attached to the utilization of helicopters to *engage tanks*. It is believed that the mounting of AT guided missiles on helicopters will improve the conditions of missile combat utilization, will increase target detection range, will ensure missile firing from a tactically advantageous point, and will increase the mobility of this weapon in engaging tanks.

It is recommended that helicopters be utilized against tanks in close coordination with ground troops. In order to reduce the vulnerability of the helicopters, the units with which they are coordinating should help secure their safety, providing the helicopter subunits with information on the situation and enemy forces, guiding their actions and if possible giving them fire support.

A new and important mission performed by the helicopter on the battlefield is that of *providing control and communications*. In Vietnam the American command makes extensive use of helicopters as airborne command posts. In particular, the UH-1D Iroquois general-purpose helicopter has been modified for such service. It contains a decimeter-band radio to control helicopters in the air, a 1-meter band radio to control tactical aircraft, and an fm radio set to control ground units and subunits. The Americans are testing several communications systems on other types of helicopters as well, such as the Chinook, which is large enough to accommodate the greater number of personnel required for controlling brigade combat operations.

Foreign military experts believe that the use of a helicopter as an airborne command post greatly increases the commander's capability to control troop combat activities. Helicopters are being extensively used as radio

transmission relay facilities, for laying wire, and as a mobile communications facility.

The helicopter can be used *for reconnaissance purposes*, and as a transport and combat vehicle in delivering reconnaissance groups behind enemy lines. They are also extensively employed for aerial photoreconnaissance, for which they are equipped with camera systems with vibration compensation. TV cameras and other equipment are also mounted on reconnaissance helicopters.

The use of helicopters by reconnaissance subunits greatly increases the capabilities of the latter. They can conduct reconnaissance across a broader zone and in greater depth. With helicopters these subunits are capable of conducting chemical and radiological reconnaissance and dosimetric survey, of providing troop cover, particularly on exposed flanks and points of contact, of seizing and holding weakly-defended areas and important sections of terrain.

In performing *security missions* helicopters are used either as a security escort or as a transport vehicle to carry subunits assigned these missions. In Vietnam American helicopters escort truck supply columns. Moving out ahead of the column, they can promptly spot a source of danger and alert the column so that measures can be taken to wipe out ambushes.

It is believed that helicopters will be extensively employed *to provide support in river-crossing operations*. In the opinion of foreign military experts, an extremely promising use of helicopters will be the delivery of bridge structures to river-crossing sites and the placement of such structures at the site. The American, British, French, and other armies have conducted experiments in this area.

In the U.S. Army and those of other NATO nations helicopters are extensively employed for *aerial mine-planting*. The United States has developed weapons systems with AP mines. Their basic components are fuselage-mounted cluster racks. Following release, the mines bury themselves into the ground to a shallow depth and are triggered by foot pressure or by a time-delay device. An AT mine has also been developed which can be planted by helicopter. It is believed that utilization of helicopters will make it possible to plant mines extremely rapidly, which will provide the capability of mining terrain directly ahead of an advancing hostile force.

In Vietnam the Americans are employing helicopters on a large scale *for airlifting supplies*. Helicopters can be used to ferry cargo from ship to shore, from shore to military bases and directly to troops in the field.

Examining the system of delivery of supplies by air in such theaters as Europe, some foreign military experts believe that the operation should be organized so that supplies are ferried by fixed-wing aircraft from rear areas to forward bases, and from there by helicopter to troops in the field. Transport helicopters can carry small quantities of supplies short distances, utilizing the most primitive landing sites. Helicopters of the "flying crane" type are capable of transporting large, heavy items.

Fuel requirements are growing along with increased density of battlefield vehicle use. In connection with this the United States is developing systems which will speed up and simplify *troop fuel supply*. In particular, soft fuel containers have been developed, to be carried by CH-47A Chinook helicopters and others. These are unique flying gas stations for terrestrial and amphibious vehicles. In South Vietnam a Chinook helicopter carries up to 4000 liters of fuel in a soft container.

During the course of fighting in South Vietnam the Americans have employed helicopters on a large scale for *support services*, and particularly for evacuating damaged fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, trucks, etc. Up to the beginning of 1968 CH-47A Chinook helicopters alone have evacuated 2500 damaged fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters in South Vietnam. It is believed that helicopters can also be used as field repair shops.

Evacuation of wounded is considered to be one of the most important missions performed by helicopters. Frequently helicopters are the only means by which seriously wounded can be delivered quickly and with care to medical facilities for urgently needed medical assistance. According to American figures, about 90 percent of those wounded in Vietnam have been evacuated from battlefield collection points directly to military hospitals within 1 to 2 hours after being wounded. This has greatly assisted in sharply reducing the number of fatalities from serious wounds.

Military leaders in the United States, the FRG and other countries believe that in spite of the unique features of the Vietnam theater, *experience gained in employing helicopters can be extended to other theaters as well*, including Europe, *both for nuclear and nonnuclear war*. The opinion is expressed abroad that in a nuclear war the conditions of conduct of combat operations may in many ways be similar to those of the war in Vietnam. In both cases there are no clearly-delineated battlefront lines, troops are greatly dispersed, are difficult to locate and pin down. A tactic is employed in Vietnam which calls for closing with the enemy to a maximum degree in order to reduce the action of hostile artillery attacks and air-strikes. It is believed that this tactic will also be employed as a defensive technique against nuclear attacks. The Vietnamese prefer night operations -- the same can be expected in a nuclear war; they carry out swift and frequent troop shifts, which forces the Americans each time to concentrate their personnel and firepower in a new area -- this will also be

the case in a nuclear war. The Americans resort to guerrilla-type tactics and spread out in small groups for the purpose of searching out or luring the enemy into an ambush, which produces additional requirements for lines of communication, control, supply and evacuation of these groups. The same will probably apply to a nuclear war.

In the opinion of foreign experts the above indicates that helicopters will be extensively employed not only in a war fought with conventional weapons but also in a nuclear war, not only in such theaters as Vietnam but in all others as well. It is borne in mind that under the conditions of other theaters artillery, air power, tanks, advanced antiaircraft weapons, etc may be extensively employed. This will probably make utilization of helicopters more difficult. It is believed abroad, however, that under new conditions it will be necessary merely to alter the methods of their utilization and tactics. The Americans believe that in developed theaters (Europe, for example), airmobile troops will be able to operate successfully under conditions of a nuclear world war.

Examining the possibilities of employing fire support helicopters in a nuclear war, foreign military experts proceed first and foremost from the point that troop density will be low. This will substantially increase the capabilities of fast shift of troops and weapons greater distances. Consequently troop mobility assumes an even greater role than in conventional warfare. In addition, radioactive contamination of extensive areas will make utilization of motorized troops difficult. It is therefore possible that under such difficult conditions fire support helicopters will prove to be that type of weapon which will possess greater preparedness for immediate utilization than other weapons, and consequently may be extensively utilized.

It is assumed that helicopters will be extensively used for performing *civil defense* missions. Here they can be employed chiefly as control means. In addition, helicopters are capable of carrying out a great number of missions connected with providing communications, transportation, supply, as well as for rescue, medical aid, etc.

Foreign military experts believe that solution of problems connected with increasing helicopter efficiency will lead to a further increase in their role, and they will continue occupying a significant position among the various types of aircraft.

Improvement of current model helicopters is proceeding in several directions: increase in range, speed, endurance and payload, all-weather operations, improved safety and more simplified maintenance.

The most important of these problems is that of increasing speed, which is particularly important for transport helicopters. Greater speed will lessen the vulnerability of helicopters involved in combat operations, will make it possible to save time in rescue operations, etc. A good deal of research, experimentation and testing is being devoted to this problem in various countries, particularly the United States.

Ways are being sought to increase helicopter payload. Studies have shown the possibility of designing and building a heavy transport helicopter which can carry a 50-ton payload.

In connection with the trend toward a substantial increase in helicopter utilization for military purposes and an increase in the number of missions they can perform, one observes a sharp increase in demands on helicopter airborne equipment. Development is proceeding in the direction of designing special landing equipment, developing equipment securing safe formation flight, as well as equipping helicopters with radars whose antennas are placed inside the main rotor blades, etc. Lasers are being more and more extensively employed on board helicopters.

New materials are being used in helicopter construction. Aluminum, magnesium, and steel are being joined by titanium, fiberglass, as well as special boron and carbon (or carborundum) containing alloys.

It is believed that in the near future research and development will result in helicopters which are reliable in design, simple in operation and maintenance as well as inexpensive to manufacture. This will make it possible to utilize helicopters even more extensively to perform the most varied missions in the interests of ground forces.

QUESTIONS ON THE METHODS OF ORGANIZING COMBAT OPERATIONS*

(Responses to Our Articles)

Col A. Serov; Col Ye. Sokolov; Col B. Trusevich; Col N. Kil'yachenkov

We agree with Col V. Vinnikov's suggestion about practical adoption of stage-by-stage organization of the engagement, which will enable commanders and staffs to utilize more fully the time at their disposal prior to receiving the combat mission. While we are in general agreement with the author's recommendations on this matter, we cannot agree with his opinion on the possibility of employing the traditional method of organization for combat under present-day conditions. It is true that he specifies only two instances for this: the conduct of experimental games and initial training of young officers in methods of organization for combat. Here Comrade Vinnikov has apparently contradicted his own assertions to a certain degree. We feel that in principle he has demonstrated quite persuasively the objective necessity and advantages of the method of stage-by-stage organization for combat. Consequently this method, as the most effective method, should be employed in all cases, including the two mentioned in the article. There has been a sharp reduction in the time available to prepare for combat operations; the volume of work required in this area has substantially increased, and the difficulty of performing this work has grown immeasurably.

Today one cannot count on pauses in the fighting, as was the case in the past. Under conditions of highly dynamic, intense and maneuvering combat operations conducted continuously, with abrupt and frequent situation changes, preparation for the execution of each successive mission is effected during the course of combat, in the process of carrying out the preceding mission. The dynamic nature of warfare demands that commanders and staffs continuously and carefully watch for situation changes, that they be able to predict situation development and be able to act prior to the adversary. Consequently exceptional importance is acquired by conduct of a maximum number of organizational measures prior to mission assignment, but this is not reflected in the traditional method of organization for combat. Therefore, although this method has served us well in the past, it is not adequate for today's combat.

There is no question of the need to seek improved methods of organization for combat. It is important not to delay in selecting the best one and promptly to adopt it in practical troop training. Accomplishment of this

* Continuation of discussion of the problem examined in an article by Col V. Vinnikov (Voyennaya Mysl', No 5, 1971, pp 70-75).

task is considerably facilitated if one is guided by well-substantiated criteria which enable one objectively to determine the advantages and drawbacks of a given method. In our opinion the demands pertaining to organization for combat as advanced by the author of the article constitute such criteria: securement of maintenance of continuous troop readiness to carry out combat missions; efficient use of time in the preparation period and achievement of efficiency, effectiveness and secrecy of organization for combat at all echelons; display of initiative, prudence and enhanced responsibility on the part of officials involved for the prompt and quality performance of their duties.

We consider it essential to add one more requirement to the above -- securement for subunit commanders of a maximum number of daylight hours for on-the-spot organizational effort.

Guided by the above criteria, one can be convinced that with formal adherence to the traditional pattern of organization of combat it is far from fully promoting prompt adoption of measures to maintain (improve) troop combat efficiency. This effort by commanders and staffs is sometimes unjustifiably made dependent on the time a mission is assigned and is carried out only following estimates of the adversary and one's own troops. But the combat mission is not communicated simultaneously to all echelons. It would be clearly impermissible to conduct such measures as the forming of composite subunits and units, bringing them up to personnel and equipment strength, assisting casualties, and resupplying only after the operation order has been received.

This is why the author is certainly correct in asserting that estimate of friendly troops should be continuous, anticipatory and coordinated, promoting both rapid adoption of a well-substantiated decision in an abruptly-altered situation and the anticipatory execution of measures to maintain (improve) the combat capability of each unit, subunit and troop control entity.

Other demands on organization for combat stated by the author are also quite legitimate. If one analyzes the traditional method with guidance by these demands, one can arrive at several important conclusions.

Let us assume that at an exercise organization for combat is initiated in the assembly area only after the operation order has been received. But almost every command-staff entity always has at its disposal a certain amount of time, sometimes a considerable amount, prior to receipt of the order. The lower the echelon, the greater the time available. It would be unforgivable not to use every hour, every minute to prepare for imminent combat. The traditional pattern of organization for combat does not provide for the conduct of any measures prior to receiving the operation

order, that is in this case the time factor, which under present-day conditions becomes exceedingly important, is not fully taken into consideration. Potential for increasing the efficiency of organization for combat is not utilized.

Also important is the fact that the sequence employed in organization of combat operations does not impel trainees to display initiative and foresight in the conduct of preparatory measures in anticipation of the next assignment. Essentially the pattern to some degree justifies the sometimes observed passivity on the part of certain executing individuals -- officers of arms, special troops and services. It works out as follows: if an operation order has been received, there is an impelling reason to prepare for combat; if no operation order has been received or it was received with a delay -- omissions in the organization of combat operations are justified. Thus we can state that when officers learn organization for combat on the traditional pattern, their organizer skills develop slowly, and less persistence is shown in their development of a sense of responsibility for performance of their duties. These deficiencies are lacking in the stage-by-stage organization for combat. The author is also correct in emphasizing that incomplete utilization of time prior to receiving an operation order also to a certain degree leads to certain omissions in the subsequent efforts of commanders and staffs. The following situation occurs: prior to receiving the operation order, commanders and staffs have a certain amount of time at their disposal, but time is clearly insufficient after receiving the order. We feel that this contradiction is resolved to a sufficient degree by applying the method of stage-by-stage organization of combat operations.

Also unquestionably correct is Colonel Vinnikov's statement that receipt of the operation order should be preceded by study and thorough analysis of available data on the situation on the axis (zone, area) of anticipated operations. We believe that this opinion is correct because a combat mission assigned by the higher commander or determined through initiative is the consequence of the prevailing situation. The sooner a commander is adequately familiar with the situation and follow situation changes, the faster he will be in reaching a well-founded decision, the more fully and promptly he will prepare his troops to carry out any unexpectedly arising combat mission.

A question arises in connection with this -- is it possible prior to receiving the next specific mission to complete that extent of measures specified in the Vinnikov article? In our opinion it is possible only if the commander and his staff are sufficiently experienced and if the officers have been trained to show foresight, initiative and ingenuity.

In confirmation of the above we should like to present an example from a command-staff exercise at which the following initial situation was created. The enemy delivered several nuclear strikes into a large unit's permanent deployment area and onto neighboring installations, followed by an air attack with napalm and other ordnance. Fires broke out and considerable collapse of structures occurred. Commando teams destroyed some bridges and corduroy road across difficult terrain. Communications with some units were lost. Simultaneously with the enemy attack, headquarters received an operation order to proceed to a specified area and to be prepared to initiate offensive operations.

The commander quickly made his decision, communicated missions to the units personally and through liaison officers, and issued the requisite instructions to his staff in conformity with the current situation. Both the commander and his staff took steps first of all to determine the results of the enemy attacks, to determine the state of each unit and subunit, and to organize recovery of the combat capability of some of them. We shall note that at this moment not a single officer attempted initially to assess the enemy and only thereafter to assess friendly troops.

Only after measures had been spelled out for securing troop readiness to carry out the forthcoming mission and verification had been organized did the commander and his staff concentrate their attention on an analysis of other situation data. This work continued en route and in the destination area. By this time additional information came in from higher headquarters, in particular on enemy nuclear strikes in the area of anticipated operations.

A total analysis of available situation data enabled the commander and his staff to predict with full substantiation that the large unit would be attacking from approach march formation from the assembly area. Therefore the commander and his staff subsequently did a considerable amount of work prior to receiving the detailed order: they carefully studied available data on the enemy, assessed the terrain, radiation situation, roughly designated routes of advance, line of departure, line of deployment into subunit columns, and final coordination line; they thoroughly considered weather and climatic conditions, season and time of day; they computed the requisite time for work in the field; they specified its general sequence, providing for parallel organization of combat in subordinate units and specified several measures in case darkness fell, as well as pertaining to organization of reconnaissance and other types of combat support as well as preparation of personnel and equipment for combat. In other words much was done prior to receiving the operation order, which unfortunately is not always taught to our officers at training establishments and at commander exercises in line units.

In conclusion we shall state that the above gives us reason to agree with Colonel Vinnikov on the advisability of early and universal adoption in practical training of the method of stage-by-stage organization for combat. Also acceptable are other suggestions he makes, particularly those pertaining to the structure and content of presentation of matters dealing with organization for combat in theoretical studies, textbooks, training manuals, and particularly in prescribed documents.

Col A. Serov;
Col Ye. Sokolov

* * *

Colonel Vinnikov's article is convincing, and we feel that it deals with a very important item. The author stresses that commanders and staffs possess considerable real opportunity to improve the efficiency of organization of combat operations if they fully utilize for this purpose the time they have at their disposal prior to receiving the operation order. But this point is not always adequately reflected in practical training and in the literature.

The principle of commander efforts in organization for combat which he proposes, which is unusual in comparison with the traditional method, may at first glance seem not quite acceptable. Some individuals claim that one cannot proceed to organize for combat without knowing the mission. A comparative analysis of both methods of commander activity, however, shows that such assertions are unjustified. Essentially, as the author points out, organization for combat constitutes execution of an aggregate (sum) of preparatory measures aimed at successful accomplishment of the impending mission. And yet both methods require execution of an identical extent of measures. But with stage-by-stage organization for combat the sequence of execution is different than with the traditional method. We are firmly convinced that it fosters to a maximum degree improved operational efficiency of troop control. Organization for combat can and should begin before the immediate mission is received.

Indeed, is it permissible to wait for orders and only then to assess weather conditions, season and time of day? Without question the above situation elements can be assessed at an earlier time, thus enabling the commander to reach important conclusions in a prompt manner; for example, on the necessity of issuing personnel seasonal clothing, setting up facilities for warming personnel, drying clothing, taking steps to ensure that vehicle motors are cold-protected, and to appropriately grease weapons. But before the necessary orders can be issued, it is necessary to know the needs of the subunits, availability of supplies, etc. Consequently, here too we see the need for assessing our troops prior to receiving the operation order.

The proposed method of commander activity is quite feasible in any situation: a combat situation may suddenly arise, but essentially subordinate troops never appear suddenly for the commander. Obviously he can (and is obliged to) assess his troops in advance. It is important to bear this in mind during officer training. During combat as well, the commander has more opportunity to obtain information on his own troops and on the enemy. Therefore, continuously studying and evaluating the situation (which is provided for in full measure by the method of stage organization for combat), he will more quickly reach a well-founded decision in case of abrupt changes in the actions of the adversary or, for example, when it is suddenly necessary to carry out another mission, particularly on a new axis.

The author's recommendations promote elaboration of a more effective and at the same time balanced method of organization for combat, which will be very beneficial both to persons at training establishments and officers in line units.

Unfortunately it is difficult to find an example in training practice where trainees begin their work with an assessment of their own troops and the taking of measures to maintain (increase) their combat efficiency. But transition to the new method of training in organization for combat will in our opinion cause no difficulties.

From an analysis of Vinnikov's suggestions one can establish the following sequence of studying stage-by-stage organization for combat. First the normal initial situation is created, in conformity with the topic. At each class session the scope and content of information on friendly troops are communicated differently, but their specific mission is not indicated, but rather a general orientation (by such and such a time the unit reached a specific line or a specified area and is ready to operate in a specified direction). Trainees study available situation data prior to the beginning of the exercise or during the exercise, for a certain period of time. The instructor then instructs them to assess their troops and determine measures to increase their combat capability. They then analyze data on the enemy and determine in advance the general character of situation development. If possible they also assess other situation elements: terrain, neighboring units, weather, time of day, and radiation situation in the assumed direction (zone) of operations. Measures are specified for preparations for and support of projected operations.

Only after this are trainees assigned a specific combat mission, whereby the prior-indicated axis of operations may not coincide with that contained in the received operation order. But it is easy to see that even in this case the work already accomplished does not lose its importance, since more time will not be required for elaborating measures and issuing instructions following assessment of one's own troops, neighboring units,

weather, season and time of day. The assessment of terrain, radiation situation and analysis of data on the enemy will also prove to be useful.

It is extremely important to diversify the exercise at the very outset. After studying the situation the instructor intensifies it, for example, with data on the enemy and demands that the trainees report on their decision in the prevailing situation. Then, acting out the part of the higher commander, the instructor approves the most expedient of them. As we see, in this example a situation is created for the trainees to display initiative when they organize for combat without receiving an operation order from the higher commander.

We feel that there is much benefit to be derived from such exercises. Officers learn to carry out anticipatory measures pertaining to maintaining (increasing) troop combat capability, to display foresight, the ability to predict the development of events, considerable efficiency in organizing for combat, and learn to make well-founded, maximum-expedient decisions in a limited-time situation.

Col B. Trusevich

* * *

Col V. Vinnikov raises very important questions in his article which are of practical significance. One is fully justified in stating that it is hard to find any objection to his recommendations. They are unquestionably both acceptable and useful.

In counterbalance to the traditional method he claims, correctly in our opinion, that receipt of the operation order should be preceded by analysis of available situation data and their assessment in the maximum possible scope. Adoption of this commander procedure in practical training will without question promote the display of initiative and efficient adoption of well-founded decisions.

Combat and combat training experience indicates that fairly frequently the commander, without having received a specific mission, is compelled to make decisions on his own initiative, on the basis of an assessment of the current combat situation. This occurs as a rule when there is a disruption of communications with the higher commander, when large units and units conduct independent operations, as well as in all cases of a crisis combat situation, when delay in decision-making is fraught with serious consequences.

Troop control under present-day conditions constitutes a very complex process. As a whole it is perceived as the continuous acquisition of situation data, a thorough assessment of this data in a close

interrelationship, prompt decision-making and unswerving practical decision execution, during the course of which continuous assessment of situation changes takes place; on its basis a new decision is made, troops are assigned new missions, etc. In other words both organization for combat and direct control of combat operations are combined as it were in combat reality.

The effectiveness of tactical control is determined by the care, speed and thoroughness with which it is organized, by the completeness and thoroughness with which the commander has foreseen the possible course of combat, that is the significance of the organizing period in the commander's activity is very great. Quality and promptness of organizational effort predetermine success in combat.

Thus organization for combat is an important, independent constituent in troop control, preceding the immediate control of troop combat operations during their performance of combat missions.

Modern combat on the whole is a very complex process. As is well known, it is characterized by a rapid succession of events. The attack, for example, can develop into a meeting engagement, while the latter can develop into defense or again into attack. A division can be conducting an offensive operation, while one of its regiments may be involved in a meeting engagement or may shift to consolidation of a position, etc, that is, the alternation of events for different units in any situation will be complex and varied. Nevertheless our military theory precisely delimits points and requirements pertaining to each type of troop combat activity. This is correct, for it is important to learn to achieve victory in each individual type of engagement (operation). Then any unexpected development, combination and swift turn of events will not take well-prepared commanders by surprise. We feel that appropriate recommendations should also be specifically delineated in an effort to achieve analogous results directly in troop control.

Col N. Kil'yachenkov

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY-ECONOMIC SCIENCE

Col M. Gladkov, Candidate of Economic Science, Docent

Economic processes directly connected with the two world wars, intensification of the danger of a third world war, proceeding from imperialism, and contemporary trends in military affairs, are proceeding with heightening intensity. The interests of security of the USSR and the other socialist nations imperatively demand disclosure of the content and mechanism of action of the objective laws controlling these processes. This function is performed by Marxist-Leninist theory in general and economic theory in particular.

The founders of scientific communism discovered the law of the relationship between war and military organization on the one hand and economics on the other, examining the interaction of economics and war in a concretely historical manner, in movement and development. Marx and Engels elucidated its specific features under different societal systems, establishing that many elements of economic relations of a given mode of production are manifested at an earlier time in war and in armies than within civilian society. ~~Karl Marx~~ wrote: "History of the army most graphically confirms the correctness of our ideas relating to the connection between productive resources and societal relations" (K. Marks and F. Engel's: Soch. [Works], Volume 29, page 164). He pointed out that factory-shop production, the use of precious metals as money, distribution of labor within a single branch of industry, hired labor and the large-scale employment of machines first appeared in armies and war.

The founders of Marxism created fundamental theoretical and methodological foundations of military-economic science, which today is identified as an independent branch of knowledge, and, before even having become detached itself, is showing a tendency to break down into component parts. This is also noticeable in that scientific debate which has developed over the question of the development of military-economic thought. Essentially two problems are debated. First of all, determination of the subject of the new science of "military economics."¹ Secondly, the validity of independent existence of a concrete military-economic discipline, which A. Lagovskiyy proposes be called "armed forces economics."²

With substantial differences of opinion on the substance of the problems, obviously the most important thing is not ready solutions but rather a valid methodology of approaching these problems.

On military economics as a science. There is no question that such a science (perhaps under a different name as well), taking form, as any other

system of scientific knowledge, due to the objective requirements of practical activities, is necessary for elaboration and implementation of an economically substantiated defense policy of the nations of the socialist community. Its necessity is recognized by many economists and military commanders.

One should refrain, however, from excessively categorical judgments, as if this science had already assumed final form. It is more correct to state that the process of its forming, the search for a more or less acceptable definition of its subject and method, is proceeding in an active and vigorous manner.

The object of science is the mass phenomenon of the objective world, recorded by human experience; cognition of the laws of motion of this phenomenon is in the final analysis dictated by the economic requirements of classes, social groups or society as a whole. Friedrich Engels noted that economic need constitutes the mainspring of progress in cognition of nature (K. Marks and F. Engels: Soch., Volume 37, page 419). The same applies to society. "If society develops a technical requirement (Engels included production and transportation equipment in economic relations -- M. G.), this advances science to a greater degree than do a dozen universities" (K. Marks and F. Engels: Soch., Volume 39, page 174).

The science we are discussing also develops under the influence of economic requirements. It too must be formed from a relatively precise designation of the subject and elucidation of the motivational reasons for its cognition.

It would seem that the subject is clearly expressed in the title "military economics." Only the objective content of this term remains unclear. Precisely what real phenomenon does it translate into the language of science? This question remains open for the time being.

Judging from publications, at least three points of view have been expressed. Many investigators believe that military economics is a special qualitative state of the economy under conditions of war, that is, the economy placed on a war footing, a nation's unified war economy.³ Some assign to this category only the military sector of the economy, which immediately and directly serves preparation for and conduct of war, viewing this sector as a special part of the economy, as a special large branch.⁴ A few economists see here specific economic relations which form in the economy as a whole, in its military sector and in the armed forces in connection with production, distribution, exchange and consumption of military goods.⁵

A view of military economics as a special qualitative state of the economy under war conditions is outwardly simple. It is the most widespread, is more easily elaborated, and historically justifies itself as a specific stage in the development of military economic science. But it contains substantial "problem spots," which under present-day conditions are inhibiting the development of its science to an increasing degree.

In the first place, military economics is treated as a category of war.⁶ But in war one cannot see the causes of economic phenomena: they lie "in the specific features of the social organization of production, from which a given policy inevitably derives" (V. I. Lenin: Poln. Sobr. Soch. [Complete Works], Volume 1, page 381). Consequently, military economics is a category not of war but rather of the economic organization of capitalism, which engenders wars.

Secondly, it is claimed that military economics studies phenomena pertaining to the economic aspect of war, investigating its economic patterns and relations.⁷ But just what is the economic aspect of war? Obviously it is not the economy (neither as a whole nor in part) which, remaining an independent, principal and determining sphere, also performs the function of satisfying the requirements of war. The economic aspect of war, in the opinion of Karl Marx, consists in the unproductive expenditure and destruction of material resources.

Thus war is a special form of consumption of products of labor through the mechanism of military organization, and military consumption is merely a link in the economic process (production, distribution, exchange, consumption), in which production always constitutes the determining element. Production, stated Marx, creates the object of consumption, an inducement for consumption, the mode of consumption, and the consumer proper (K. Marks and F. Engel's: Soch., Volume 12, pp 717-718).

The military organization as a consumer of material goods is engendered by the societal system. The army, representing the volume, structure and dynamics of the economic requirements of war, constitutes a superstructure above the economic foundation of the mode of production (V. I. Lenin: Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 35, pp 345-346).

Marxism explains men's actions through their needs. Evidently this same criterion should be used in approaching an elucidation of the origin and essence of society's military-economic activity, as well as the subject of the science which studies it. In the military organization as well the need for the implements of war (under capitalism it is evoked by the growth of militarism, and in socialist countries by the military danger emanating from capitalism), under certain conditions leads to the occurrence of a specific economic process which acquires relative independence. This

process encompasses production, distribution, exchange and consumption of military goods. It begins beyond the boundaries of war (in the economy) and terminates in war. Not military but rather economic relations are expressed in it; it is not the laws and patterns of war which operate, but rather the laws and patterns of development of the economy, which acquires qualitatively new properties as a result of interaction with the military organization. We therefore feel that it is incorrect to speak of the economic patterns or laws of war; war is not an economic phenomenon as regards its principal content. One can speak only of the economic patterns and laws of satisfying the material requirements of war. But these laws and patterns, judging from all the evidence, occur outside of war.

Thirdly, in this concept there is no clear-cut demarcation line between political economy and military economics as a science -- the latter essentially is deprived of its specific subject. While it studies the "economic laws and patterns of war, the specific features of the action of general economic laws under the conditions of war,"⁸ while its subject includes a special form of economic relations of classes and social groups conditioned by the waging of war,⁹ it retains the content of political economy, "recostumed" into a military uniform, and even according to some opinions becoming a division of military science.¹⁰ Another shortcoming of this definition of the object and subject of military-economic science consists in the fact that it substantially focuses on the experience of the world wars of the past, failing to take into consideration a substantial modification of the law of interrelationship between economics and war under present-day conditions and in the immediate future. It is precisely this modification which compels one to view military-economic science in a different manner; connected with it is statement of the problem of military economics as an independent branch of scientific knowledge.

As regards the interrelationship between economics and militarism, the strain imposed on the economy by military-technological development and the arms race, into which imperialism has plunged the entire world, increases in intensity. In the United States, for example, in the period 1948-1970 expenditures for producing means of delivering nuclear warheads totaled 110.5 billion dollars (10 times as much as all outlays for nuclear devices proper).¹¹ Now 130 new weapons systems are in the planning stages, which will cost a total of 140 billion dollars.¹²

War production has become a component element of the economy of countries drawn by imperialism into the sphere of military preparations. In the United States direct and indirect military expenditures comprise 14 percent of the gross national product and 18 percent of national income; from one sixth to one fifth of industrial output is for military purposes.¹³

All branches of the economy are involved in the system of military economic relations; the principal branches of the economy are primarily filling military orders (scientific research organizations, the aerospace, nuclear, shipbuilding, and electrical equipment industries). Each year the Pentagon concludes approximately 15 million deals in 850 specialized areas of military goods deliveries;¹⁴ arms production involves a large part of the population. The livelihood of 35 million Americans is dependent on the military-industrial complex.¹⁵ One out of every five electrical and mechanical engineers, two out of every five aviation technicians and research physicists, and three out of every five aeronautical engineers are involved in military projects.¹⁶ This is to the detriment of the vital interests of the toilers.

The economic process taking place within the military organization (financing, supply, maintenance and operation of military equipment) is becoming increasingly complex. In the NATO army, for example, the routine supply inventory includes 4 million separate item designations.¹⁷

In economic potential, which under conditions of the scientific and technological revolution is becoming increasingly dynamic and transformed into a target of military actions, are being accumulated the properties of its vulnerability -- specialization and the cooperative nature of the production process, its concentration, centralization and industrialization of the system of management, and urbanization -- the drawing of the population to the big cities. Sixty percent of the entire U.S. manufacturing industry and 40 percent of the country's population are concentrated in 54 metropolitan areas.¹⁸ Out of 5000 cities whose population is involved in the sphere of the U.S. military-industrial complex,¹⁹ at the beginning of the sixties 70 percent of all persons employed in military industry were concentrated in 62 cities.²⁰

An analysis of economic processes indicates that figuratively speaking today's world, charged with implements of modern war, also shapes its economic requirements. Nobody denies that in order to wage nuclear war, in addition to material resources which are appropriate in both volume and structure, a social-production mechanism for nourishing it, created in advance and smooth-running is necessary. This mechanism is found within production relations as a special property which arises under the influence of the production of material means of warfare and development of the military organization and the social-class nature of the state.

What kind of a mechanism is this? It constitutes a system of economic relations with specified social content, by means of which the economy is adapted to the needs of war. These include relations connected with the process of meeting military requirements with economic resources (production, distribution, exchange and consumption of military goods, utilization of reserves, redistribution of manpower resources, etc), maintaining stability and mobility of the economy in war.

The aggregate of the economic relations, consolidated as a constant property of social production and performing the function of meeting military requirements with resources, comprises the subject of military economics as a science. It investigates not the laws of war but rather economic laws which express a specific aspect of production relations and which control the process of feeding the war with economic resources, that is, an economic process of satisfying a specific societal requirement.

It is methodologically more correct to conduct the search for the subject of this science in production relations. Of great interest in connection with this is the view of A. Pozharov.²¹ It should be developed, freed from the inertia of earlier concepts, from the shortcomings of the first approach (lack of preciseness in delineating the subject of political economy and military economics, the dual nature of the object of the latter, restriction of the term "military economic relations" within the framework of relations connected with military production, etc).

On concrete military economic sciences. The attention of the readers of this journal, particularly military economists, was attracted by A. Lagovskiy's article containing the proposal that a special scientific discipline be established, "economics of the armed forces." It is proposed that it be elaborated and studied alongside military economics as a branch scientific discipline. Lagovskiy feels that the subject of armed forces economics should be the diversified complex of economic phenomena within the armed forces (supply, labor, production, finances). We shall state at the outset that basically all these phenomena boil down to military consumption and distribution. Production and exchange within the military organization are not characteristic types of economic activity.

The formulation of the problem merits approval. Economic studies in the Armed Forces are essential as a condition for scientifically substantiated control aimed at achieving the highest possible combat readiness with the least expenditure of resources. This is a Leninist principle which forms the basis of all CPSU economic policy. The Armed Forces also need economics trained cadres capable of embodying in military routine the theoretical conclusions and recommendations of economic science. Economics training of all cadres and the toiler masses is viewed by the 24th CPSU Congress as a vital necessity. From this standpoint proposals pertaining to armed forces economics are beyond criticism.

But the arguments in favor of armed forces economics contained in the article and in responses to the article are not without flaw; they evoke fundamental objections.

In the first place, military consumption, just as any other consumption, is an inseparable element of a unified economic process, the point of

departure and determining factor of which is production. It completes production and creates the need for new production, inducement to production.

Military consumption as a social-production relation cannot be the subject of a special science; it cannot be comprehended without an analysis of production. From this aspect it enters into the subject of political economy and military economics. Lenin was against designating "consumption" as a separate division of science. He stated that if one defines "production" as social relations in production (only in this case is it an economic process), then "distribution" and "consumption" "lose all independent meaning" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 2, page 196).

Secondly, the subject of armed forces economics is presented as a conglomerate of different types of economic activity, the specific features of manifestation of economic relations in each of which are studied by appropriate concrete-economic sciences (economic planning, finance, labor economics, construction economics, transportation economics, communications economics, etc). One cannot help but see the features of military consumption as a social-production relation. It constitutes a social action, organized by type of large scale machine industry. In it are reproduced for a second time the forms and all aspects of the economic relations of social production. The general patterns of these relations are studied by military economics, and the specific features of their manifestation in individual types of military economic activity by specific economics, functional or branch. Consequently, the need for armed forces economics disappears, since there is no need to gather "under one roof" all concrete military-economic disciplines and to deprive military economics of the opportunity to deal with its own subjects.

While the need for armed forces economics disappears, evidently there remains an urgent need to develop, alongside military economics, such concrete military economic disciplines as "economic planning in the armed forces," "military research and design economics," etc.

As regards coordination of economic and military science, it does not demand inclusion of the former in the latter, but rather scientific organization of military planning.

FOOTNOTES

1. A. Korniyenko: "On Military Economics as a Science," Voyennaya Mysl', No 7, 1969.

2. A. Lagovskiy: "Economics of the Armed Forces," Voyennaya Mysl', No 1, 1970.
3. Voyennaya Mysl', No 7, 1969, pp 31, 32; No 5, 1971, page 23.
4. G. Kravchenko: "Theory and Practice of the Military Economics of Modern Capitalism," Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1967, page 76.
5. Voyennaya Mysl', No 4, 1971, page 49.
6. Voyennaya Mysl', No 7, 1969, page 31.
7. Ibid., page 32.
8. Ibid., No 3, 1969, page 11.
9. Ibid., No 7, 1969, page 31.
10. Ibid., No 3, 1969, page 11.
11. Sovremennyye problemy razoruzheniya (Contemporary Problems of Disarmament), Izd-vo Mysl', 1970, page 124.
12. V. S. Alekseyev: Uroki Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny i sovremennost' (Lessons of the Great Patriotic War and the Present Day), Izd-vo Znaniye, 1970, page 7.
13. Sovremennyye...., op. cit., pp 335, 336.
14. R. A. Faramazyan: SShA: militarizm i ekonomika (The USA: Militarism and Economics), Izd-vo Mysl', 1970, page 234.
15. Ekonomicheskoye polozheniye kapitalisticheskikh i razvivayushchikhsya stran. Obzor za 1969 i nachalo 1970 g. (The Economic Status of the Capitalist and Developing Countries. Survey for 1969 and the Beginning of 1970), Izd-vo Pravda, 1970, page 82.
16. Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, No 3, 1970, page 38.
17. Probleme der Militärökonomie (Problems of Military Economy), Deutsche Militär Verlag, Berlin, 1967, page 149.
18. Wehr-Wissenschaftliche Rundschau, Frankfurt am Main, No 11, 1966, page 603.

19. Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, No 3, 1970, page 38.
20. Probleme..., op.cit., pp 63-64.
21. Voyennaya Mysl', No 4, 1971.

THE DISTORTION BY MAOISTS OF LENINIST IDEAS ON THE DEFENSE OF SOCIALISM

Col V. Zubarev, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences

Even prior to the Great October Socialist Revolution V. I. Lenin, analyzing the ideology and politics of opportunism, concluded: "The dialectics of history are such that the theoretical victory of Marxism compels its enemies to disguise themselves as Marxists" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., [Complete Works], Volume 23, page 3).

The facts of our time confirm again and again the correctness of this conclusion. Many of today's revisionists are trying even harder to counterfeit their views as Marxism-Leninism, for this doctrine has won over the masses, has been confirmed in the victories of the new system and has acquired enormous attractive force. Camouflage of ideas hostile to Marxism-Leninism with terminology which is externally similar to Marxist terminology, the concealment of reactionary actions with the "ultrarevolutionary" phrase, sophistry or simply gross juggling of facts and slander are techniques which are characteristic, for example, of the ideologues and propagandists of Maoism.

Presenting their ideological-political platform, which is incompatible with Leninism and directed against the socialist nations, toward splitting the international Communist and the entire antiimperialist movement, the Chinese leaders at the same time call themselves Marxists and internationalists. In addition they declare that "Chairman Mao's line is the only correct one," "reflecting the objective laws of development of society."

Let us examine some aspects of such claims as applied to one of the most important areas of the theory and practice of scientific communism -- the area of defense of the socialist system and its conquests.

1.

As was noted at an international Communist forum in 1957, defense of the conquests of socialism constitutes a general law of the socialist revolution, the building of socialism and communism. Lenin approached the question in precisely this manner. Analyzing this pattern, he pointed to a number of laws which influence its genesis and action and defined the high-principled attitude of Marxists toward defense of the homeland, socialism, and the most important principles of the defense activities of the ruling Marxist party.

Defense of the socialist homeland and the conquests of socialism (and today defense of communism in the process of development) constitutes an area of

politics, class relations and historical rivalry between two antagonistic systems. It follows from this that the pattern and natural law under examination was engendered first and foremost by the action of the law of employment of force in the class struggle. Karl Marx graphically described force or violence as the "midwife" of society when it is bearing within its womb a new society. Friedrich Engels, explaining the economic and political nature of violence and its character, revealed the diametrical opposition of counterrevolutionary violence and revolutionary, response, forced violence. Lenin, substantiating his ingenious discovery -- the possibility of a victorious socialist revolution initially in a single country, linked this prospect with accomplishment of a primary task -- securing of resistance to counterrevolutionary forces, which are endeavoring with all means, including armed force, to prevent the establishment of worker-peasant power and to strangle it if it arises.

Violence, constituting a specific means and method of achieving the economic and political goals of rival classes, constitutes an aggregate of coercive measures in respect to the adversary, measures possessing various forms. The most extreme measure is open, direct military action. The proletariat, carrying out the socialist revolution and organizing transition to a new socioeconomic system following the conquest of power, desires least of all the extreme forms of struggle forced upon it, for these are accompanied by the greatest sacrifices and suffering by the toilers. Under certain conditions military measures are totally excluded, since there is no necessity of resorting to them. Bearing in mind primarily this circumstance, Friedrich Engels stated that "when there is no reactionary violence against which one must struggle, there can be no talk of revolutionary violence..." (K. Marks and F. Engel's: Soch. [Works], Volume 38, page 419).

Although preferring peaceful means of taking power and advancing toward socialism, the proletariat and its party do not equate "peaceful" with "nonresistance to evil with force." Peaceful variants cannot help but include various forms of violent action, since the exploiters do not give up their power and privileges without attempts to preserve them. But in creating circumstances (particularly a preponderance in material resources) whereby the reactionaries are deprived of the opportunity to offer effective resistance, the proletariat and the toiler masses guided by it acquire the capability to seize power by peaceful means and to carry out socialist reforms without employing the most acute forms of violence. It is important not to underrate or overrate the role of violence in the revolutionary reformation of society. One should not make an absolute out of any form of struggle; it is essential flexibly to apply various methods and means, in conformity with the specific circumstances of the given stage of the revolution, as well as with the basic development trend.

The Marxist-Leninist theoretical and practical formulation of the question of violence has withstood the test of time; it was and remains one of the most important principles in determining the strategy and tactics of the world Communist and labor movement, in exposing the views and actions of rightist and "leftist" opportunists.¹

Rightist opportunists, following the postulates of Karl Kautsky, distortedly interpreting class struggle, the concept of dictatorship and democracy, view the substance of peaceful transition to socialism as totally excluding any social force. Rightists clamor for reformism, an unrealizable means of merging the capitalist into the socialist system.

"Leftist" opportunism in its Maoist form, also metaphysically but in its own manner placing "peaceful" into opposition with "violent," categorically refuses to recognize the possibility of peaceful conquest of power by the proletariat and a peaceful transition to socialism. Maoism preaches solution to social problems at all times and in all places (on a national and international scale) by means of armed violence, by means of the bayonet. This naturally has no scientific foundation nor practical corroboration. Therefore propagandist "proof," typical of all such cases, boils down to phraseological variations: "as Chairman Mao has pointed out," and unsubstantiated reference to the "universal truth of Marxism-Leninism."

The interpreters of the "ideas" of Mao Tse-tung, for example, call his thesis that "the rifle engenders power" just such a truth. But Marxism and the experience of history teach that truth is always concrete. In that period when armed revolution in China was struggling against counter-revolution, the thesis about the rifle and power contained certain meaning. To elevate armed struggle to the rank of a universal and mandatory method under all circumstances means to distort the ideas of the founders of scientific communism. Karl Marx's graphic expression about the "midwife," which the Maoists attempt to adapt as confirmation of their "universal truth," refutes it if only because Marx speaks of the "intrauterine" state of the new society. Equally speculative is the reference to the statement by Friedrich Engels that "if the victorious party does not wish to lose the fruits of its efforts, it must maintain its rule by means of that terror which is instilled in reactionaries by its arms" (Marks and Engel's: Soch., Volume 18, page 305).

This thesis, just as the Leninist idea that the proletariat, if it wishes to and will rule, should demonstrate this with its military organization, is by no means equivalent to an orientation toward extreme, armed forms of struggle, toward the rifle as the most efficient and desirable motive force of history. On the contrary, Lenin designated as fools and provocateurs those who advanced the idea of urging on the revolutionary process with military action, with war, "the export of revolution."

ing Marxist views and summarizing the experience of the first victorious socialist revolution, Lenin wrote: "...Revolutionary violence constituted a necessary and legitimate technique of revolution only at certain moments in its development... while organization of the proletarian masses, organization of the toilers was and remains a permanent property of this revolution and condition for its victories" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 38, page 74). It is characteristic that during the foreign military intervention and civil war Lenin, stressing the idea of utilization of the great wealth of means and techniques of struggle, not only violent means, stated: "...We are the only republic which is waging a war against imperialism and which knows how to exploit every situation, operating not by violence but also able to win by refusing to employ force" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 40, page 99).

So much for the "Marxist-Leninist truth" about the rifle, which Maoists view as a fundamental principle of their domestic and foreign policy strategy and tactics.

The Maoist concept of violence, which has inherited the ideas of anarchism and Trotskyism, the ideology and political practices of Maoism as a whole, as is persuasively demonstrated in scholarly literature, constitute at the same time a unique rebirth -- in pseudo-Marxian wrappings -- of the traditional political and social ideology of the ruling classes of feudal China.² Mao Tse-tung and his accomplices have transformed and pragmatically adapted, in the interests of their nationalistic, hegemonistic aspirations, the ideas of orthodox Confucianism. A central position among these ideas is occupied by the creation and consolidation of the absolute power of the ruler, based on "legitimate force"; views of war as a social blessing, a means of strengthening the country's internal and external political situation and the elimination of wars themselves; the idea and practice of forceful transformation of the masses into obedient executors of the monarch's will; the idea of the dominant role of armed force in strengthening the position of the ruler of the earthly realm. Practical implementation of these ideas has already led to extensive changes in the building and defense of socialism in China. We are dealing here primarily with the very object of defense, the foundations of building a socialist society and organizing defense of revolutionary conquests.

The world Communist movement proceeds from the position that defense of the conquests of socialism is a natural law which operates within a system of general (principal) natural laws, which as an aggregate determine the most substantial elements inherent in the historical process of society's transition to socialism: implementation of the proletarian revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat, leadership by the Marxist-Leninist party, creation of the material and technological foundation of the new system, radical reforms in the cultural area, socialist internationalism, etc. All

the principal laws are interrelated and dialectically interlinked; their relationships bear the character of the law of harmonious interaction.

This law presupposes the leading principle of practical activity, which, bearing in mind Lenin's precepts, is consistently implemented by the CPSU and the brother parties of the other socialist nations -- the principle of comprehensive solution to the problems of building socialism and communism with priority to its armed defense. This signifies first and foremost a strengthening of the deep-lying principles of building the new society, its defense and fraternal cooperation among the socialist nations. These principles are the common economic foundation created in each country -- public ownership of the means of production, a common political system -- rule by the people headed by the worker class, and a common ideology -- Marxism-Leninism.

The line pursued by the Mao Tse-tung clique is diametrically opposite. Its principle of comprehensive approach is liquidation of the foundations of the building and defense of socialism.

In the economic area this was expressed in the fact that the "great leap forward" and the "cultural revolution" substantially distorted the socialist basis; the Chinese leadership is increasingly endeavoring to adapt it to its own antipopular course.

In the sociopolitical area the "cultural revolution" led to that result to which its authors were striving -- the political system of the PRC as a state led by the worker class was demolished. The people's constitutional organs of authority were destroyed. The Chinese Communist Party organizationally ceased to exist as a party of the new type. The Maoists persecuted and physically destroyed the representatives of its Marxist-Leninist internationalist segment. They broke up trade unions, Komsomol, and all public organizations. The real instruments of power were taken away from the worker class. Everywhere, in all areas of economic, sociopolitical and cultural affairs of society, the army began to exercise control, an army which had previously been remade to the liking of the Maoists by destroying its revolutionary nucleus, by appropriate ideological and moral-psychological brainwashing. A barracks regimen held sway throughout the country, and the dictatorship of the proletariat was forcefully replaced by a military-bureaucratic dictatorship.

In the intellectual area every effort was made to force upon the people a petty bourgeois-nationalist ideology -- "the ideas of Mao."

In a society which has embarked upon the path of socialist reforms, there objectively develops room for the effect of the law of the increasing role of the Marxist-Leninist party, the state of toilers and the masses in all

areas of building socialism and defending its gains. The conditions for the functioning of this law are being vigorously eroded away as a result of the "cultural revolution" in the Chinese society.

In 1967 L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU, stated in a meeting with constituents that "the fairy-tale of the 'proletarian cultural revolution' is nothing but a clumsy attempt to camouflage a policy which is alien to Marxism-Leninism," that "it is more like suppression of the socialist revolution" and "a reactionary military coup." Present attempts by Peking propaganda to call black white have been particularly crude.

Shifting and dodging, the ideologues and propagandists of official Peking attempt again and again to hide under the banner of Marxism-Leninism. They are counting, for example, on using fact-juggling to convince as to the correctness of Lin Piao's sophistic thesis presented in the report at the 9th Congress that the history of the Chinese Communist Party "is the history of the struggle of the Marxist-Leninist line of Chairman Mao against rightist and leftist opportunist lines in the party." They claim that all the success of the Chinese Revolution both before and after its victory in 1949 is the result of the Chairman's "correct line." But we know from the history of the CPC that Mao always adhered to the petit-bourgeois-nationalist school, against which the Marxist, internationalist school always struggled. The historic victories of the CPC are also connected with it. When Mao Tse-tung and his supporters temporarily succeeded in imposing their tactics upon the party, damage was inflicted on the party, the revolution, and its defense. This was the case, for example, during the withdrawal of the Chinese Red Army to China's sparsely-populated northwest region. This has also occurred in recent years, particularly following proclamation in 1958 of the policy of "three red banners."

An article published by the Maoists in honor of the 50th anniversary of the CPC points to its name and its "Marxist-Leninist ideology" as proof that today's party is "correct." Under the name of the CPC, however, the Mao Tse-tung clique is presently building a party which totally differs from that which, implementing the fundamental theses contained in Lenin's writings and in the documents of the international Communist movement, secured the victory of the Chinese Revolution and subsequently, with the fraternal assistance of the CPSU, the peoples of the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations and Communist parties, achieved major success in building socialism and strengthening the nation's defense capability. Seeking to profit from the prestige and authority of the CPC, Mao Tse-tung and his confederates, rejecting the political, ideological and organizational principles of the Marxist-Leninist party, are putting together under its name a new political organization, assigning it the role of obedient tool of a regime of personal power, and no claims by Peking propaganda

that the Maoist party is "correct," that the "line of the 9th Congress is correct," and that "Mao's ideas are correct" are capable of concealing this fact.

The departure from Leninist principles of party organizational development has had a pernicious effect on all areas of the building of socialism in China, including in the military.

Maoist propagandists call today's Chinese Army "people's," "proletarian," and claim that it constitutes the "bulwark of the proletarian dictatorship." But this is contrary to fact. For quite some time now an army whose socio-political function does not correspond to the tasks of an armed force of the socialist type has existed under the name of Chinese People's Liberation Army, the heroic revolutionary and fighting deeds of which have by right become a vivid page in the chronicle of struggle by the peoples of China for their national and social independence and consolidation of the new system.

There operates in a socialist society the law of correspondence between military organizational development on the one hand and the character and fundamentals of the building of socialism and communism on the other. It is not without reason that Lenin emphasized that organizational development of the Red Army was successful because it was carried out in a spirit of overall Soviet organizational development. Demolishing the principles of building socialism, the Chinese leaders have trampled underfoot the Leninist principles of organizational development of the socialist army, particularly such principles as leadership by the Marxist party, unity of army and people, indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, and dedication to the ideas and principles of communism. The armed forces transformed by the Maoists have become the main instrument "of revolution in the area of the superstructure," that is the "cultural revolution." The Chinese Army has become the bulwark of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship.

A draft of the new Constitution of the PRC has been published in the foreign press. It states that "the task of the armed forces of the PRC is defense of the conquests of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism." Of course one can state whatever one likes, but words do not constitute proof of truth. In actual fact the sentence contains only one actual meaning -- we are dealing here not with defense of the conquests of socialism but rather with defense of the "conquests" of the Maoist "cultural revolution."

The draft Constitution specifies as one task of the army defense of the nation against "subversive activities and aggression" on the part of "social imperialism," which means primarily the Soviet Union. This reflects Peking's general anti-Soviet foreign policy and the endeavor to formalize

in a constitution the anti-Soviet, antisocialist character of Chinese military organizational development. This orientation finds concrete expression in both military doctrine and in practical steps. For example, the Chinese leaders have made unjustified territorial claims on the Soviet Union, have called for "war preparations" and are militarizing society. Mouthings imperialist propaganda about a "Soviet threat," the Maoists have whipped up anti-Soviet hysteria in China and have moved military units to the Soviet border under pretext of a "threat from the north." The foreign press has reported on numerous occasions large-scale troop movements and other military preparations, as well as a substantial strengthening of military forces in the north and in the interior. As has been noted by foreign observers, the slogan "prepare for a major nuclear war" is being fortified in China by active participation in the nuclear arms race.

Thus the military organizational development pursued by the Mao clique attests to its total distortion of Lenin's ideas pertaining to defense of the socialist homeland.

First and foremost the class, political essence of the task of defense of revolutionary conquests has been distorted. Lenin's idea of defense of socialism as the homeland, that is primarily the socialist base and the socialist superstructure, has been supplanted by the "idea" and practice of suppression of the socialist revolution and liquidation of the foundations of construction and defense of the new system. A military-bureaucratic regime and an order hostile to the worker class and the toiler masses have become the sociopolitical object of defense in China.

The specific content of armed defense of the socialist homeland is securement of the requisite conditions for peaceful development and a transition to socialism and communism under circumstances of opposition by domestic and external counterrevolutionary elements. Leninist doctrine on defense of socialism reveals the major factors in transformation of the possibilities of reliable defense of revolutionary conquests into reality. Essential for this is scientific substantiation of the political line of the ruling party; securement of the economic, sociopolitical and military conditions for a firm defense of the socialist state; heroic-patriotic and international indoctrination of people and army; close military collaboration and a fighting alliance of all forces struggling for national and social liberation. These Leninist ideas are rejected by the Chinese leaders in both domestic and foreign policy.

2.

The foreign policy of the Mao Tse-tung clique is a continuation of a reactionary foreign policy and is clearly in conflict with the objective

STAT

Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010006-8

Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000300010006-8

needs and laws of development of the world revolutionary process, with the international tasks and obligations of its detachments in the struggle against imperialism, for social progress.

The experience of history attests that world imperialism and domestic reactionaries are the bearers of counterrevolutionary violence in the modern era initiated by the Great October Socialist Revolution. Imperialism, as demonstrated by V. I. Lenin, is by its very economic and political nature a constant and principal source of international tension and armed clashes. The law of existence of imperialism in the form of militarism, aggression and wars operates here. Lenin stressed: "War is not a chance occurrence, not a 'sin'... but rather an inevitable stage of capitalism, just as legitimate a form of capitalist activity as peace" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 26, page 41).

We are witnessing an intensification of the aggressiveness of imperialism, the cutting edge of which is directed primarily against the USSR and the socialist system as a whole. The law of the increasing resistance of imperialism and reaction to development of the world revolutionary process is manifested in this. "The law that the force of revolution, the force of pressure, the energy, resoluteness and triumph of its victory at the same time intensify resistance on the part of the bourgeoisie," stated Lenin, "has been confirmed in our revolution to a greater extent than in any other. The more we win, the more the capitalist exploiters learn to unite and shift to more vigorous attack" (Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 40, page 244).

The proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress and other party documents as well as the proceedings of the 1969 International Conference of Communist and Worker Parties thoroughly demonstrate that the increase in the aggressiveness of imperialism is taking place as a consequence of a deepening of its general crisis and aggravation of all the contradictions inherent in it. One notes a tendency toward further integration of all forces of the old world with the aim of refighting historic battles, of regaining ground lost by imperialism and reaction, and of doing as much damage as possible to the international detachments of social and national liberation. There may occur new imperialist adventures, fraught with serious consequences. Our party and the world Communist movement carefully consider all these circumstances in elaborating and implementing a specific program of struggle by antiimperialist forces for peace and the security of peoples, for national independence, democracy and socialism.

The brother Communist parties are guided in this by fundamental Leninist principles, among which the following are basic.

The first commandment of the policy of the ruling Marxist-Leninist party and socialist state is to be on guard against the intrigues of imperialism

and reaction and to preserve the nation's defense capability and the combat readiness of its army at all costs.

The united forces of imperialism should be opposed by a unified anti-imperialist front; joint efforts are mandatory, aimed at frustrating attempts by imperialism and reaction to hinder by force of arms the transition of peoples from capitalism to socialism.

The defense of socialism and its conquests is the international duty of Communists; he who treats lightly defense of the nation where the proletariat has emerged victorious is striking a blow at the bond with international socialism; "there is in fact one and only one internationalism: selfless effort to develop the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one's own country, support (with propaganda, sympathy, material assistance) of a like struggle... in all countries without exception" (V. I. Lenin: Poln. Sobr. Soch., Volume 31, page 170).

This is the position of Marxist-Leninists. It has nothing in common with the Mao Tse-tung line.

The Maoists, claiming that their policy "correctly reflects the objective laws of development of society and the demands of the people," have subjected the people of their own country to counterrevolutionary violence and are destroying its historical conquests. Pursuing hegemonistic aims, the Mao clique has adopted as the first commandment of its policy savage attacks against the USSR and the community of socialist nations, against the Leninist Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement. The Chinese leaders intend to subvert the ranks of antiimperialist forces from within, to frustrate joint measures being taken by the socialist nations to restrain the imperialist aggressors. The Mao clique considers as its "international duty not the defense of socialism but struggle against it. In opposition to the fundamental revolutionary detachments of the modern day, Peking is attempting to patch together a bloc of various countries, giving this bloc an antisocialist, anti-Soviet orientation. Viciously rupturing in this manner ties with international socialism, the Maoists have become transformed into open, militant accomplices of world imperialism.

Of course the imperialists, and particularly U.S. "hawks," have hastened to take advantage of this new front of political and ideological struggle deployed by the Peking leaders against world socialism and all antiimperialist forces. A graphic example of this is the escalation of U.S. military intervention in Indochina. Receiving the personal assurances of Mao Tse-tung that there will under no circumstances be a rapprochement between the PRC and the Soviet Union and that China will not go to war with the United States over Vietnam,³ and well aware of the meaning of Peking's

rejection of any actions taken jointly with the socialist nations in support of the struggling Vietnamese people, the strategists in Washington have sharply escalated their barbarous military operations against the DRV and the patriots of South Vietnam, and have subsequently spread the criminal, destructive war to the rest of Indochina.

Events of the last 10 years clearly demonstrate that Peking policy objectively promotes the aggressive policy of imperialism to the detriment of the genuine struggle of peoples for peace, socialism and progress. Soviet citizens and the world community have been well informed about these facts by documents of the CPSU and Soviet government, the Communist parties and governments of the socialist nations, other materials of the world Communist movement, from literature published in the USSR and abroad, from the press, etc.⁴ We could recall many obvious provocations, acts of instigation, and anti-Soviet actions during the most critical international situations created by aggressive imperialist and reactionary circles. For example, unbridled slanderous attacks by the Chinese leaders against the USSR and the other socialist nations which came to the defense of the Arab peoples, against Israeli-American aggression in the Near East; insinuations by Maoist Peking which, closing ranks with the Czechoslovak counterrevolutionaries, rightist revisionists and other European and world reactionaries, unleashed a vile campaign against the steps taken by the five brother socialist nations which came to the assistance of the Czechoslovak people in defense of socialism in Czechoslovakia. The entire progressive world has branded as disgraceful the criminal acts perpetrated by the Peking leaders, when they instigated armed conflicts on the Sino-Soviet border and attempted to encroach upon the inviolability of Soviet territory.

Anti-Soviet bias and anticommunism on the part of the Mao clique are the major element of the platform on the basis of which Peking and Washington are effecting a rapprochement. It is precisely for this reason that progressive elements throughout the world are concerned by the character of development of Sino-American contacts. They certainly understand and appreciate the establishment of normal relations between nations, but they cannot ignore the fact that Peking is accompanying its political flirtation with Washington with open emphasis of its hostility toward the bulwark of peace and the security of peoples -- the Soviet Union, that the parties are engaged in a search for ways to carry out their selfish aims. It is not surprising that even in the bourgeois press, reports dealing with the stages of establishment of a Peking-Washington axis are accompanied by such terms as "bargain," "deal," "maneuvers," etc.

Commentaries carried in the world press in connection with the invitation issued by the Chinese government for the U.S. President to visit Peking and his acceptance of the invitation have noted the advantages to be

derived by the ruling circles of these nations as a result of the Nixon visit. It was emphasized, for example, that certain influential elements in the United States plan on maneuvering in such a manner that direct contact between President Nixon and Chairman Mao will divert world attention from U.S. aggression against Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, will restrain development of the antiwar movement in the United States, will assist the present administration in the 1972 election campaign, and will make it possible to step up pressure on the USSR. It has been reported that Peking in turn would like, for example, to settle the problem of the war in Vietnam by a deal behind the Vietnamese people's back, thus gaining some political capital in the world of business. Reports in the press have particularly emphasized the Maoist intention to make maximum use of the meeting in the interest of their anti-Soviet militarist course.

In the area of the military (my underline -- V. Z.) "Peking needs a lever to use against Russia." "China is not at all as opposed to the Nixon Administration as one might expect... In the eyes of the Chinese the Republicans are preferable to the Democrats due to their greater distrust of the Russians." Australian Sinologist R. Terril arrived at this conclusion, judging from his article in the newspaper Washington Post, following talks with officials in the PRC, which he visited soon after announcement of the impending Nixon visit.

Edgar Snow, who has become a unique messenger between the State Department and Mao, discussing in Life magazine his impressions of his recent visit with Mao this year and speculating on the motives which impelled Peking to invite Nixon to visit China, stated: "A very prominent place among the reasons for which China is interested in a Sino-American rapprochement is improvement in China's strategic position in relations with Russia."

It is interesting in this connection to compare statements made by Mao himself. "At the present time," he wrote in 1940, "the position is quite clear: if it were not for a policy of alliance with the Soviet Union, alliance with the socialist state, a policy of alliance with imperialism would be inevitable." In his latest interview with Snow, Mao stressed that he prefers "such people as Nixon, Social Democrats and revisionists," and that if Nixon wished to visit China Mao would be willing "to talk with him, and everything would be in order."

One can hardly state more clearly who is given "preference": in the Maoist lexicon "revisionists" are primarily Soviet Communists and Marxist-Leninists of other countries.

Distortion of Leninist ideals and the principles of building and defending the socialist society, anti-Sovietism, and a great-power, hegemonist course are camouflaged by the numerous "theories," "teachings," and "theses" of

Mao Tse-tung. The principal pseudoscientific camouflage device is the "theory of continuation of the revolution under conditions of dictatorship of the proletariat," called the "fundamental guiding idea." Put briefly, its content boils down to a collection of the following sophistic assertions.

The victory of socialism in any country is impossible prior to the victory of the world socialist revolution, since a struggle between antagonistic classes takes place within a country "throughout the entire historical stage" of transition from capitalism to a Communist society, "from beginning to end," while aggression threatens continuously from without, "aggression emanating from imperialism and social imperialism."

But how should one handle the fact that the Soviet Union is living and thriving, a country where socialism has already won complete and final victory, and that a world socialist system has been established and is growing stronger? The obvious discrepancy between this historical fact and the theses advanced is "reconciled" in Peking in a very simple fashion. It has proclaimed that "capitalism has been restored" in the USSR and that the Soviet Union has become transformed into a "social-imperialist superpower" which, having "made a deal" with the other superpower, the United States, is pursuing an aggressive policy with the aim of "division of the world, spheres of influence and plunder" of other countries. And a world socialist system simply does not exist.

After these vagaries it is not difficult to construct a desired strategy and tactics, which the Maoists in fact are doing. On the domestic front, they state, in order to "strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, to prevent the restoration of capitalism and to promote the building of socialism" it is necessary to carry out "great proletarian cultural revolutions -- three, four and more." In the international arena it is necessary to engage in a struggle for the defeat of the "two superpowers." In all cases it is necessary "to hold firmly to a course of armed seizure of power."

The insane "fundamental guiding idea" of achieving the "triumph of the world revolution" by means of an armed overthrow of the people's government in the socialist countries and military defeat of the USSR also permeates Mao's other strategy concept -- the thesis of "two possibilities of world war." It is stated as follows: "As regards a world war, there exist only two possibilities: either war will engender the revolution, or the revolution will prevent war."

This "doctrine," just as the "theory of revolution with a dictatorship of the proletariat," was fabricated with the aid of slanderous concoctions regarding the character of the social and governmental system in the USSR

and the other socialist nations, the peaceful policies of the nations of the socialist community and their interrelations. These invented antagonistic contradictions are mixed with ones which actually exist, resulting in the proclamation of "only two possibilities."

The first possibility: American imperialism and "Soviet revisionism-social imperialism," aspiring to world domination by means of war," "are mobilizing the people and arming them against themselves." They initiate war, and peoples in response join battle with weapon in hand; as a result "war will accelerate the beginning and victory of the proletarian revolution in all countries."

The second possibility: peoples act in anticipation of attack by the "two superpowers." The proletariat and the oppressed, having prepared themselves according to the rules of "people's war"⁵ and "violent revolution," overthrow "reactionary rule in a number of countries or in the main imperialist and social-imperialist countries." The dictatorship of the proletariat is victorious, and the "source of contemporary wars is destroyed." (We shall note in parentheses that statements about the "second possibility" rather clearly reveal the "idea" of a preventive war against the USSR. Mao Tse-tung adds his variant to variants of such a war advanced by American ultrarightists).

In short, it can happen one way or another, but all problems of revolution, war and peace, according to Maoist views, can be resolved today only under the condition of struggle against the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations.

The purpose of such theorizing is obvious. Judging the United States and the Soviet Union by the same measure, holding to views of "two superpowers" as well as "medium and small countries," the strategists in Peking endeavor to gloss over the principal conflict of the modern era -- the conflict between imperialism and socialism. They need to do this in order to justify their anti-Soviet course, to push the USSR into conflict with other countries, particularly the socialist and developing nations, in order to achieve their hegemonistic aims. Advancing the "ideas" of Mao and his practical recommendations as the only reliable compass, allegedly pointing out to peoples, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the way to liberation, Peking is attempting to substantiate its claims to the role of leader of the "third world," spiritual and political mentor of all those struggling for national independence and social reforms, the role of dominant power and controller of the fate of the world proletarian revolution.

In order to give their arguments and conclusions the appearance of objectivity and proof, the Maoists constantly refer to Lenin, his statements, and recall the experience of the October Revolution. But these devices are hypocritical.

In the above-mentioned article on the 50th anniversary of the CPC we find the sentence: "We are grateful to the great Lenin for the fact that the October Socialist Revolution which he led brought Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese people." Elsewhere Mao is quoted: "The Chinese Revolution is a continuation of the Great October Revolution, a part of the world proletarian-socialist revolution." It is not difficult to guess the pragmatic purpose of these insertions. The entire article is permeated with hatred toward the CPSU, the party of Lenin, with lies about the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations. These insertions indicate merely a constant endeavor on the part of the Chinese leaders to instill in whomsoever possible the idea that they, not the CPSU or the Communist parties of the other socialist nations, are the successors of the great ideas and deeds of Lenin and the October Revolution, the genuine champions of socialism and its defense.

The Maoists assure us that the notorious theory of continuation of the revolution under conditions of dictatorship of the proletariat was created on the basis of dialectical and historical materialism. But this is merely verbal camouflage of Maoist opportunism in theory and practice. In actual fact Chairman Mao has armed his followers with leftist-revisionist philosophy, anti-Communist and anti-Soviet ideas.

The Leninist theory of the socialist revolution and its defense, elaborated on the basis of cognition of the objective laws and patterns of societal development and the experience of history, has been replaced by Mao with a voluntarist "theory" of permanent revolution in the form of counterrevolutionary coups. Lenin proceeded from a deep confidence in the victory of socialism, scientifically demonstrated its inevitability, revealed the conditions, ways and means of its attainment in the new historical era, and substantiated the increasing revolutionary-transformation role of the toiler masses, led by the worker class, headed by the Marxist party, in building and defending the new society. The points of departure of Mao's "theories" are disbelief in the victory of the socialist system, forceful removal of the worker class and its party from political leadership, the imposition of a reactionary regime within the country and "cultural revolutions" beyond its borders.

Lenin linked the building of socialism and defense of its conquests with a fundamental and vigorous struggle against the forces and traditions of the old world, against imperialism. In the "theories" of Mao the building and defense of socialism are linked with the struggle against the nation

building communism, against the revolutionary forces and traditions of the present day. The Chinese leaders, while superficially altering their tactics and engaging in maneuver, continue to pursue a strategic great-power-hegemonistic policy -- a policy of split with world socialism, a policy of making deals with imperialism on the basis of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism, a policy of alliance with the most diversified political elements which are hostile to socialism. History contains many examples of political unprincipledness, double-dealing and betrayal of the class interests of the toilers. The theory and practice of Maoism provide new examples of such treachery. Maoism has revealed itself to be a petit-bourgeois ideological-political current which is fundamentally alien to Marxism-Leninism, leeching parasitically on the principles of scientific socialism and Leninist ideas of building and defense of a new, Communist society.

Practical activity and experience is the criterion of the truth of views, theories, and political line. The "ideas" and course followed by Mao Tse-tung do not correspond to the objective demands of the building and defense of socialism; they are without promise -- this is the judgment handed down by life itself. World revolutionary experience rejects Maoist great-power-chauvinist ideology and policies. The Chinese leaders have not succeeded in achieving the desired results in implementing the "line of the 9th Congress," a policy of putting together an anti-Soviet, anticommunist bloc under China's sponsorship.

At the same time the Maoists are doing enormous damage to the cause of socialism and its defense. Their incessant attempts to carry out a program which has no positive content and which fundamentally contradicts the logical course of societal development and their adventuristic aspirations to dominate the world Communist movement and to assume leadership of the "third world" represent a definite danger. Marxist-Leninist parties are offering resolute resistance to the hegemonistic pretensions of the Peking leaders. Consistently carrying out an ideological-political struggle against the great-power-chauvinist attitude of Peking in its foreign policy, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is doing everything possible to defend against all encroachments the interests of our people, which is building communism, and the interests of our friends and allies.

* * *

Lenin stated that no revolution is worth anything unless it is able to defend itself, but a revolution does not immediately learn to defend itself. Great difficulties connected with defense of that which has been achieved have faced every socialist revolution of the modern era. History demonstrates that these difficulties have been successfully overcome thanks to the revolutionary enthusiasm of the builders and defenders of socialism

and thanks to the dedication of the ruling party to Leninism, its ideals and principles. The world-historic victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War constituted a vivid confirmation of the invincible strength of Leninist ideals and principles of the defense of socialism and its conquests. This invincible force is manifested in the steady growth in the economic and defense might of the USSR and the entire socialist community, firm and effective support of the people of Vietnam and other peoples struggling against the imperialist aggressors, and frustration of the military-strategy schemes of world imperialism and reaction.

Our Communist Party and the entire Soviet people are firmly convinced that healthy elements within the CPC and the Chinese people will overcome this serious crisis by means of alliance and fraternal cooperation with the USSR and the other socialist nations as well as the entire Communist movement, will achieve a genuine national rebirth of China and will secure its socialist development and reliable defense.

FOOTNOTES

1. Recent studies on this subject include, for example, G. N. Kireyev: "Revolutionary Violence and Peaceful Transition to Socialism," Filosofskiye Nauki, No 4, 1970.
2. See, for example, V. F. Fedorov: "Feudal Ideology and the 'Ideas of Mao Tse-tung'," Filosofskiye Nauki, No 4, 1971.
3. American writer and journalist Edgar Snow reported this fact in an article published in 1965 following an interview with Mao Tse-tung -- Ed. note.
4. Recently-published materials on this subject include: L. Vladimirov and V. Ryazanov: "The 50th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party," Kommunist, No 10, 1971; I. Aleksandrov: "50th Anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party," Pravda, 1 July 1971; I. Aleksandrov: "Slogans and Deeds of the Chinese Leaders," Pravda, 4 September 1971; O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov: Sovetsko-Kitayskiye otnosheniya. Kratkiy ocherk (Sino-Soviet Relations. Brief Essay), Izd-vo Mysl', 1971.
5. See Voyennaya Mysl', No 5, 1969, pp 63-76.

AMERICA UNDER ARMS

As was emphasized at the 24th CPSU Congress, although the forces of aggression and militarism have been pressed hard, they have not been disarmed. Today they have become considerably more aggressive. Since World War II they have initiated more than 30 wars and armed conflicts of various scale. Nor can one consider totally eliminated the threat of a new world war. It is the vital business of all antiimperialist forces, peace-loving nations and all peoples to prevent this threat from becoming reality.

Consistently implementing a Leninist foreign policy, aimed at holding the aggressors in check, at strengthening the cause of peace and security of peoples as well as the positions of world socialism, the Soviet Union vigorously opposes U.S. aggressive actions, politics of force, and is a vigorous supporter of the effort to curb the warmongers.

The role of the most reactionary and aggressive force of American imperialism and of the capitalist system as a whole is played by the U.S. military-industrial complex -- a vivid embodiment of all-encompassing militarization of the principal imperialist power and a burgeoning of the expansionist aspirations of the U.S. monopolies.

The military-industrial complex, which has taken root in the soil of coalescence of militarist, industrial-banking and political circles, does everything it can to promote a policy of aggression and military adventures. The Pentagon -- a focal point of warmongers and their champions--- is the direct executor of its sinister plans.

The Pentagon is the main instrument of the powerful military-industrial monopolies, the country's leading economic and political force, which guides the actions of the edifice of government. With giant military contracts it promotes the fantastic enrichment of the omnipotent oligarchies, whose henchmen occupy key posts in the Department of Defense.

A vivid picture of the increasing power of this citadel of American aggression and the enormous influence exerted by the military on all aspects of American life is offered by French journalist Claude Moisy in his book America under Arms,* which came out in Paris in 1971. The following is a brief discussion of some of the chapters in this book.

* Claude Moisy: L'Amérique sous les armes, éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1971.

The book begins with an examination of the sources of development of the U.S. military-industrial complex following World War II. "The building of a new empire by the United States and its emergence following World War II as a superpower, which the Soviet Union alone can rival, are of course due first and foremost to its extraordinary range of economic capability," the author writes. "American capitalism succeeded, however, in its worldwide imperialist expansion because it employs a missionary ideology, and this ideology has unwaveringly fashioned for itself a supporting force in the form of a rapidly-growing army which is ready and willing to engage in interventionist activities."

Entering its "golden age" due to the war in Vietnam, the Pentagon has assumed a truly vast scale: it maintains more than 3,500,000 men in uniform and employs 1,250,000 civilians; it administers a budget in the order of 80 billion dollars, which exceeds all the expenditures of great Britain, France and the FRG combined. It is important to note that more than 40 billion dollars return to the civilian sector in the form of contracts to the arms industry and organizations engaged in research activities.

The United States stations more than 1 million men at thousands of bases and installations in 30 foreign countries (not including Vietnam). This vast edifice involves a huge arsenal of all types of weapons and combat equipment. The United States, the author writes, is now buckling under the burden of its own arms.

A general description of the Pentagon and the all-powerful military-industrial complex is presented in the first part of the book. The Pentagon, the author states, is not only the biggest employer but also the biggest landowner: 13 million hectares in bases, installations, and training areas in the United States and abroad. It is also the wealthiest enterprise: 200 billion dollars assets in plant and equipment -- more than the 65 largest U.S. industrial firms. It is also the biggest purchaser: 200,000 purchase contracts for a total sum of 40 billion dollars. The Pentagon operates the world's biggest radio and television network: 350 stations, including 35 TV stations, in 30 foreign countries.

The President of the United States, as commander in chief of the armed forces, is technically the head of the U.S. war machine. In actuality, however, he hands over management and control of the military to the Secretary of Defense. In the final analysis, although the spotlight is on the Secretary of Defense, under all administrations the joint chiefs of staff play a much greater role than that which is ascribed to them.

The structure of the Pentagon is so designed as to ensure domination of business over the military. According to the present rule, the Secretary of Defense, his deputy and assistants must be civilians, political friends

of the President, big financiers and influential businessmen. That which originally was conceived as a measure preventing the chiefs of staff from exerting excessive influence soon was transformed into a factor promoting the emergence of the military-industrial complex. The first secretary of defense under Eisenhower was Charles Wilson, president of General Motors, which is one of the 10 biggest suppliers to the Pentagon. His deputy was Roger Kyes, a vice-president of General Motors. Robert Stevens, president of the textile concern G. P. Stevens and Company, one of the biggest military uniform manufacturers, served as secretary of the army. The secretary of the air force was Harold Talbot, a board member of three companies working for the Department of Defense. The secretary of the navy was oil industry financier Robert Anderson. The Pentagon under President Kennedy was formed on the same principle.

Under President Nixon initially the Pentagon was headed by professional politician Melvin Laird. The defense industry, however, was very heavily represented as well, in particular by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, a multimillionaire, founder and president of Hewlett-Packard, an electronics company, one third of whose business is with DOD or NASA. It is most interesting that in order to accept a government post paying a salary of 42,500 dollars per year Packard gave up an annual income of 1 million dollars.

These are only a few examples in regard to the Pentagon leaders. At the lower echelons close links with the defense industry are practically a rule, particularly in the area of research and procurement.

The author discusses the ruses to which U.S. officials resort in order to conceal the true dimensions of the resources which fall into the hands of the military-industrial complex. Take 1969, for example. The Bureau of the Budget estimated military expenditures at 81.2 billion dollars of a total budget of 184.6 billion dollars, or 44 percent. The Department of Defense stated the share of military expenditures in the budget at 42.3 percent. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency gave a figure of 46 percent. Everything depends on what is included in the military budget. These figures are substantially below that fateful 50 percent, beyond which one could say that more than half the state's resources were being consumed by the military-industrial complex. And yet this is in fact the case. The U.S. budget mixes government revenues and expenditures with the revenues and expenditures of such agencies as the Social Security Administration, which it merely administers. This confusion was deliberately introduced by Lyndon Johnson in 1967 in order to conceal the growing expenditures for the war in Vietnam in a larger mass of expenditures. In actual fact the U.S. federal budget in 1969 totaled only 147 billion dollars, of which the Department of Defense consumed at least 55 percent.

According to the calculations of Richard Barnett, director of the Institute for the Study of Policy, the Department of Defense (if one includes veterans' benefits, interest and redemption expenditures for government bonds issued during war years) accounts for 70 percent of the federal budget. This is what can be called the cost of "past, present and future wars." Using the same manner of calculation, Senator McGovern claims that in 1969 military expenditures comprised 72 percent of the budget: 56 percent for the Pentagon and the remaining 16 percent for veterans and interest payments on war loans. This means that out of every dollar paid by the American citizen in 1969 as taxes, only 28 cents went for nonmilitary expenditures.

It is interesting to compare the enormous and still growing military appropriations with the modest expenditures of a social nature. In 1969, for example, the Department of Defense spent 81 billion dollars, with only 4 billion dollars being spent on all "social assistance" programs combined; and yet the last three presidents all promised to eliminate the poverty in which 20 million Americans live.

The growing power of the Pentagon is also indicated by the following facts cited by the author. The Department of Defense and its numerous entities (official or secret) are becoming increasingly engaged in foreign policy affairs. Both Democratic administrations under presidents Kennedy and Johnson officially confirmed the primacy of the Pentagon over the State Department in international relations by instructing the Secretary of Defense to present an annual report to congress on the world military situation. In 1970 Secretary of State William Rogers was planning to reassert the prerogatives of the State Department and to present the report himself, but Richard Nixon put an end to the debate by delivering the foreign policy message himself.

When 1,500,000 U.S. soldiers are scattered throughout the world, the armed forces inevitably exert just as much influence on foreign policy as the diplomats. While the State Department maintains 103 embassies and 130 consulates, the Department of Defense maintains 3400 facilities abroad, including 430 major bases. Of course the influence of the military on a "friendly" country depends on the size of the military contingent stationed in that country, a size which ranges from 6 technical advisers in Tunisia to 500,000 men in South Vietnam (figures as of 1 January 1970).

American ambassadors have long ceased to be masters in their embassies. Idar Rimestad, Deputy Undersecretary for Administration, acknowledged to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that less than 20 percent of the personnel stationed at American embassies abroad are State Department personnel. The rest are military or "equivalent," CIA agents, AID officials, USIA personnel, etc, with the bulk coming from the Pentagon. They

pursue the objective of influencing U.S. foreign policy to coincide with the wishes of the military-industrial complex.

The Pentagon, this government within a government, has its own "little State Department" for influencing foreign policy; it is sometimes more effective than the diplomats' State Department. Among the dozen or so assistant secretaries of defense is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; he is called the "secretary of state." He in turn has 8 assistants who "divide" up the world among themselves into large geographic zones, plus an entire army of directors. It is their job to inform and consult with the head of the Pentagon on all matters pertaining to U.S. external security and to prepare reports on defense capability for the National Security Council, which is a top-echelon decision-making body.

The Pentagon is interfering to an increasing degree in the police functions of the Department of Justice and the FBI. Since 1964-1965, in connection with an increase in demonstration activities by the Negroes and the first mass peace demonstrations directed against the war in Vietnam, it has become common practice in the United States to turn to the army to put down mass demonstrations.

Soon after the April 1968 riots in Washington, ignited by the murder of Martin Luther King, a planning and operations entity was set up in the Pentagon for handling "civil disturbances." The following year a civilian operations center was established in the secret subterranean depths of the Pentagon, which maintains constant observation of 150 U.S. cities. The center's computers are hooked up to the entire national radio communications system in order to sound the alarm at the slightest incident.

Two operational brigades, totaling 3000 men each, are in a state of continuous combat readiness at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Hood, Texas; these units can be airlifted to any part of the country. Other predetermined subunits can swing into action on short notice. The army figures that it can handle 25 mass demonstrations simultaneously, occurring any place in the United States. Army intelligence has gathered files on 7 million citizens, whose actions or statements pertaining to politics, trade unions, religion or even professional actions or statements are recorded by electronic computer. This is the largest data bank in the United States. It is called an "information file." This system is much more extensive than that maintained by the FBI.

The Pentagon is not satisfied with information about civilians furnished by the press or police. Approximately 1000 "soldier-detectives" in civilian clothes operate out of 300 investigation units scattered throughout the United States. Their reports supplement the flow of information from all sources which is accumulated in the data file at Fort Holabird.

The masters of the military-industrial monopoly have every reason to be satisfied with Pentagon contracts. In 1969, for example, out of 81.2 billion dollars appropriated for the Department of Defense, more than half (41,986,000,000) returned to the private sector in the form of supply contracts. Of this total, 8.3 billion was for aircraft, 5.2 billion for missiles, 4.9 billion for ammunition, 3.8 billion for electronic equipment and radio communications, etc. The Pentagon is a sole client, which purchases items produced specially for it in small quantities by giant enterprises located in half a dozen states. This combination of sole client and a concentration of suppliers forms the military-industrial complex. This explains the complicity among military leaders, high civilian officials of the Department of Defense, heads of defense industry enterprises and the legislators of the states in which they are concentrated. This forms a compact, tight complicity which under any administration, Democratic or Republican, controls one half of government expenditures.

The directors of big defense enterprises and firms willingly leave their directorships or chairmanships to accept a Pentagon post. One also observes a mass migration of retired military officers to defense industry enterprises. This situation finally became disturbing even to Congress. In 1959 the House Armed Services Committee instructed Congressman Edward Hebert, a friend of the Pentagon, to conduct an investigation of that which at the time was not yet called the military-industrial complex but bore the more modest name of "munitions lobby." He stated in his report that the hundred largest suppliers of the Pentagon employed 726 retired military men of the rank of colonel, or equivalent, or above, including 261 generals and admirals. General Dynamics, which at the time was the second biggest Pentagon supplier, employed 27 generals and admirals and 159 colonels or equivalent in rank.

Ten years later a similar investigation was conducted by Senator William Proxmire; the number had tripled. As of the beginning of 1969 2072 retired military officers with the rank of colonel or above were on the payroll of major military contractors. Lockheed had broken the General Dynamics record: it was employing 210 generals and colonels.

The list of members of the "100 Club" -- major Pentagon contractors -- is headed up by the big aerospace companies: Lockheed, General Dynamics, United Aircraft, McDonnell Douglas, North American-Rockwell, Grumman Aircraft... Due to the nature of their products (primarily aircraft and missiles) they are highly dependent on government contracts. It has been computed that between 1960 and 1970 the Pentagon accounted for 88 percent of Lockheed's business, 75 percent of McDonnell Douglas's business (F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers), 67 percent of General Dynamics business (F-111 fighter-bombers), but only 54 percent of Boeing's business (B-52 bombers),

for the simple reason that this company also produces civilian transport aircraft.

In 1969 the Comptroller General of the United States analyzed 22 contracts for the supply of aircraft spare parts, between the Defense Materials Procurement Agency and the Lionel-Pacific Company, a small California firm. The firm received revenues of 88,547 dollars on the basis of these contracts. The actual cost of the items, including overhead expenses, was determined at only 25,612 dollars, with 62,935 dollars profit. Profit, depending on the contract, ranged from 12.9 to 14.03 percent.

* * *

In the second part of the book, entitled "The Complex under Fire of Criticism," the author relates how certain spokesmen for political and business circles, recognizing the danger of the increasing influence of the military-industrial complex, are criticizing the nation's growing militarization. Although this criticism is leveled from a bourgeois position, without revealing or even touching upon the social roots of militarism, and is frequently impelled by business considerations, it nevertheless does cast some light on the mechanism of operation of this complex and the tactics of its representatives, and demonstrates the profound crisis of the so-called "great and prosperous society."

Following are some excerpts from this section. The author writes that the article on the new American militarism published in the April issue (1969) of the Atlantic magazine and entitled "America Has Become a Militaristic and Aggressive Nation," would not have caused a sensation if the author were not General David Shoup, former commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.

This article, which demonstrates the pernicious influence of the Pentagon on American society, is very well documented. This was the first time the complex had been condemned from within.

As early as January, before Nixon and his group of conservatives took over in Washington, 1969 promised to be a year of stormy protest. George McGovern, Edmond Muskie, and Edward Kennedy, these three natural Democratic candidates for president, were the first to announce their dissatisfaction. Fourteen senators and 39 members of the House (all Democrats) took part in an antimilitarist conference on the military budget and national priorities, which was held in Washington in March of that year.

Many liberals, who had been calmly observing the birth of the military-industrial complex during the 8 years of Democratic administrations, now began declaring that "something is rotten in Denmark." Stewart Udall, who

had served as Secretary of the Interior under both John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, stated before Congress that neither president had ever possessed a freedom of choice between military and civilian expenditures. The rejoinder could have been made that Johnson had given assurances that he would provide butter and guns simultaneously, conducting a war in Vietnam and at the same time building his "Great Society." Udall, who had never publicly complained of anything during his 8 years as a cabinet member, now considered it intolerable for the administration and Congress to be more generous to the Pentagon than to domestic programs in working out the budget. Opposition to the war in Vietnam quickly spread throughout the country. Approximately 2500 businessmen, bankers and insurance company executives formed a movement called "Businessmen for Peace in Vietnam," the stated aim of which was to speed up an end to the war and a reduction in military spending. This was not for ideological reasons but simply because an expansion of the seminationalized defense industry sector threatened the free enterprise system.

The average American, whom Richard Nixon had not yet mobilized in his "silent majority," had also long been displaying signs of fatigue. This war, which succeeding administrations had been unable to predict, win or end, was presented as the cause of all evils -- inflation, unrest among youth, increased drug abuse and neglect of the most acute domestic problems. Gallup polls indicated that between August 1965 and August 1969 the percentage of Americans who felt that U.S. intervention in Vietnam was a mistake rose from 24 to 58 percent. Other public opinion soundings indicated a growth in isolationist moods. The percentage of Americans who felt that the United States should retract from all involvement in the affairs of other countries rose from 10 to 22 percent between 1963 and 1969.

In the "golden age" of the military-industrial complex approval of the military budget had been a mere formality. The first danger signal occurred in 1968, with the beginning of deep disenchantment with the war in Vietnam. At first the Senate required 3 days of lively debate to ratify the defense budget. The following year both houses took 4 months to reach agreement on a 20.7 billion dollar program for the development of new weapons, whereby the amount requested by the Pentagon was cut by 1,200,000,000 dollars. When the overall military budget left Congress in December, it had been stripped of 5,300,000,000 dollars. Such a thing had not happened since the end of the war in Korea.

While some members of Congress engaged in a campaign to limit Pentagon waste spending, Senators Fulbright and Mansfield, the two leaders of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, worked on another task. They wanted to return to Congress the prerogative of control over U.S. obligations abroad, a prerogative which was being slowly but surely usurped by the

President, who frequently passed it on to the military. Major international crises, which in the forties had plunged Washington into the role of world policeman, did not give the presidents time to observe form and to consult with Congress in advance whenever it was necessary to make an immediate decision. Kennedy and Johnson had followed the practice of merely informing congressional leaders on decisions they were making together with military leaders.

This led to a growing Senate distrust of "diplomats in uniform." Sensing future growing discontent with the war, Fulbright and Mansfield reintroduced an old Senate draft resolution which they had intended to use in 1967 against Lyndon Johnson. This resolution prohibited the sending of U.S. troops abroad without the explicit approval of Congress. On 25 June the resolution was passed with a vote of 70 to 16.

At the beginning of 1970 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously to rescind the "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution." "This began the gradual rescinding of all obsolete agreements and resolutions," declared Fulbright. "I hope that this will be followed by a reexamination of all our foreign obligations." But the Washington Post soberly noted that the Senate had come to this realization only after Vietnam had cost 108 billion dollars and 41,000 American lives.

The revolt at the universities, which had been gathering momentum for a number of years, erupted at the beginning of 1969 at MIT. On 4 March some of the scientists on the MIT staff stopped work to take part in a meeting at which the role of science in the development of military technology and Pentagon enslavement of university research were discussed. Many other major universities joined this movement, such as Stanford, Yale, Cornell, the University of California at Berkeley, and Johns Hopkins University. In April a student strike paralyzed activities at the Stanford University electronics laboratory, which was receiving 2 million dollars a year from the Pentagon for secret projects.

* * *

As a result of the moral crisis generated by the Vietnam misadventures, a segment of youth began to take more active part in the antiwar movement. The escalation of a war which the military leaders were unable to bring to a victorious conclusion undermined faith in their infallibility. Increasingly carping criticism of the Pentagon by members of Congress brought to light monstrous inefficiency and waste. Under the circumstances it was inevitable that the comic incidents and tragic scandals which had followed one another in recent years in the world of the American military, received increasing publicity. The My Lai massacre continues to influence the attitude Americans are forming about their army.

The Senate's permanent committee to investigate the activities of government agencies, chaired by Senator Abraham Ribicoff, discovered two types of criminal activities. First of all it established that within the army there existed a gang of senior NCOs who were becoming rich on theft, the forging of signatures, machinations with warehoused supplies, protection, corruption and intimidation in running clubs and mess halls in the United States, Germany, Korea, and particularly in Vietnam. Digging into the affairs of this "NCO mafia," the Senate committee established that Maj Gen Carl Turner, former head of the Military Police, was not only covering up the affair of the NCO gangsters in order not to injure the army's reputation but was himself involved in shady dealings. Secondly, currency manipulations with piasters were discovered. According to the official exchange rate 1 dollar is equivalent to 118 piasters, while on the black market a dollar brings 240 piasters. U.S. military and civilian personnel "were earning" 122 piasters on the dollar with the assistance of South Vietnamese, Korean and Chinese currency manipulators.

In connection with America's embarrassment pertaining to disclosure of the events at My Lai, journalist Mike Wallace stated in a television interview: "We condemned everything the Nazis did. We condemned their brutality... I imagine that it is very difficult for many Americans to believe that our own soldiers are capable of murdering old men, women, children and infants in cold blood... How can one explain this?"

The author also links with the war in Vietnam the racial disturbances which began to flare up in the U.S. armed forces in the summer of 1969.

On 20 July a full-scale battle broke out between black and white Marines at the Camp Lejeune naval base in North Carolina; a white corporal was killed in this fighting. In connection with this incident it was determined that racial incidents occurred almost daily at this base. A month later at Fort Bragg, also located in North Carolina, 25 soldiers were hospitalized as a result of a fight which broke out at the entrance to a mess hall between 200 black and white soldiers. Soon violent racial confrontation had spread to dozens of camps and bases throughout the country, as well as in Vietnam, where brawling occurred at bases in Danang, Camranh Bay, and even in Saigon.

The fact is that the external calm which had been observed previously was due primarily to the fact that, because of military discipline, Negroes "knew their place" in the army somewhat longer than was the case in civilian life. Of course the units are integrated. Soldiers train, march, eat, drink, and sleep together, and also die together in Vietnam. But just as the Roman Catholic Church, the U.S. Army is still a white man's organization. Negroes comprise approximately 13 percent of enlisted personnel in the army but only 3.3 percent of officers; the figures are 10.4 and 1.8 percent in the air force and only 5 percent and 0.4 percent in the navy, the most conservative branch of the armed forces.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Rights Howard Bennett, who visited Camp Lejeune following the events of 20 July, stated that one black Marine related his bitterness as follows: "I served in Vietnam. Many of my brothers (by skin) died there. I put my own life on the line. Now I return home to the U.S. and see that little has changed for my brothers and sisters in New York, Chicago, and Cincinnati. Things are just as bad as ever." Young Negroes who felt equal in the face of suffering and death in Vietnam had difficulty accepting the fact that they were not equals back home in the United States. Discrimination, which had seemed normal to their elders, had become intolerable to them. Black Panther slogans did the rest, and the myth of racial equality in the armed forces collapsed.

* * *

Ever since the beginning of his political career, Nixon has conducted all his election campaigns under the banner of anti-Communism. He summarized as follows the plan of action he proposed to the Republican Party to capture the White House in November 1952: "This is a program designed to meet fully prepared the threat to our security presented by the international Communist conspiracy. We must keep the United States militarily strong, and we must maintain a strong, healthy, productive and free economy."

This Nixon political credo was an ideal program for development of the military-industrial complex.

Richard Nixon's entire political past and his position during the 8 years of Democratic administrations transformed him into a presidential candidate who enjoyed the confidence of military leaders and their friends in industry. Most of the heads of major companies engaged in the manufacture of arms, even those who were deriving the greatest benefits from the Democratic administration, made financial contributions to Nixon's last presidential campaign and were fully confident of receiving dividends after he was sworn into office.

President Nixon and Defense Secretary Laird do not deny the problem of the military-industrial complex as a power entity. But they are playing a double game. From time to time they cast angry glances at it, promising to force it to abandon its bad habits, to correct abuses when they are condemned in Congress and in the press. On the other hand, they just as frequently praise it to the skies and extol its good deeds in defense of the nation. One step forward, one step backward. But Nixon prefers in particular to march in place, motionless movement which is possible thanks to government by committee. Within a year he had personally set up 34 committees, not including those which were proliferating in the various agencies. This is an age-old system which makes it possible to create the

illusion of action without the risk of decision-making. He has developed it to a fine art, creating committees whose task consists solely in studying recommendations submitted by other committees.

In view of growing congressional and public dissatisfaction with the squandering of military appropriations, Nixon set up a committee which was instructed to study military contracts and procurement. It was difficult to believe, however, that the committee would come to excessively harsh decisions in regard to the military and its suppliers. Eight out of 14 members were officers of industrial or financial concerns whose participation in arms deliveries exceeded the sum of 1 billion dollars. The committee chairman, Fred Bashardt, was on the staff of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. "It is quite obvious that this group is closely linked with the bureaucracy which it is supposed to criticize," stated Senator Proxmire. "Can we expect it to arrive at objective conclusions?"

* * *

Realizing that the foundations of American democracy are dangerously unstable and that the power in the hands of the military-industrial complex is enormous, the author issues an appeal to the citizens of the United States to show greater vigilance in regard to the growing influence of the Pentagon on all aspects of American life. This is definitely to the author's credit. We must note, however, that the author fails to make necessary class appraisals in presenting a good deal of concrete data. This applies to those places in the book where the military-industrial complex is criticized by various segments of the American public, as well as the military policy of U.S. leaders and Pentagon activities in various parts of the world. The author also preferred to say nothing about new aggressive plans being hatched in the U.S. Department of Defense.

Therefore when reading this book our readers should critically approach certain facts and particularly evaluations by the author, bearing in mind that the book was written by a bourgeois journalist. At the same time one must acknowledge that the author demonstrated in a fair amount of detail certain aspects of Pentagon activities, the interlinking of the interests of the military establishments, big business and the politicians. From this standpoint the book is of definite interest to the military reader.

MEETINGS WITH READERS AND AUTHORS

Conferences of readers of this journal were held in the Red-Banner Kiev and Belorussian military districts. Journal representatives met with Col Gen I. M. Tret'yak, commander of the Red-Banner Belorussian Military District, with officers and general officers from the district headquarters, and with readers from various establishments of the Kiev, Minsk and other garrisons and the Minsk Higher Engineer Radio-Technical School.

The meetings with readers and contributors involved a lively discussion of vital problems pertaining to the further development of contemporary theory and practice of military affairs in light of the historic decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress. Commanders, engineers, political workers -- all who took part in the meetings -- discussed with great interest the philosophical and methodological foundations of Soviet military science, its content and tasks, advanced know-how in troop training and indoctrination under conditions of the military technological revolution, and the increased demands made on the military theory journal.

Lt Gen N. A. Soloveykin and Maj Gen A. G. Ovchinnikov, who acted as chairmen at the conferences, as well as other comrades stressed that the journal Voyennaya Mysl' gives assistance to military cadres in thoroughly studying Marxist-Leninist theory, CPSU policy, in exposing bourgeois falsifiers of military history, the militarist ideology and policies of imperialism. They noted articles dedicated to the 24th CPSU Congress, military aspects of the theory of scientific communism, general and particular problems of military science and history, military educational science and psychology, as well as improvement in army and navy combat readiness.

At the same time the readers expressed a number of critical comments and suggestions.

Col G. I. Degtyarev and Lt Col I. A. Kilin recommended that more attention be devoted to problems of management science, with the more active involvement of prominent military scientists, staff and troop representatives; they recommended that scientific organization of labor be elaborated more purposefully for military labor, particularly as regards specific items of operational training. It is desirable to continue presenting methodological problems of operational art and tactics of higher units in contemporary warfare, as well as such fundamental problems of theory of military science as the system of its laws and categories, classification of military knowledge, and various terms and concepts arising in the course of the military technological revolution. Theoretical aspects of evolution of the art of warfare should be resolved in like manner -- strategy, operational art, tactics, particularly dealing with development of methods and forms of various-scale conduct of combat operations.

Col L. D. Alavuk, discussing problems of control throughout the entire range from tactical to strategic echelons, stressed that in this area it is important to utilize not only Soviet but foreign experience as well, with bolder exchange of ideas. The course of discussions should be summarized more frequently, without waiting for exhaustive conclusions on the debate. This is essential for practical efforts, securement of unity in practical activities and further productive search.

Col I. A. Sorokopud devoted his statements to Marxist-Leninist and professional training of young officers. He is of the opinion that the editors are performing this task in a consistent manner. But it can be improved if commandants of military higher educational institutions act more frequently as article contributors. This will make it possible more effectively to train officer cadres and to overcome deficiencies more rapidly. The journal should more concretely assist military science departments of civilian educational institutions, which perform an extremely important function. He believes that the heroism of the Great Patriotic War and present-day examples of labor and military deeds of Soviet citizens should be utilized in the process of training and indoctrination of young officers to a greater extent than has been the case up to the present time.

Col B. I. Svyatishenko feels that the journal could more frequently present material in conformity with the topic schedules of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. These articles are of great assistance to officers and general officers in their independent study and help improve the quality of classes in the Marxist-Leninist training system. Study of and publicity on the Leninist ideological-theoretical heritage and the proceedings of the 24th CPSU Congress constitute one of the most important conditions for accomplishing the tasks facing us in the area of personnel combat and political training. Comrade Svyatishenko further stated the necessity of elaborating problems of troop moral-political and psychological training as well as matters pertaining to the military collaboration of the Warsaw Pact nation armies in a more efficient and businesslike manner, on the basis of Leninist methodology.

Cols V. P. Kovyazin, L. F. Tonevitskiy, V. Ya. Chumara and M. A. Yurchenko as well as Lt Col G. M. Maksimov also spoke on the importance of closer coordination of theoretical problems raised by the journal with practical tasks handled in the line units.

Lt Col N. F. Ivanov emphasized the importance of further elaboration of problems pertaining to the conduct of combat operations with conventional weapons, and particularly the employment of artillery in such operations

In the opinion of Maj Gen Avn A. D. Antipov, the journal should devote more space to a discussion of problems dealing with military aviation. Modern

aviation can serve as an example of unique embodiment of technological progress. Its comprehensive development led to a consolidation of its position not only as an independent service but also as a component part of the navy, air defense troops and ground forces. What is needed is further study of the organization of aviation coordination with ground troops, taking into maximum consideration the experience of the Great Patriotic War. Lt Col A. A. Andreyev and Col A. Ye. Charukhin presented a number of recommendations pertaining to discussion of basic aspects of electronic countermeasures and protection of friendly facilities under combat situation conditions.

Lt Gen M. F. Ryb'yakov commented that qualitative changes in the technical equipping of the army and navy leave an imprint not only on the forms of conduct of warfare but also on the method of troop training. The methodological aspect to a certain extent is of decisive importance at the present time, particularly at the company, battalion, and regiment level, where combat and political training is specifically planned and executed. Stressing the exceptional importance of ensuring succession in the mastery of methodological skills at all levels, Ryb'yakov spoke of the role of senior officers in transmitting to young cadres diversified training and indoctrination techniques. In this connection the general shared his personal impressions from a most instructive platoon exercise once conducted by Mar SU G. K. Zhukov, as well as organization of training for enlisted personnel, NCOs and officers at an exercise conducted under the supervision of Mar SU P. K. Koshevoy. Comrade Ryb'yakov noted that publication of materials on root items pertaining to a scientific approach to training and indoctrination methods promotes growth in officer methods skills.

Col P. K. Koloyarov discussed the necessity of a comprehensive boost in work with military cadres in light of the resolutions of the 24th CPSU Congress. He suggested that the serious discussion on these matters initiated by Col Gen A. T. Altunin in an article published in this year's July issue be continued. It is particularly important to solve problems in a comprehensive manner, looking ahead to the prospects for development of the theory and practice of military affairs and improvement of the "human material" proper. Comrade Koloyarov advised contributors discussing the initial phase of the Great Patriotic War to analyze more thoroughly the experience gained during this period in the area of work with army and navy command and political cadres and to present scientifically substantiated recommendations which cadre entities today could utilize in their practical activities.

Col B. M. Ivanov also discussed the great importance of utilizing the wealth of experience gained from the Great Patriotic War. A common definition of various military terms is important for its creative application and the development of military theory, for "to understand correctly means to interpret and act correctly." The journal must more vigorously assist in this effort.

Maj Gen A. L. Kronik told of work being done by the military scientific society under the auspices of the district Officers' Club. The military scientific society disseminates materials on the Lenin Birth Centennial and the 24th CPSU Congress, constantly utilizing them in activist daily activities. In order to increase the effectiveness of the journal it is desirable more frequently to publish editorials on the development of Soviet military theory, Marxist-Leninist education of military cadres, methodology of military scientific efforts, and other scientific problems. In the opinion of Comrade Kronik it is advisable to follow the practice of publishing special-subject issues dedicated to the elaboration of various problems of military art, problems of troop training and indoctrination, moral-political and psychological training. He spoke of the benefit of articles directed toward the struggle against bourgeois and revisionist ideology. He spoke out in favor of increased subscription circulation of this journal.

Col A. M. Fomin noted that Voyennaya Mysl' constantly assists us in studying military theory and practice of the potential adversary. But there is a shortcoming here as well -- at times there is a lack of thorough analysis and synthesis of facts, phenomena and processes characteristic of imperialist armies. We should like to receive more extensive information on army and navy combat operations in local wars, and on measures taken by NATO and other imperialist military blocs pertaining to organizing and equipping specific theaters of military operations. Col V. B. Prokopov directed attention to the importance of synthesizing materials on problems of airmobile operations.

Problems of organizing scientific research effort at headquarters, training establishments and in line units were discussed during the get-togethers and talks with readers and contributors. Col V. D. Aleksenko, for example, shared his views on activation of specific military sociological studies and greater assistance in this area by the journal to those who are conducting such studies locally.

Meeting reader requests stated at the conferences (see also Issue No 7 of this journal), the editors introduced appropriate modifications in the content subject plan for the final issues of this year and for next year.

For example, plans call for preparing materials on officer Marxist-Leninist training programs. They include: "The 24th CPSU Congress and Current Problems of Soviet Military Organizational Development, Troop Training and Indoctrination"; "The Increased Role of Scientific Troop Control in Achieving Victory in the War of Today"; "Party Political Effort to Strengthen Military Discipline and Increase the Vigilance and Combat Readiness of the Subunit, Unit, and Naval Ship."

Articles from a series devoted to methodological problems of military theory and practice are being readied for publication. The journal will publish materials discussing the most important aspects of specific military sociological studies.

The reader will be offered new articles exposing the theory and practice of imperialist materialism as well as Macist ideology and policy.

Other materials will also be published, taking into account reader and contributor suggestions. The editors are hoping that the participants in these conferences and other get-togethers will in the very near future send in promised articles to the journal.

The get-togethers on which we are reporting in this issue took place just prior to the submission of subscription orders for 1972. Naturally circulation of Voyennaya Mysl' among broad segments of the officer corps and more effective utilization of the materials published in this journal on the theoretical and practical activities of commanders, engineers and political workers are matters of interest to the conference participants. Joint scientific and organizational effort will definitely enable us to resolve these problems just as successfully as all others.